Category: China

China’s “Ruthless” One Child Policy Forced Some Women to Have Abortions

(p. 15) Deng Xiaoping, China’s leader after 1978, had set a target of quadrupling the country’s per capita national income by 2000. China’s planners decided that they could achieve this goal only if, in addition to increasing the size of the pie, there were fewer people to share it.
So they determined, in their words, to “adjust women’s average fertility rate in advance.” The man who ran the program that treated women as if they were production functions was a rocket scientist, Song Jian, who had worked on ballistic missiles. Song went on to help manage the giant Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River. His was a world in which unintended consequences were not important.
Population control was not unusual in the 1980s. India also had a fertility-­control program. The United Nations gave its first-ever population award to the Chinese minister for population planning in 1983 (along with Indira Gandhi). But China’s application of population control was particularly ruthless.
In 2012, Feng Jianmei, a factory worker pregnant with her second child, was taken to a clinic, forced to sign a document consenting to an abortion and injected with an abortifacient. She was in her seventh month. Pictures of her lying next to her perfectly formed seven-month dead fetus went viral. But hers was hardly an unusual case. In the 1990s, population targets became a major criterion for judging the performance of officials. It is no surprise that they carried out the one-child policy ruthlessly. Reading this account, one wonders why rape as a weapon of war is (rightly) seen as a war crime, whereas the forcible violation of women’s bodies in pursuit of government policy wins United Nations awards.

For the full review, see:
JOHN PARKER. “Little Emperors.” The New York Times Book Review (Sun., JAN. 10, 2016): 15.
(Note: the online version of the review has the date JAN. 8, 2016, and has the title “”One Child,’ by Mei Fong.”)

The book under review, is:
Fong, Mei. One Child: The Story of China’s Most Radical Experiment. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2016.

Chinese Economic Stimulus Creates Egg Bubble

(p. A1) HONG KONG — China is pouring hundreds of billions of dollars into its economy in a new effort to support growth. Some of it is going into roads and bridges and other big projects that will keep the economy humming.
And some of it is going into eggs.
China’s latest lending deluge has sent money sloshing into unexpected parts of the economy. That includes a financial market in Dalian where investors can place bets on the future productivity of the country’s hens.
Egg futures have surged by as much as one-third since March, the sort of move that would be justified if investors believed China’s chicken flocks were headed for an unfortunate fate.
But the market’s usual participants say the flocks are fine. In fact, the actual price of eggs in the country’s markets has fallen from a year ago, according to government statistics.
The reason for the unusual jump in egg futures, they say, is China’s tendency to experience investment bubbles when the government steps up spending and lending. China’s previous efforts to bolster growth unexpectedly sent money into real estate and the stock market — markets that had unexplained rises followed by striking drops.

For the full story, see:
NEIL GOUGH. “China’s Flood of Cash Roils Egg Futures.” The New York Times (Mon., MAY 2, 2016): A1 & B2 [sic].
(Note: ellipsis added.)
(Note: the online version of the story has the date MAY 1, 2016, and has the title “China Lending Inflates Real Estate, Stocks, Even Egg Futures.”)

Micro-Entrepreneur Worked Hard, Saved, and Has No Regrets

(p. 1) PORT HEDLAND, Australia — A lanky, dark-haired surfer, Lee Meadowcroft modeled on the runways of London, Milan and Singapore, then followed his dream of going home to Australia to sell herbal medicines. His store failed — he had chosen the wrong street, he says — and he lost almost all his savings. By then, the fashion world had found fresher faces.

So like tens of thousands of other Australians, Mr. Meadowcroft went to the mines.

It was late 2004. He plowed his last $4,000 into a two-week course on how to operate a crane. He found companies so desperate for workers that they would send chauffeured cars to pick up prospective welders, electricians and crane operators and deliver them to the nearest airport for their flights to mining country, here on Australia’s remote northwestern coast.

China back then was growing at a breathtaking pace and needed all the Australian rocks it could get. Mine workers like Mr. Meadowcroft kept a punishing schedule: 13 consecutive days of 12-hour shifts, a day off, then another 13 consecutive days of 12-hour (p. 4) shifts. Mining fueled Australia’s surging exports to China, which at their peak reached nearly $100 billion a year — a figure representing $4,300 for every man, woman and child in the country.

