Category: Economics

The Free Market Gets a Bum Rap When Blamed for High and Chaotic Drug Prices

The Law of One Price in economics says that in the absence of transaction costs, similar goods will have the same price. If the price of a Tesla truck is $100,000 in Omaha and $200,000 in Des Moines, some enterprising arbitrager will buy a few in Omaha for $100,000, and sell them for slightly less than the going price in Des Moines. As the arbitrager arbitrages, the price of the truck in Omaha will converge with that in Des Moines, a close-enough confirmation of the Law of One Price. If this does NOT happen then either transaction costs are very high or we are not dealing with a free market. As the article quoted below shows, prices of medical drugs vary widely and persistently. Medical drugs are NOT sold in a free market. Arbitrage is NOT allowed. Who can sell to whom is highly regulated. To blame the free market for high and chaotic drug prices is an outrageous bum rap.

(p. A1) The cost of prescription drugs in the U.S. isn’t like the tabs for other products. The price for a single medicine can range by thousands of dollars depending on the drug plan.

It is a symptom of America’s complicated—and costly—system for paying for medicines.

Medicare is paying wildly different prices for the same drug, even for people insured under the same plan.

. . .

Take commonly used generic versions of prostate-cancer treatment Zytiga. They have more than 2,200 prices in Medicare drug plans. The generics ring in at roughly $815 a month in northern Michigan, about half of what they cost in suburban Detroit, while jumping to $3,356 in a county along Lake Michigan, according to a recent analysis of Medicare data.

The same is true with other popular medicines such as psoriasis treatment Otezla, blood thinner Xarelto and generic versions of the cancer drug Tykerb, known as lapatinib, which has 460 prices, according to the analysis by 46brooklyn Research, a nonprofit drug-pricing analytics group.

. . .

(p. A2) The reason for the huge price differences: America’s complicated drug-reimbursement system, which uses middlemen to negotiate prices.

. . .

Not only is it confusing and costly for seniors, the wide range of drug prices costs Medicare. The program, which farms out drug-price negotiations to the firms, pays tens of millions of dollars extra for prescriptions.

“It’s a broken system. It’s really confusing for seniors. It’s really confusing for providers. It’s costing the government way too much,” said Dared Price, who owns eight pharmacies in the Wichita, Kan., area, and complains the stores are underpaid.

The middlemen [are] known as pharmacy benefit managers or PBMs, . . .

. . .

“The inconsistent and disconnected way that PBMs arrive at drug prices makes Medicare look less like a trustworthy marketplace intended to yield low, sober prices and more like a casino,” said 46brooklyn Chief Executive Antonio Ciaccia.

. . .

To find out the prices that the big three and other PBMs negotiated, 46brooklyn looked at what standalone Part D and Medicare Advantage plans say they will reimburse pharmacies on behalf of Medicare for branded and generic drugs during the second quarter. They reported the prices that Medicare would pay.

Some 61 drugs had monthly prices that diverged by at least $30,000, including a $223,037 range for a drug, called nitisinone and sold under the brand name Orfadin, treating a rare metabolic disorder. About 300 medicines had more than 1,000 monthly prices when the difference between the lowest price and the highest was more than $1,000.

It didn’t matter that the same PBM was negotiating the prices. Prices varied widely among health plans, even if a plan used the same PBM.

The 30 mg dose of Otezla had among the most different prices among branded medicines. It had 633 different prices across health plans that used Express Scripts, while Optum Rx carried 569 different prices and Caremark had 431.

The largest PBMs notched some of the biggest number of different prices for lower-priced copies of Zytiga, which is sold as a generic under the drug’s chemical name abiraterone acetate.

Caremark has logged 643 different prices for Zytiga generics, while Express Scripts has 500 and Optum Rx carries 445. By comparison, Capital Rx, a PBM with fewer beneficiaries than the three largest firms, had two prices.

Capital Rx had few prices—either $106 or $117—because it pegged them to the benchmark that the U.S. government uses to calculate drug costs, called the National Average Drug Acquisition Cost, which is based on a survey of retail pharmacy prices, said Chief Executive Anthony Loiacono. Capital Rx’s prices were much less than the sums that many other health plans reported.

