Category: Economics

Early Illegal Migrants’ Resentment of “the Venezuelans” Led Them to Support Trump

I often disagree with the commentaries in The New York Times, but recently I read one that taught me something important that I did not know.

For the commentary, Megan Stack interviewed two Mexican immigrants in Chicago, one legal and one illegal.

(p. A20) They are both fans of Donald Trump. Mr. Mata voted for Trump, and though Jose can’t vote, he tells me that Mr. Trump “has courage.

They blame “the Venezuelans,” which is their shorthand for the roughly 50,000 migrants who came to Chicago in buses in the last three years. Because of how they were processed at the border during the Biden years, “the Venezuelans” are allowed to receive work permits, which gives them an unfair advantage over earlier illegal migrants such as Jose. And some of them are criminals.

Chicago has spent about $640 million in housing, feeding, and otherwise supporting “the Venezuelans” which has caused resentment both among long-term Chicago citizens and among the earlier illegal migrants, who were not so well-housed, fed, or supported.

Stack’s commentary taught me that many illegal migrants support and admire Donald Trump, and it taught me why.

For Stack’s full commentary see:

Megan K. Stack. “Why Immigrants Fear Trump Even if They Voted for Him.” The New York Times (Sat., March 15, 2025): A20-A21.

(Note: the online version of the commentary has the date March 10, 2025, and has the same title as the print version.)

Ed Leamer Doubted the Robustness of Many Econometric Studies

Ed Leamer showed that a lot of econometric studies in economics amounted to economists searching among the plethora of plausible specifications of variables and functional forms, until they found one that yielded the sign and statistical significance of the variable they cared about. So, for example, an economist who thought capital punishment deterred murder, could produce that result, and an economist who thought capital punishment did strong>not deter murder, could also produce that result.

Leamer suggested that economists should show whether their results varied under a variety of specifications, in order to show the robustness of the claimed main result.

(p. C6) One day in elementary school, Edward Leamer noticed that his teacher had written the wrong answer to a math problem on the blackboard, so he stood up and told her so. His teacher took another look and assured him that it was correct. Again he protested, so she asked him to take his seat.

“He refused to sit down,” his brother, the author Laurence Leamer, said in a gathering on Zoom to celebrate his brother last month. “His whole life, he’s refused to sit down.”

Leamer, an economist who died Feb. 25 at the age of 80 from complications stemming from ALS (or Lou Gehrig’s disease), was best known for standing up and telling economists that they were doing it wrong. In influential papers like 1983’s “Let’s Take the Con Out of Econometrics” and his seminal book, “Specification Searches” (1978), Leamer warned economists that the methods they were using to analyze data produced weak findings that couldn’t hold up to scrutiny. He said economists often had a bias toward the results they wanted or that were the kinds of firm conclusions that led to press coverage, funding and policy positions they supported.

What’s more, Leamer warned economists that they weren’t being honest about the strength of their conclusions or transparent about the fact that they had run other tests that showed different results.

For the full obituary, see:

Chris Kornelis. “The Economist Who Called Out Other Economists.” The Wall Street Journal (Saturday, March 15, 2025): C6.

(Note: the online version of the obituary has the date March 14, 2025, and has the title “Edward Leamer, Economist Who Said Economists Were Doing It Wrong, Dies at 80 [sic].” Where the wording is different between the versions, the last three sentences quoted above follow the online version.)

Leamer’s wonderful paper, mentioned above, is:

Leamer, Edward E. “Let’s Take the Con Out of Econometrics.” American Economic Review 73, no. 1 (March 1983): 31-43.

Leamer’s book, mentioned above, is:

Leamer, Edward E. Specification Searches: Ad Hoc Inference with Nonexperimental Data, Wiley Series in Probability and Mathematical Statistics. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1978.

Nvidia Entrepreneur’s Work-Life Imbalance: Ferocious Hard Work

(p. A15) Mr. Kim’s book is nothing like Walter Isaacson’s portraits of tech geniuses Steve Jobs or Elon Musk. It is more prosaic, focusing on the technical and human ground war of building a company. Even so, there is drama in Nvidia’s remarkable rise, and Mr. Kim’s reporting offers plenty of incident and portraiture.

. . .