Resource-rich places around the world prospered thanks to China, and Mr. Meadowcroft and his fellow Port Hedland equipment jockeys were no exception. By 2011 he was earning $250,000 a year.

. . .

The bust came just as hard and just as fast. China’s economic slowdown left too many mines to feed too many dormant Chinese steel mills. Construction of new mines stopped. Port Hedland’s economy slumped. Mr. Meadowcroft lost his job, then lost a second job. Like thousands of others, he went back home.

Mr. Meadowcroft’s tale could serve as yet another boom-and-bust cautionary tale of the limits of China’s rise. From Russia to Brazil, and Nigeria to Venezuela, resource-rich countries that boomed during China’s surge found their economies shaken when Chinese demand slowed.

Except something unexpected has happened to Australia: It has withstood the global rout. Most mines — lower-cost compared with mines elsewhere — have stayed open. But Australia has also kept thriving, against all expectations, with a different kind of money flowing in from China.

Attracted by clean air, a strong education system and worries about China’s future, more Chinese are spending their money in Australia. Thousands of Chinese families have sent their children to study at costly Australian universities, and Australian food exports to China have boomed. Chinese investment in Australian real estate has increased at least tenfold since 2010; Chinese investors have purchased up to half the new apartments in downtown Melbourne and Sydney.

. . .

. . . for people like Mr. Meadowcroft and others in Western Australia who were cut loose by the mining slump, Chinese money is a blessing. He now lives in the Western Australia capital city of Perth and works as an apprentice plumber in new housing developments aimed at Chinese buyers. He earns just $21,000 a year, but that could double or triple when he finishes his apprenticeship.

. . .

(p. 5) . . . for now, Chinese money is still flowing. Many miners who squandered their earnings during the iron ore boom are now trying to catch up in construction jobs. But many others socked away their money from the boom and have used those savings to buy homes or start small businesses.

“They were micro-entrepreneurs,” said Tom Barratt, a University of Western Australia doctoral student who is doing his thesis on labor markets in the Pilbara hills.

Mr. Meadowcroft is among those savers. He bought a house and soon paid off most of the mortgage. He also married his longtime girlfriend after years of commuting to far-flung mines and ports, and is now raising two children as he learns to be a plumber.

Although his savings account is much smaller now, he has no regrets about the boom years. “That was 12 years of really hard work,” he said, “to achieve what a lot of people don’t achieve in their whole lives.”

For the full story, see:

KEITH BRADSHER. “Money From the Dust.” The New York Times, SundayBusiness Section (Sun., SEPT. 25, 2016): 1 & 4-5.

(Note: ellipses added.)

(Note: the online version of the story has the date SEPT. 24, 2016, and has the title “In Australia, China’s Appetite Shifts From Rocks to Real Estate.”)

Chinese Government Executes Farmer Who Killed Official for Destroying His House

(p. A9) . . . when Mr. Zhou heard last week that the Chinese government had executed the farmer, Jia Jinglong, he was furious. He saw it as a sign that the ruling Communist Party was imposing harsh punishments on the most vulnerable members of society while coddling the well-connected elite.
“The legal system isn’t fair,” Mr. Zhou, 57, said, adding that local officials had “turned against the common people.”
President Xi Jinping has made restoring confidence in Chinese courts a centerpiece of his rule, vowing to promote “social justice and equality” in a legal system long plagued by favoritism and abuse.
. . .
But the furor over the execution of Mr. Jia, who had sought revenge on officials for demolishing his home, has raised doubts about Mr. Xi’s efforts, with people across the country publicly assailing inequities in the justice system and asking why high-level officials often escape the death penalty.
“The perception is that the people are powerless and vulnerable against corrupt officials,” said Fu Hualing, a law professor at the University of Hong Kong. “What is surprising is that Xi Jinping has been in power for four years, and that narrative has not changed.”

For the full story, see:
JAVIER C. HERNÁNDEZ. “Villager’s Execution in China Ignites an Uproar Over Inequality of Justice.” The New York Times (Mon., NOV. 21, 2016): A9.
(Note: ellipses added.)
(Note: the online version of the story has the date NOV. 20, 2016, and has the title “Villager’s Execution in China Ignites Uproar Over Inequality of Justice.”)