“We don’t make money on drug spend, and I do not set prices. I use what CMS gives us as the starting point,” Loiacono said.

For the full story see:

Jared S. Hopkins and Josh Ulick. “Medicare Payouts Vary Widely for Same Drug.” The Wall Street Journal (Wednesday, Nov. 27, 2024): A1-A2.

(Note: ellipses, and bracketed word, added.)

(Note: the online version of the story has the date November 26, 2024, and has the title “Same Drug, 2,200 Different Prices.” Where there is a slight difference in wording between the print and online versions, the passages I quote above follow the online version.)

Ozempic 25 Years Sooner Would Have Saved and Improved Many Lives

Apparently Ozempic had been discovered in the late 1980s and could have been on the market roughly 25 years ago. Pfizer decided that the likely potential revenues were not sufficient to justify the huge costs. But what if the costs had not been so huge? For instance what if we adopted the proposal suggested by Milton Friedman, and advocated by me, to stop mandating hyper-expensive Phase 3 clinical trials to prove efficacy? (The mandates to prove safety through Phase 1 and Phase 2 trials would be retained.) With lower costs, Pfizer might have moved forward. Or if Pfizer had not, some other firm probably would have entered the breach sooner. If Ozempic had been available sooner, by now it would be much cheaper. Many lives would have been saved that have been lost. Other lives would have been healthier and happier.

(p. A26) They called 2023 the year of Ozempic, but it now seems GLP-1 drugs might define an entire decade — or an even longer era. The game-changing drugs, which mimic the hormone GLP-1, offer large benefits for not just diabetes management and especially weight loss but also, apparently, heart and kidney and liver disease, Alzheimer’s and dementia, Parkinson’s and addiction of all kinds. And perhaps because of widespread use of the drugs, the obesity epidemic in America may finally and mercifully be reversing.

But of all the things we learned this year about GLP-1s, the most astonishing could be that the revolution might have started decades earlier. Researchers identified the key breakthrough for GLP-1 drugs nearly 40 years ago, it turns out, long before most Americans had even heard the phrase “obesity epidemic.”

This summer, a former dean of Harvard Medical School, Jeffrey Flier, published a long personal reflection that doubled as an alternate history of what may well be the most spectacular and impactful medical breakthrough of the century so far. In 1987, Flier co-founded a biotech start-up that pursued GLP-1 as a potential treatment for diabetes, not long after it had first been identified by researchers who’d also found that the hormone enhanced insulin secretion in the presence of glucose.

The startup obtained worldwide rights to develop GLP-1 as a metabolic therapy from a group of those researchers, based at Massachusetts General Hospital. They even generated clinical results that suggested it might have promise as a weight-loss drug as well — only to have Pfizer, which had agreed to fund the research, withdraw its support, without providing the researchers with an especially satisfying explanation. Instead, Pfizer told Flier and his partners that the company didn’t believe there would be a market for another injectable diabetes treatment after insulin. Well, Flier tells me, “they were wrong.”

. . .

. . . Flier’s memoir is not just a lament for what might have been. In the aftermath of the pandemic emergency, as citizens and officials alike have embraced a more libertarian attitude toward public health, there’s been a similar drift in the public conversation about drug discovery and development. Operation Warp Speed is often held up as a new model — calls for an Operation Warp Speed 2.0 have been followed by those for an Operation Warp Speed for everything — . . .

Many of the same reformers will complain about all the red tape at the F.D.A. and C.D.C., tallying up huge mortality costs imposed by slow-moving government, arguing for human challenge trials in which individuals volunteer to take untested drugs and be deliberately infected and even talking about the invisible graveyard of unnecessary regulation and delay.

This is all fine and good — there are surely lots of things those agencies can speed up. And in recent years, reformers of various stripes have lobbied some worthy additional proposals into the biomedical zeitgeist — for a system based not on patents but on huge and direct cash prizes for medical breakthroughs, for instance, or one helped along by advance market commitments or benevolent patent extensions. Just last week the researchers Willy Chertman and Ruxandra Tesloianu published “The Case for Clinical Trial Abundance,” an invigorating manifesto for drug development reform.