As a teenager, we are told, Mr. Huang was a formidable table-tennis player and earned money by cleaning tables and bathrooms at a local Denny’s, a toughening experience that prepared him for life as a tech CEO. As a business sage, Mr. Huang says that work is simply perseverance in the face of difficult odds and that character is the source of greatness. Asked how to be successful, he will respond: “I wish upon you ample doses of pain and suffering.”

. . .

By . . . -the late 1990s—Mr. Huang had figured out a particular way of building and managing his company. The bedrock precept was ferociously hard work. New employees were told that the culture was “ultra-aggressive.” Mr. Huang demanded that they work at the “speed of light,” constrained (as Mr. Kim puts it) “only by the laws of physics—not by internal politics or financial concerns.”

. . .

Does all of this success make Mr. Huang happy? Apparently not. After one especially successful quarter, he began a review meeting by saying: “I look in the mirror every morning and say, ‘you suck.’ ” He still enjoys publicly dressing down employees, saying that humiliation is a small price to pay for group learning. He believes that he can “torture” his people “into greatness.” When employees begin to ramble in his presence, he will start to murmur “LUA,” a warning to the speaker. The abbreviation means: “Listen to the question. Understand the question. Answer the Question.”

For the full review see:

Philip Delves Broughton. “Bookshelf; The Hard Work Of Tech Mastery.” The Wall Street Journal (Monday, Dec. 16, 2024): A15.

(Note: ellipses added.)

(Note: the online version of the review has the date December 15, 2024, and has the title “Bookshelf; The Nvidia Way’: The Hard Work of Tech Mastery.”)

The book under review is:

Kim, Tae. The Nvidia Way: Jensen Huang and the Making of a Tech Giant. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2024.

High Cost of Sickle Cell Cure, Slows Insurance Reimbursement, Delaying Surcease of Sorrow

The high-cost of innovative treatments for dire diseases is largely driven by the high cost of government=mandated Phase 3 clinical trials. For relatively rare diseases, these costs must be spread over fewer patients, making the cost per patient astronomical. If mandates were repealed costs would fall, insurance would be more likely to cover them, and more patients would be cured more quickly.

Note also that one of the pharma firms developing a cure for sickle cell disease is Vertex. Vertex was chronicled in two books by Barry Werth. In the first Vertex was a mission-oriented startup. In the second it was growing by adding marketers, investment experts, legal experts, and regulator-whisperers–seemingly headed toward losing their mission and their passion.

How much of the original spirit of Vertex has managed to survive?

(p. A1) An estimated 100,000 people in the United States, most of them Black, have sickle cell disease.

Gene therapy dangles the prospect of normalcy for the estimated 20,000 people in the United States with the most severe forms of the disease — lives without constant pain and continuing damage to organs and bones and joints.

But all is not well in the world of sickle cell gene therapy.

Last December [2023], the Food and Drug Administration gave approval to two companies, Bluebird Bio of Somerville, Mass., and Vertex Pharmaceuticals of Boston, to sell the first gene therapies approved for sickle cell disease. After nine months, Kendric remains the first Bluebird patient to progress this far, with at least a few others advancing toward his pace.

. . .

(p. A20) “We all expected it to be much faster,” said Dr. Leo Wang of City of Hope Children’s Cancer Center in Los Angeles, which has so far sent cells from one patient to Vertex for the treatment, and is in the final stages of getting authorization from Bluebird.

. . . The treatment is labor intensive, requiring patients to spend at least a month in the hospital. City of Hope can treat at least one patient a month, Dr. Wang said. Other large medical centers said they could treat only 10 or fewer per year, and some say they can treat just five or six.

Then there is insurance.  . . .

“Authorization and reimbursement are not the same thing,” said Dr. Stephan Grupp at Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, which has not yet infused patients with treated cells.

The hospital, he says, has to buy the treatment for $2.2 million per patient from Vertex or $3.1 million from Bluebird. It is reimbursed after the therapy is delivered to the patient. Hospitals get nervous, Dr. Grupp said, because they have to lay out a lot of money. “They want to see that reimbursement happen,” he said.

Some hospitals decided to treat one patient at a time, limiting how much they commit up front.

Making the process even more cumbersome, a hospital has to negotiate separately with each patient’s insurer, said Dr. Julie Kanter of the University of Alabama at Birmingham. Her medical center has not yet started treating patients.

Most hospitals, she said, “don’t want to approve the treatment until they know what the payment plan looks like.”

