(p. 1138) . . . , in many areas, the existing organization of research is characterized by large research institutions staffed with hundreds of
researchers and national funding agencies who set the research agenda for the field. Given the size of such institutions, if they decide to launch a new research program, then the critical mass of scholars can be reached with certainty, and individual researchers need not fear the coordination risk. Researchers should thus choose to work on that research topic, provided that they perceive an expected reward that is larger than s. (p. 1139) Unfortunately, if the large institution selects a poor idea (with a small or even negative θ), it would then be responsible for the emergence of a strand of research with modest scientific value. As an example, Diamond (1996) recalls Milton Friedman’s criticism of the U.S. National Science Foundation, which, in his opinion, has directed the economics profession toward a highly mathematical model.12
. . .
12. Ironically, his opinion is endorsed in this paper by a “highly mathematical model.”
Besancenot, Damien, and Radu Vranceanu. “Fear of Novelty: A Model of Scientific Discovery with Strategic Uncertainty.” Economic Inquiry 53, no. 2 (April 2015): 1132-39.
(Note: ellipses added; italics in original.)
The 1996 Diamond article mentioned above, is:
Diamond, Arthur M., Jr. “The Economics of Science.” Knowledge and Policy 9, nos. 2/3 (Summer/Fall 1996): 6-49.