Censored and Walled-Off Internet Hurts Chinese Start-Ups

(p. B1) Two decades after Beijing began walling off its homegrown internet from the rest of the planet, the digital world has split between China and everybody else. That has prevented American technology companies like Facebook and Uber, which recently agreed to sell its China operations, from independently being able to tap the Chinese market.
For China’s web companies, the divide may have even more significant implications.
It has penned in the country’s biggest and most innovative internet companies. Alibaba, Baidu and Tencent have grown to be some of the world’s largest internet companies, but they rely almost entirely on domestic businesses. Their ventures abroad have been mostly desultory, and prognostications that they will challenge American giants internationally have (p. B2) not materialized.
. . .
In many ways, the split is like 19th century railroads in the United States, when rails of different sizes hindered a train’s ability to go from one place to another.
“The barrier to entering the U.S. or China market is becoming higher and higher,” said Kai-fu Lee, a venture investor from Taiwan and former head of Google China.
The difficulties that China’s internet companies face in expanding their success abroad are epitomized by WeChat, the messaging app owned by Tencent.
. . .
Critics pointed to Tencent’s lack of distinctive marketing, a record of censorship and surveillance in China and its late arrival to foreign markets. Yet the biggest problem was that outside of China, WeChat was just not the same. Within China, WeChat can be used to do almost everything, like pay bills, hail a taxi, book a doctor’s appointment, share photos and chat. Yet its ability to do that is dependent on other Chinese internet services that are limited outside the country.

For the full story, see:
PAUL MOZUR. “Internet’s Great Wall.” The New York Times (Weds., AUG. 10, 2016): B1-B2.
(Note: ellipses added.)
(Note: the online version of the story has the date AUG. 9, 2016, and has the title “Chinese Tech Firms Forced to Choose Market: Home or Everywhere Else.”)

“My Fate Lies with Me, Not with Heaven”

(p. A7) . . . Dr. Unschuld, who is as blunt as he is outspoken, stands at the center of a long and contentious debate in the West over Chinese medicine. For many, it is the ur-alternative to what they see as the industrialized and chemicalized medicine that dominates in the West. For others, it is little more than charlatanism, with its successes attributed to the placebo effect and the odd folk remedy.
Dr. Unschuld is a challenge to both ways of thinking. He has just finished a 28-year English translation of the three principal parts of the foundational work of Chinese medicine: the Huangdi Neijing, or Yellow Emperor’s Inner Classic, published by the University of California Press. But unlike many of the textbooks used in Chinese medicine schools in the West, Dr. Unschuld’s works are monuments to the art of serious translation; he avoids New Age jargon like “energy” or familiar Western medical terms like “pathogens,” seeing both as unfair to the ancient writers and their worldviews.
But this reflects a deep respect for the ancient authors the detractors of Chinese medicine sometimes lack. Dr. Unschuld hunts down obscure terms and devises consistent terminologies that are sometimes not easy to read, but are faithful to the original text. Almost universally, his translations are regarded as trailblazing — making available, for the first time in a Western language, the complete foundational works of Chinese medicine from up to 2,000 years ago.
. . .
. . . then there is the issue of efficacy. With his extremely dry humor, Dr. Unschuld likens Chinese medicine to the herbal formulas of the medieval Christian mystic Hildegard von Bingen. If people want to try it, they should be free to do so, he said, but not at taxpayer expense. As for himself, Dr. Unschuld says he has never tried Chinese medicine.
. . .
His purely academic approach, . . . , makes him a difficult figure for China to embrace. While widely respected for his knowledge and translations, he has done little to advance the government’s agenda of promoting Chinese medicine as soft power. Echoing other critics, he describes China’s translations of the classics as “complete swindles,” saying they are done with little care and only a political goal in mind.
For Dr. Unschuld, Chinese medicine is far more interesting as an allegory for China’s mental state. His most famous book is a history of Chinese medical ideas, in which he sees classic figures, such as the Yellow Emperor, as a reflection of the Chinese people’s deep-seated pragmatism. At a time when demons and ghosts were blamed for illness, these Chinese works from 2,000 years ago ascribed it to behavior or disease that could be corrected or cured.
“It is a metaphor for enlightenment,” he says.
Especially striking, Dr. Unschuld says, is that the Chinese approach puts responsibility on the individual, as reflected in the statement “wo ming zai wo, bu zai tian” — “my fate lies with me, not with heaven.” This mentality was reflected on a national level in the 19th and 20th centuries, when China was being attacked by outsiders. The Chinese largely blamed themselves and sought concrete answers by studying foreign ideas, industrializing and building a modern economy.