. . . in focusing on government bureaucracy as the major biomedical bottleneck, we are seeing just one piece of the picture and overlooking what is perhaps the central challenge of research and development — that it is, at present, so complicated that difficulties or bad decisions at any stage can stifle the whole decades-long process, distorting the actual medical and public-health functions of drug development in countless ways.

For the full commentary see:

David Wallace-Wells. “We Could Have Had Ozempic Years Ago.” The New York Times, SundayOpinion Section (Sunday, Jan. 5, 2025): 11.

(Note: ellipses added.)

(Note: the online version of the commentary has the date Dec. 25, 2024, and has the title “Pfizer Stopped Us From Getting Ozempic Decades Ago.”)

Dr. Flier’s published “memoir” mentioned above is:

Flier, Jeffrey S. “Drug Development Failure: How GLP-1 Development Was Abandoned in 1990.” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 67, no. 3 (Summer 2024): 325-36.

“The Clinical Trial Manifesto” mentioned above is the introductory essay in the compilation referenced below. Another essay that looks promising in the compilation is “Unblocking Human Challenge Trials for Faster Progress.”

Chertman, Willy, and Ruxandra Tesloianu, eds. The Case for Clinical Trial Abundance: A Series of Short Papers Outlining Reform Possibilities for Our Nation’s Clinical Trials. Washington, DC: The Institute for Progress (IFP), 2024.

In 2023, Costs of Medical Care Rose 40% Faster Than Overall Inflation

If rising healthcare costs were clearly due to improving health outcomes, few would be angry. The anger arises from rising fraud, inefficiency, and inertia. Many healthcare workers are paper pushers and the paper pushed is often inaccurate and opaque. Other healthcare workers enforce protocols that slow innovation. And of course mandated regulations, most notably Phase 3 clinical trials, enormously increase costs.

(p. A3) The killing of a health insurance executive in New York City prompted a furious outpouring of anger over the industry and healthcare prices. So just how much have healthcare costs and spending been going up?

The short answer: a lot. National healthcare spending increased 7.5% year over year in 2023 to $4.867 trillion, or $14,570 per person, according to data released Wednesday by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.

. . .

The 7.5% rise represented a much faster pace of growth than the 4.6% increase in 2022.

. . .

Over the past couple of decades, the price index for what the Labor Department classifies as medical care—which includes visits to doctors, hospital stays, prescription drugs and medical equipment—has risen roughly 40% faster than the overall pace of inflation. Healthcare tends to rise more quickly than overall inflation because of high labor costs in the sector, as well as advancements leading to new and more expensive drugs and treatments. Demand for healthcare is also increasing as the population ages.

. . .

Hospitals are . . . adding billions of dollars in “facility fees” to medical bills for routine care at outpatient centers, according to reporting by The Wall Street Journal. That means patients are often paying hundreds of additional dollars for standard care like colonoscopies, mammograms and heart screenings.

. . .

Employers are shouldering a lot of those costs. For example, the average worker spent $6,296 in premiums for family coverage in 2024, according to KFF [a healthcare nonprofit]. Employers spent $19,276.

But when a company is paying more for insurance premiums for its workers, that leaves it with less money for giving out raises or reinvesting and expansion.

“It’s ultimately all of us who pay for [healthcare] either in the form of lower wages for people who have employer insurance or in the form of higher taxes to cover Medicare and Medicaid,” said Katherine Baicker, professor of health economics at the University of Chicago.

For the full story see:

Harriet Torry. “Nation’s Healthcare Tab Is Surging Amid Rising Wages, Hospital Fees.” The Wall Street Journal (Friday, Dec. 20, 2024): A3.

(Note: ellipses added. The first bracketed words were added by me; the second bracketed word was in the original.)

(Note: the online version of the story was updated December 18, 2024, and has the title “Why Are Americans Paying So Much More for Healthcare Than They Used To?” Where there is a slight difference in wording between the print and online versions, the passages I quote above follow the online version.)