For the full story see:

Gina Kolata. “Vanguard of Sickle Cell-Free Patients Finds a Long, Hard Road.” The New York Times (Tuesday, September 17, 2024): A1 & A20.

(Note: ellipses, and bracketed year, added.)

(Note: the online version of the story was updated Sept. 20, 2024, and has the title “First Day of a ‘New Life’ for a Boy With Sickle Cell.”)

Werth’s account of the founding and early mission-orientation of Vertex is:

Werth, Barry. The Billion-Dollar Molecule: One Company’s Quest for the Perfect Drug. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.

Werth’s account the later growth and risk of loss of mission-orientation is:

Werth, Barry. The Antidote: Inside the World of New Pharma. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014.

Disintermediate Healthcare

Many of the problems of our broken healthcare system could be fixed if insurers and healthcare providers were competing directly and transparently for the dollars of patients. But their are middlemen between patients and providers–mostly employers and governments. The goals and knowledge of the payers overlap, but are not the same. The payers may prioritize lowering their costs and may not care as much, or even know, the full costs to the patients.

The patients have a much better knowledge of the value of the healthcare or insurance that they are receiving, but they are very constrained in their ability to switch to insurers or healthcare providers who provide better services, or do so more efficiently. For many workers healthcare and health insurance are bundled with their work. They can leave their work, but other components of the bundle matter.

And nothing is transparent.

The fancy word for cutting out the middleman is “disintermediation.”

(p. 1) Weeks after undergoing heart surgery, Gail Lawson found herself back in an operating room. Her incision wasn’t healing, and an infection was spreading.

At a hospital in Ridgewood, N.J., Dr. Sidney Rabinowitz performed a complex, hourslong procedure to repair tissue and close the wound.

. . .

But the doctor was not in her insurance plan’s network of providers, leaving his bill open to negotiation by her insurer. Once back on her feet, Ms. Lawson received a letter from the insurer, UnitedHealthcare, advising that Dr. Rabinowitz would be paid $5,449.27 — a small fraction of what he had billed the insurance company. That left Ms. Lawson with a bill of more than $100,000.

“I’m thinking to myself, ‘But this is why I had insurance,’” said Ms. Lawson, who is fighting UnitedHealthcare over the balance. “They take out, what, $300 or $400 a month? Well, why aren’t you people paying these bills?”

The answer is a little-known data analytics firm called MultiPlan. It works with UnitedHealthcare, Cigna, Aetna and other big insurers to decide how much so-called out-of-network medical providers should be paid. It promises to help contain medical costs using fair and independent analysis.

But a New York Times investigation, based on interviews and confidential documents, shows that MultiPlan and the insurance companies have a large and mostly hidden financial incentive to cut those reimbursements as much as possible, even if it means saddling patients with large bills. The formula for MultiPlan and the insurance companies is simple: The smaller the reimbursement, the larger their fee.

Here’s how it works: The most common way Americans get health coverage is through employers that “self-fund,” meaning they pay for their workers’ medical care with their own money. The employers contract with insurance companies to administer the plans and process claims. Most medical visits are with providers in a plan’s network, with rates set in advance.

But when employees see a provider outside the network, as Ms. Lawson did, many insurance companies consult with MultiPlan, which typically recommends that the employer pay less than the provider billed. The difference between the bill and the sum actually paid amounts to a savings for the employer. But, The Times found, it means big money for MultiPlan and the insurer, since both companies often charge the employer a percentage of the savings as a processing fee.

In recent years, the nation’s largest insurer by revenue, UnitedHealthcare, has reaped an annual windfall of about $1 billion in fees from out-of-network savings programs, including its work with MultiPlan, according to testimony by two of its executives.

. . .

(p. 18) In some instances, the fees paid to an insurance company and MultiPlan for processing a claim far exceeded the amount paid to providers who treated the patient. Court records show, for example, that Cigna took in nearly $4.47 million from employers for processing claims from eight addiction treatment centers in California, while the centers received $2.56 million. MultiPlan pocketed $1.22 million.

. . .

In examining MultiPlan’s dominant role in this secretive world, The Times reviewed more than 50,000 pages of confidential corporate records, legal filings, claims information and other documents. The Times also interviewed more than 100 patients, doctors, billing specialists, advisers to employer health plans and former MultiPlan employees.

. . .

Mary Reinbold Jerome had been diagnosed with ovarian cancer at age 62 and received treatment at Memorial Sloan Kettering. Because the hospital was outside her plan’s network, she was billed tens of thousands of dollars.