For the full story, see:
IAN JOHNSON. “The Saturday Profile; An Expert on Chinese Medicine, but No New Age Healer.” The New York Times (Sat., SEPT. 24, 2016): A7.
(Note: ellipsis added.)
(Note: the online version of the story has the date SEPT. 23, 2016, and has the title “Gandhi the Imperialist – Book Review.”)

The recently finished book mentioned above, is:
Unschuld, Paul U. Huang Di Nei Jing Ling Shu: The Ancient Classic on Needle Therapy. Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2016.

Chinese Industry Using Robots to Automate Routine Tasks

(p. B1) China’s appetite for European-made industrial robots is rapidly growing, as rising wages, a shrinking workforce and cultural changes drive more Chinese businesses to automation. The types of robots favored by Chinese manufacturers are also changing, as automation spreads from heavy industries such as auto manufacturing to those that require more precise, flexible robots capable of handling and assembling smaller products, including consumer electronics and apparel.
At stake is whether China can retain its dominance in manufacturing.
. . .
(p. B2) China, in 2013, became the world’s largest market for industrial robots, surpassing all of Western Europe, according to the International Federation of Robotics. In 2015, Chinese manufacturers bought roughly 67,000 robots, about a quarter of global sales, and demand is projected to more than double to 150,000 robots annually by 2018.

For the full story, see:
Robbie Whelan and Esther Fung. “China’s Factories Turn to Robots.” The Wall Street Journal (Weds., August 17, 2016): B1-B2.
(Note: ellipsis added.)
(Note: the online version of the story has the date August 16, 2016, and has the title “China’s Factories Count on Robots as Workforce Shrinks.”)

“Hong Kongers Will Not Bow Down to Brute Force”

(p. A1) HONG KONG — Blindfolded and handcuffed, the bookseller was abducted from Hong Kong’s border with mainland China and taken to a cell, where he would spend five months in solitary confinement, watched 24 hours a day by a battery of Chinese guards.
Even the simple act of brushing his teeth was monitored by minders, who tied a string to his toothbrush for fear he might try to use it to harm himself. They wanted him to identify anonymous authors and turn over data on customers.
“I couldn’t call my family,” the man, Lam Wing-kee, said on Thursday. “I could only look up to the sky, all alone.”
Months after he and four other booksellers disappeared from Hong Kong and Thailand, prompting international concern over what critics called a brazen act of extralegal abduction, Mr. Lam stood before a bank of television cameras in Hong Kong and revealed the harrowing details of his time in detention.
“It can happen to you, too,” said Mr. Lam, 61, who was the manager of Causeway Bay Books, a store that sold juicy potboilers about the mainland’s Communist Party leadership. “I want to tell the whole world: Hong Kongers will not bow down to brute force.”
. . .
(p. A14) In the months since Mr. Lam and his colleagues disappeared, the industry has fallen on hard times. Causeway Bay Books has closed, and many Hong Kong bookstores have pulled titles about Chinese politics from their shelves.
The disappearances shocked people in Hong Kong and reverberated internationally. Many saw the episode as an expansion of China’s authoritarian legal system beyond its borders, in clear violation of the “one country, two systems” framework that allows Hong Kong to maintain a high degree of autonomy from Beijing.
Thousands of people took to the streets of Hong Kong to demand the booksellers’ release. Diplomats from Britain, the European Union and the United States also registered concern.

For the full story, see:
ALAN WONG, MICHAEL FORSYTHE and ANDREW JACOBS. “Defying China, Hong Kong Bookseller Describes Detention.” The New York Times (Fri., JUNE 17, 2016): A1 & A14.
(Note: ellipsis added.)
(Note: the online version of the story has the date JUNE 16, 2016, and has the title “Defying China, Hong Kong Bookseller Describes Detention.”)