The source for some of the data discussed in The New York Times article appears to have been:

“National Health Expenditures 2023 Highlights.” Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), Last modified on Dec. 18, 2024.

Welcome Immigrant Innovators

Empirical research by reputable economists at some top schools concludes that although “immigrants represent 16 percent of all US inventors . . . immigrants are responsible for 36% of aggregate innovation, two-thirds of which is due to their innovation externalities on their native-born collaborators” (Bernstein et al. 2022, p. 1). (I have not yet looked carefully at this research, but have looked at other papers by Rebecca Diamond (no relation), finding them important and well-done.)

We should make it easier for innovators to enter the United States and harder for murderers and thieves to enter. And whatever immigration rules we adopt, we should enforce. We are unfair to those who follow our immigration rules if we allow others to enter the United States without following our rules.

Beyond that, I think our rules can be fairly generous, even letting in many non-innovative immigrants, if at the same time we adopt policies that give a probable path forward to current Americans who are among the least well-off. In a working paper that I hope to return to soon, I argue that we can create this path forward by unbinding entrepreneurs so that they can create more and better jobs for the least well-off.

(I thank my former student and current friend Aaron Brown for alerting me to the article on immigration.)

The empirical research on immigrant innovators mentioned above is:

Bernstein, Shai, Rebecca Diamond, Abhisit Jiranaphawiboon, Timothy McQuade, and Beatriz Pousada. “The Contribution of High-Skilled Immigrants to Innovation in the United States.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper #30797, December 2022.

My working paper mentioned above is:

Diamond, Arthur M., Jr. “Robustly Redundant Labor Markets.” Working Paper. 2021.

Innovative Medical Project Entrepreneur Karikó Long Persevered to Develop mRNA Technology Behind Covid-19 Vaccines

The basic science and technology behind mRNA did not come easy and did not come quick. If the skeptics of Covid-19 vaccines knew this they might be less skeptical because one of the reasons they sometimes give for their skepticism is the speed with which the vaccines were developed. (Other reasons for skepticism I think are more defensible, such as the worry that the authorities downplayed the real side-effects that some vaccine recipients suffered from the vaccines. But on balance I still think the vaccines were a great achievement.) One of the heroes of the long slog is Katalin Karikó. Part of her story is sketched in the passages quoted below. She is a good example of an innovative medical project entrepreneur. When she was named a winner of the Nobel Prize she identified part of what it takes to succeed: “we persevere, we are resilient” (Karikó as quoted in Mosbergen, Loftus, and Zuckerman 2023, p. A2).

(p. A2) The University of Pennsylvania is basking in the glow of two researchers who this week were awarded the Nobel Prize in medicine for their pioneering work on messenger RNA.

Until recently, the school and its faculty largely disdained one of those scientists.

Penn demoted Katalin Karikó, shunting her to a lab on the outskirts of campus while cutting her pay. Karikó’s colleagues denigrated her mRNA research and some wouldn’t work with her, according to her and people at the school. Eventually, Karikó persuaded another Penn researcher, Drew Weissman, to work with her on modifying mRNA for vaccines and drugs, though most others at the school remained skeptical, pushing other approaches.

. . .

. . . on Monday [Oct. 2, 2023], when Karikó and Weissman were awarded the Nobel, on top of prestigious science prizes in recent years, the school expressed a different perspective on their work.

The reversal offers a glimpse of the clubby, hothouse world of academia and science, where winning financial funding is a constant burden, securing publication is a frustrating challenge and those with unconventional or ambitious approaches can struggle to gain support and acceptance.

“It’s a flawed system,” said David Langer, who is chair of neurosurgery at Lenox Hill Hospital, spent 18 years studying and working at Penn and was Karikó’s student and collaborator.

. . .

Penn wasn’t the only institution to doubt Karikó’s belief in mRNA when many other scientists pursued a different gene-based technology. In a reflection of how radical her ideas were at the time, she had difficulty publishing her research and obtaining big grants—prerequisites for those hoping to get ahead in science and gain academic promotions.

