I believe that the perverse incentives that Medicare creates for insurers, as described in the 2019 article quoted below, still exist. But I need to confirm my belief.
(p. A1) Each June, health insurers send the government detailed cost forecasts for providing prescription-drug benefits to more than 40 million people on Medicare.
No one expects the estimates to be spot on. After all, it is a tall order to predict the exact drug spending for the following year of the thousands of members in each plan.
However, year after year, most of those estimates have turned out to be wrong in the particular way that, thanks to Medicare’s arcane payment rules, results in more revenue for the health insurers, a Wall Street Journal investigation has found. As a consequence, the insurers kept $9.1 billion more in taxpayer funds than they would have had their estimates been accurate from 2006 to 2015, according to Medicare data obtained by the Journal.
Those payments have largely been hidden from view since Medicare’s prescription-drug program was launched more than a decade ago, and are an example of how the secrecy of the $3.5 trillion U.S. health-care system promotes and obscures higher spending.
Medicare’s prescription-drug benefit, called Part D, was designed to help hold down drug costs by having insurers manage the coverage efficiently. Instead, Part D spending has accelerated (p. A12) faster than all other components of Medicare in recent years, rising 49% from $62.9 billion in 2010 to $93.8 billion in 2017. Medicare experts say the program’s design is contributing to that increase. Total spending for Part D from 2006 to 2015 was about $652 billion.
The cornerstone of Part D is a system in which private insurers such as CVS Health Corp., UnitedHealth Group Inc. and Humana Inc. submit “bids” estimating how much it will cost them to provide the benefit. The bids include their own profits and administrative costs for each plan. Then Medicare uses the estimates to make monthly payments to the plans.
After the year ends, Medicare compares the plans’ bids to the actual spending. If the insurer overestimated its costs, it pockets a chunk of the extra money it received from Medicare—sometimes all of it—and this can often translate into more profit for the insurer, in addition to the profit built into the approved bid. If the extra money is greater than 5% of the insurer’s original bid, it has to pay some of it back to Medicare.
For instance, in 2015, insurers overestimated costs by about $2.2 billion, and kept about $1.06 billion of it after paying back $1.1 billion to the government, according to the data reviewed by the Journal.
. . .
If those big insurers were aiming to submit accurate bids, the probability that they would have overestimated costs so frequently and by such a large amount is less than one in one million, according to a statistical analysis done for the Journal by researchers at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, who study pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement.
Insurance companies use heaps of data to predict future spending. If truly unpredictable events were blowing up their statistical models, the proportion of overestimates to underestimates would be closer to 50/50, says Peter Bach, director of Sloan Kettering’s Center for Health Policy and Outcomes, which conducted the statistical analysis.
“Even expert dart throwers don’t hit the bull’s-eye every time. But their misses are spread around in every direction,” says Dr. Bach. “If they start missing in one particular direction over and over they are doing it on purpose.”
For the full story see:
(Note: ellipsis added.)
(Note: the online version of the story has the date Jan. 4, 2019 [sic], and has the title “The $9 Billion Upcharge: How Insurers Kept Extra Cash from Medicare.”)