In Cultural Revolution, Chinese “Tried to Turn Their Homes into Fragile Islands of Freedom”

(p. C8) Mr. Dikötter’s greatest contribution with “The Cultural Revolution,” which is the third in a trilogy on China during the Mao era, is his undermining of the conventional view of the period following Mao’s death in 1976. The prevailing narrative, much encouraged by the Communist Party, is that the Chinese state began “lifting” hundreds of millions of people out of poverty through its sage adoption of capitalist-style policies officially called “reform and opening,” beginning with an end to systemwide economic planning and the restoration of markets.
Drawing on a growing body of existing research, Mr. Dikötter argues that China’s markets were not born of the official reforms of the late-1970s and early 1980s but rather got their start before the Cultural Revolution had ended in 1976. He writes of peasants and city dwellers who had completely lost faith in the system and began improvised acts of survival and resistance, like the private trading of goods and labor, which was banned, and even small-scale industrial output.
“Senseless and unpredictable purges were designed to cow the population and rip apart entire communities, producing docile, atomized individuals loyal to no one but the Chairman,” Mr. Dikötter writes. The outcome, as with so many extreme, top-down uses of power, was almost the exact opposite. As surreptitious markets began to flourish in response to scarcity, “people from all walks of life tried to turn their homes into fragile islands of freedom.”​

For the full review, see:
HOWARD W. FRENCH. “‘Bombard the Headquarters’; The twin pillars of Mao’s campaign were uprooting supposed reactionaries and the promotion of sycophancy.” The Wall Street Journal (Sat., May 28, 2016): C8.
(Note: the online version of the review has the date May 27, 2016.)

The book under review, is:
Dikötter, Frank. The Cultural Revolution: A People’s History, 1962-1976. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2016.

All Land in China Owned by Communist Government

(p. B1) WENZHOU, China — Chen Furong and his wife bought their home 23 years ago for its proximity to the city center and for the tree-lined canal just outside. Their dream was to pass it on to their children and grandchildren, a piece of wealth giving their family a share of China’s economic miracle.
Then their neighbor tried to sell her place — and it was all thrown into doubt.
Like every other homeowner in China, Mr. Chen and his neighbor own their homes but not the land underneath them. All land in China is owned by the government, which parcels it out to developers and homeowners through 20- to 70-year leases.
When the neighbor — whose surname is Wang — tried to sell her apartment, local officials told her that her lease on the land had expired. To sell her apartment, they told her, she would have to pay them one-third of the sales value.
Ms. Wang protested in a move that drew national attention. Suddenly millions of Chinese who had socked away billions — and possibly trillions — of dollars were worried as well. If the local authorities in other parts of China did the same thing, they thought, a big chunk of their own wealth could end up with the government as well.
“What will happen after our land lease expires?” (p. B4) asked Mr. Chen, 69, who with his wife holds a 70-year lease. “I will be dead when the lease expires, but will I be able to give it to my son?”

For the full story, see:
STUART LEAVENWORTH and KIKI ZHAO. “Built on Shaky Ground.” The New York Times (Weds., June 1, 2016): B1 & B4.
(Note: the online version of the story has the date MAY 31, 2016, and has the title “In China, Homeowners Find Themselves in a Land of Doubt.”)

Government Elephant Ivory Bans Endanger Rare Helmeted Hornbills

Another unintended consequence of well-intentioned government policy.

(p. A3) BEIJING — Even as China, the world’s leading market for illegal ivory, promises to help safeguard elephants in Africa, a rare bird in Southeast Asia is in danger because its skull is being sold in China as an ivory alternative, conservationists say.
. . .
More than 2,000 helmeted hornbill skulls, or casques, were seized by the authorities in Indonesia and China in the past five years, according to a new report by the Environmental Investigation Agency, a nongovernmental organization based in London. In some cases, Chinese citizens were caught trying to leave Indonesia with casques in their luggage.
. . .
China has joined the world in taking a stand against the trade in elephant and rhinoceros products. In September, during his state visit to the United States, President Xi Jinping pledged to “enact nearly complete bans on ivory import and export.”
But some conservationists worry that less celebrated but also threatened animals, including the helmeted hornbill, are being overlooked, becoming easy picks to meet the demand.
“Shifting to hornbill ivory is like grabbing a low-hanging fruit,” Yokyok Hadiprakarsa, the director of the Indonesian Hornbill Conservation Society, wrote in an email.

For the full story, see:
SHAOJIE HUANG. “Chinese Demand for Ivory Alternative Threatens Rare Hornbill Bird.” The New York Times (Weds., MARCH 23, 2016): A3.
(Note: ellipses added.)
(Note: the online version of the story has the date MARCH 22, 2016, and has the title “Chinese Demand for Ivory Alternative Threatens Rare Bird.”)