Another reason her relationship with the school frayed: Karikó could antagonize colleagues. In presentations, she often was the first to point out mistakes in their work. Karikó didn’t intend to offend, she just felt the need to call out mistakes, she later said.

For the full story see:

Gregory Zuckerman. “Penn Toasts Winning Scientist After Shunning Her for Years.” The Wall Street Journal (Thursday, Oct. 5, 2023 [sic]): A2.

(Note: ellipses, and bracketed date, added.)

(Note: the online version of the story has the date October 4, 2023 [sic], and has the title “After Shunning Scientist, University of Pennsylvania Celebrates Her Nobel Prize.”)

The source of the Karikó quote in my opening comments is:

Dominique Mosbergen, Peter Loftus and Gregory Zuckerman. “Pair Met With Doubts, Now Win Nobel Prize.” The Wall Street Journal (Tuesday, Oct. 3, 2023 [sic]): A1-A2.

(Note: the online version of the story was updated October 2, 2023 [sic], and has the title “Pioneers of mRNA Find Redemption in Nobel Prize.”)

For more detailed accounts of Karikó’s life, struggles, and research see:

Karikó, Katalin. Breaking Through: My Life in Science. New York: Crown, 2023.

Zuckerman, Gregory. A Shot to Save the World: The inside Story of the Life-or-Death Race for a Covid-19 Vaccine. New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2021.

A.I. May Create More and Better Jobs

In my Openness book, I made good use of The New Division of Labor book by Levy and Murnane that gave plentiful evidence that the innovative dynamism exemplified by the computer revolution on balance resulted in more and better jobs. The Levy/Murnane book is now over 20 years old, so the skeptical might question whether what was true about computers is also still true about artificial intelligence (A.I.). Now one of the book co-authors, Frank Levy, has co-authored a new working paper in which he answers “yes.” The working paper has recently been summarized by Steve Lohr.

Steve Lohr’s article is:

Steve Lohr. “A.I. Is Poised to Put Midsize Cities on the Map.” The New York Times (Mon., December 30, 2024): B1-B2.

(Note: the online version of the Steve Lohr article has the date Dec. 26, 2024, and has the title “How A.I. Could Reshape the Economic Geography of America.”)

The academic working paper co-authored by Frank Levy, that Lohr summarized in The New York Times article mentioned and cited above is:

Abrahams, Scott, and Frank S. Levy. “Could Savannah Be the Next San Jose? The Downstream Effects of Large Language Models.” In SSRN, June 23, 2024.

The book co-authored by Frank Levy and mentioned in my initial comments is:

Levy, Frank, and Richard J. Murnane. The New Division of Labor: How Computers Are Creating the Next Job Market. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.

My book mentioned in my initial comments is:

Diamond, Arthur M., Jr. Openness to Creative Destruction: Sustaining Innovative Dynamism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.

Price Controls on Drugs Reduce Drug Innovation

Price controls on drugs may reduce some short-term healthcare costs for consumers, but will also reduce the innovation that brings us more cures, less pain, and fewer side effects. If we want to both reduce costs for consumers and increase innovation, we should end government mandates for the Phase 3 clinical trials–the phase of clinical trials that make up most of the cost of gaining regulatory approval.

(p. A19) The Biden White House has proposed requiring Medicare to “negotiate” drug prices.

. . .

Unfortunately, the debate is being informed by erroneous Congressional Budget Office analysis. CBO says . . . the supply of new drugs will only be reduced by 5% from 2021 to 2039, a loss of only two drugs a year.

The CBO minimizes the harmful effects on innovation, but the entire supply chain that funds medical R&D relies on rate-of-return assessments driven by future earnings. An analysis I released this week finds 10 times the effect on R&D, a loss of up to some 340 drugs over the same period.

The White House also claims that price controls won’t hamstring innovation because they only govern top-selling drugs. But the occasional blockbuster funds the roughly 90% of pipeline drugs that never pass Food and Drug Administration review. CBO even acknowledges that only the top 7% of Medicare drugs drive U.S. profits. Targeting financially successful drugs could make large segments of the development portfolio unprofitable, even if such drugs aren’t affected by price controls.

For the full commentary see:

Tomas J. Philipson. “Biden’s Price Controls Will Make Good Health More Expensive.” The Wall Street Journal (Thursday, Sept. 16, 2021 [sic]): A19.

(Note: ellipses added.)

(Note: the online version of the commentary has the date September 15, 2021 [sic], and has the same title as the print version.)

The research brief co-authored by Philipson and mentioned above is:

Philipson, Tomas J., and Troy Durie. “The Evidence Base on the Impact of Price Controls on Medical Innovation.” Issue Brief. Becker Friedman Institute, University of Chicago, Sept. 14, 2021.

Supporting Philipson’s argument is a 2024 working paper showing that Medicare-mandated price cuts in medical equipment has resulted in less innovation in medical equipment:

Ji, Yunan, and Parker Rogers. “The Long-Run Impacts of Regulated Price Cuts: Evidence from Medicare.” NBER Working Paper #33083, Oct. 2024.

To End Drug Shortages Make Healthcare a Free Market

Drug shortages are sometimes blamed on the free market. A bum rap. In a free market when supply declines or demand increases, prices rise, and the increase in price incentivizes a greater quantity supplied, eventually ending a short-run period where quantity demanded at the going price exceeds quantity supplied at the going price (in other words, a shortage). But healthcare in America is far from a free market. Every aspect is highly regulated. Prices are negotiated, often by middlemen called (Pharmacy Benefit Managers, aka PBMs), entry is not free, and the demanders (patients) often do not know (or care) about the prices, since they are paid by a third party (insurers, employers, or the government). Perverse incentives abound.

(p. A26) There’s been a bombardment of bad news for drug supplies. The American Society of Health-System Pharmacists found this summer that nearly all of the members it surveyed were experiencing drug shortages, which generally affect half a million Americans. Cancer patients have scrambled as supplies of chemotherapy drugs dwindle. Other shortages include antibiotics for treatable diseases, such as the only drug recommended for use during pregnancy to prevent congenital syphilis (a disease that is 11 times more common today than a decade ago), and A.D.H.D. medications, without which people struggle to function in their day-to-day lives. The toll on Americans is heavy.

Over half of the shortages documented this summer by health consulting firm IQVIA had persisted for more than two years. But even though drug shortages affect millions of Americans, policymakers and industry leaders have provided little to no long-term relief for people in need.

Shortages have occurred regularly since at least the early 2000s, when national tracking began. Hundreds of drugs, in every major therapeutic category, have been unavailable for some period. The average drug shortage lasts about 1.5 years. Even when substitute medications are available, they may be suboptimal (for example, deaths by septic shock rose by 10 percent during a 2011 shortage of the first-line medication, norepinephrine) or have spillover effects (such as possibly increasing the risk of antimicrobial resistance). In addition to harming patients, shortages have cost health systems billions of dollars in increased labor and substitute medications.

. . .

Large hospital chains can readily monitor shortage risks and preemptively place large orders. This panic buying can wipe out inventory, and leave hospitals with fewer resources strapped since they may get notice of a drug shortage only when it’s too late. There is little penalty for over-ordering because unused drugs can often be returned.

. . .

Addressing the underlying fragility of our essential drug supply will take structural change and investments. While all industries must grapple with how to build resilient supply chains, the pharmaceutical industry is unique. The people who are most affected by supply chain vulnerabilities — patients — are also those with least say in the choice to buy from reliable manufacturers. When people buy cars, they may pay more based on company reputation, ratings by outside testers and reviews from other customers. In contrast, patients bear the harm of drug shortages, yet they cannot choose the manufacturers of their essential drugs nor evaluate their reliability.

For the full commentary see:

Emily Tucker. “We’re Stuck in a Constant Cycle of Drug Shortages.” The New York Times (Thursday, December 7, 2023 [sic]): A26.

(Note: ellipses added.)

(Note: the online version of the commentary has the date Dec. 6, 2023 [sic], and has the title “America Is Having Yet Another Drug Shortage. Here’s Why It Keeps Happening.”)

Regulations Discourage Search for Magic Bullet Cures

The so-called “Inflation Reduction Act” mandates that several of the biggest blockbuster drugs must have prices negotiated between Medicare and Pharma firms. As the commentary quoted below suggests, this creates an incentive for Pharma firms to develop many middling drugs rather than a couple of blockbuster drugs. Paul Ehrlich’s “magic bullet” may be impossible, but we will never know if no-one is trying to discover it.creates an

(p. B10) A true home run in the drug industry is when a company develops a mega-blockbuster that transforms its finances for years.

But with Medicare trying to bring costs down by targeting the industry’s most expensive drugs, a portfolio of medium-size moneymakers that can keep your name off the U.S. government’s naughty list can be a wise strategy.

That is at least one reason why big pharma is investing heavily in biotech companies developing antibody-drug conjugates. Known as ADCs, these treatments work like a guided missile by pairing antibodies with toxic agents to fight cancer. In short, they enable a more targeted form of chemotherapy that goes straight into the cancer cells while minimizing harm to healthy cells.

. . .

One reason most ADCs aren’t likely to become mega-blockbusters like Keytruda, a cancer immunotherapy that has earned 35 approvals across 16 types of cancer, is that they aren’t one-size-fits-all drugs. Instead, they are designed to target a specific protein that is expressed on the surface of a cancer cell. That means that each drug is made with an antibody targeting a subset of cancer. There are more than 100 ADCs being tested in humans by pharma and biotech companies.

For the full commentary see:

David Wainer. “Heard on the Street; Drug Industry’s Secret Weapon: ‘Guided Missiles’.” The Wall Street Journal (Friday, Oct. 27, 2023 [sic]): B10.

(Note: ellipsis added.)

(Note: the online version of the commentary has the date October 26, 2023 [sic], and has the title “Heard on the Street; ‘Guided Missile Drugs’ Could Be Big Pharma’s Secret Weapon.”)

Effective Therapies Will Remain Banned When F.D.A. Mandates Costly Evidence of Long-Term Clinical Benefits, Rather than Frugal Evidence of Short-Term Biomarkers

How many therapies that would have cured diseases, or extended lives, or limited side effects or pain, are not available because their champions cannot afford the often astronomical costs of Phase 1, Phase 2, and Phase 3 clinical trials? Nobel-Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman favored eliminating the F.D.A., but as a more politically palatable step-in-the-right-direction, favored limiting F.D.A. mandates to approving safety through Phase 1 and Phase 2 clinical trials (and no longer mandating proving efficacy through Phase 3 clinical trials, which usually cost much more than Phase 1 and Phase 2 clinical trials, combined). Perhaps an even more politically palatable, but tinier, step-in-the-right-direction is proposed in the commentary quoted below. This modest step would allow in Phase 3 clinical trials the use of less costly biomarker “surrogate end-points” in place of far more costly clinical end-points, such as years of added life. In the case discussed in the article quoted below, the surrogate end-point was the percent of arginine in the patient’s blood.

(p. A17) Discovering treatments for rare diseases is a daunting task. Recruiting even a few dozen people for a clinical trial requires doctors and drug companies to identify a large share of the patient population. And since the market for such therapies is necessarily small, it’s nearly impossible to attract investment. So when news emerged about Aeglea BioTherapeutics’ ARG1-D therapy pegzilarginase, we could hardly believe it. Pegzilarginase is an enzyme engineered to lower the body’s levels of arginine. The randomized placebo-controlled study of pegzilarginase included 32 patients with ARG1-D.

The results speak for themselves. The amount of arginine present in blood plasma declined by 80% for patients on pegzilarginase. After only six months, 90.5% of patients who received pegzilarginase had normal arginine levels, and this was sustained over time. The data also suggested progressive improvements in motor function compared with a placebo. And most patients tolerated the therapy quite well.

These numbers were jaw-dropping. Which is why the FDA’s decision is incomprehensible.

The FDA even refused to look at Aeglea’s data. Instead, the agency demanded that the firm compile additional data suggesting pegzilarginase will produce a clinical benefit in addition to eliminating excess arginine. But for ARG1-D and other rare diseases, measuring clinical outcomes can take years, while measuring biomarkers likely to produce clinical benefits can take weeks.

. . .

Evaluating clinical benefits could force sick patients to remain in placebo groups for months. That the FDA would put its rigid rules before the convincing data we already have is unethical. If the FDA doesn’t correct its error soon, patients with ARG1-D will lose their best chance at full, productive lives.

For the full commentary see:

Stephen Cederbaum and Emil Kakkis. “The FDA’s See-No-Data Approach.” The Wall Street Journal (Wednesday, Sept. 27, 2023 [sic]): A17.

(Note: ellipsis added.)

(Note: the online version of the commentary has the date September 26, 2023 [sic], and has the same title as the print version.)

Medicare Rewards Health Insurers for Overestimating Future Prescription-Drug Costs

I believe that the perverse incentives that Medicare creates for insurers, as described in the 2019 article quoted below, still exist. But I need to confirm my belief.

(p. A1) Each June, health insurers send the government detailed cost forecasts for providing prescription-drug benefits to more than 40 million people on Medicare.

No one expects the estimates to be spot on. After all, it is a tall order to predict the exact drug spending for the following year of the thousands of members in each plan.

However, year after year, most of those estimates have turned out to be wrong in the particular way that, thanks to Medicare’s arcane payment rules, results in more revenue for the health insurers, a Wall Street Journal investigation has found. As a consequence, the insurers kept $9.1 billion more in taxpayer funds than they would have had their estimates been accurate from 2006 to 2015, according to Medicare data obtained by the Journal.

Those payments have largely been hidden from view since Medicare’s prescription-drug program was launched more than a decade ago, and are an example of how the secrecy of the $3.5 trillion U.S. health-care system promotes and obscures higher spending.

Medicare’s prescription-drug benefit, called Part D, was designed to help hold down drug costs by having insurers manage the coverage efficiently. Instead, Part D spending has accelerated (p. A12) faster than all other components of Medicare in recent years, rising 49% from $62.9 billion in 2010 to $93.8 billion in 2017. Medicare experts say the program’s design is contributing to that increase. Total spending for Part D from 2006 to 2015 was about $652 billion.

The cornerstone of Part D is a system in which private insurers such as CVS Health Corp., UnitedHealth Group Inc. and Humana Inc. submit “bids” estimating how much it will cost them to provide the benefit. The bids include their own profits and administrative costs for each plan. Then Medicare uses the estimates to make monthly payments to the plans.

After the year ends, Medicare compares the plans’ bids to the actual spending. If the insurer overestimated its costs, it pockets a chunk of the extra money it received from Medicare—sometimes all of it—and this can often translate into more profit for the insurer, in addition to the profit built into the approved bid. If the extra money is greater than 5% of the insurer’s original bid, it has to pay some of it back to Medicare.

For instance, in 2015, insurers overestimated costs by about $2.2 billion, and kept about $1.06 billion of it after paying back $1.1 billion to the government, according to the data reviewed by the Journal.

. . .

If those big insurers were aiming to submit accurate bids, the probability that they would have overestimated costs so frequently and by such a large amount is less than one in one million, according to a statistical analysis done for the Journal by researchers at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, who study pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement.

Insurance companies use heaps of data to predict future spending. If truly unpredictable events were blowing up their statistical models, the proportion of overestimates to underestimates would be closer to 50/50, says Peter Bach, director of Sloan Kettering’s Center for Health Policy and Outcomes, which conducted the statistical analysis.

“Even expert dart throwers don’t hit the bull’s-eye every time. But their misses are spread around in every direction,” says Dr. Bach. “If they start missing in one particular direction over and over they are doing it on purpose.”

For the full story see:

Joseph Walker and Christopher Weaver. “Medicare Overpaid Insurers Billions.” The Wall Street Journal (Saturday, Jan. 5, 2019 [sic]): A1 & A12.

(Note: ellipsis added.)

(Note: the online version of the story has the date Jan. 4, 2019 [sic], and has the title “The $9 Billion Upcharge: How Insurers Kept Extra Cash from Medicare.”)