. . .

She stood beside Andrew M. Cuomo, then the attorney general, as he announced his office’s blistering conclusions: A payment system riddled with conflicts of interest had been shortchanging patients, and at its core was a data company called Ingenix. Insurers used the company, a UnitedHealth subsidiary, to unfairly lower their payments and shift costs to patients, the probe found.

. . .

But amid the triumph, a key detail in the attorney general’s agreements with insurers largely escaped notice: The companies were required to use the nonprofit database for only five years.

When that term expired in 2014, MultiPlan was well positioned to capitalize.

For decades, the company, founded in 1980, offered a traditional approach to managing out-of-network claims by negotiating rates with doctors. Insurers got discounts and assurances that patients would not have to make up the difference.

But after MultiPlan’s founder sold it to private equity investors in 2006, the company pursued a more aggressive approach. It embraced pricing tools that used algorithms to recommend lower payments, and no longer protected patients from having to pay the difference, documents show.

Meanwhile, private equity ramped up investments in physician groups and hospitals and, in some instances, began billing for extraordinary sums. Once insurers were no longer obligated to use the nonprofit database, FAIR Health, they began looking for ways to combat that billing and other charges they considered egregious.

. . .

Internal documents show that UnitedHealthcare began a campaign to persuade employers to switch from FAIR Health. In a 2019 email, a UnitedHealthcare senior vice president emphasized creating a “sense of urgency” and helping companies still using FAIR Health “understand they don’t want to be on that program anymore.”

UnitedHealthcare had a big incentive to encourage this change. When it processed claims from employer plans using FAIR Health, the insurer collected no additional fee, according to legal testimony. But when it used MultiPlan, documents show, it typically charged employers 30 to 35 percent of the difference between the billed amount and the portion paid.

MultiPlan, too, charged a percentage of the savings, meaning it could make more by recommending lower payments. (FAIR Health charged a flat fee.)

. . .

(p. 19) Some providers said they had begun requiring payment upfront or stopped accepting patients with certain insurance plans because appealing for higher payments can be time-consuming, infuriating and futile. Others have tried to sue insurers or MultiPlan. Dr. Rabinowitz, who repaired Ms. Lawson’s incision, hopes to collect the remaining balance from UnitedHealthcare in an ongoing case.

Surprise bills for some types of care are no longer an issue, insurers said, thanks to the law that went into effect in 2022. Brittany Perritt didn’t realize the anesthesiologists at her 3-year-old’s brain tumor treatments in 2020 were out-of-network until the claims went to MultiPlan. If that care occurred today, she likely would be spared the calls from debt collectors, because she didn’t go out of network by choice.

But MultiPlan assured investors shortly before the law’s passage that it was likely to have “limited impact” on the company. In fact, MultiPlan said, 90 percent of its revenue involved out-of-network claims that wouldn’t be affected.

. . .

Even when patients figured out where to direct complaints — the Employee Benefits Security Administration — they described the process as draining and mostly fruitless.

. . .

Insurers can set negotiation parameters for MultiPlan, including not negotiating at all, records and interviews show. Multiple providers and billing specialists said that in recent years they had increasingly been told their claims weren’t eligible for negotiation.

“It wasn’t this bad before,” said Tiffany Letosky, who oversees a small practice specializing in surgeries for endometriosis and gynecologic cancers.

Former MultiPlan negotiators said their bonuses had been linked to their success at reducing payments, incentivizing a hard-line approach.

Ms. Young, the former negotiator critical of the process, said she had occasionally called a provider from a cellphone — knowing that her work line was recorded — and advised against accepting her own offer.

Another former negotiator said the pressure to get bigger discounts had made her physically ill. “It was just a game,” she said. “It’s sad.”

For the full story see:

Chris Hamby. “Patients Hit With Big Bills While Insurers Reap Fees.” The New York Times, First Section (Sunday, April 7, 2024): 1 & 18-19.

(Note: the online version of the story was updated April 9, 2024, and has the title “Insurers Reap Hidden Fees by Slashing Payments. You May Get the Bill.”)

S.B.A. “Forgives” Most Covid “Loans” Even Though at Least 17% Were Issued to Fraudsters

We used to handle suffering during crises by mutual aid societies or by giving philanthropy to those we know best–our friends and neighbors. The potential fraudster is less likely to defraud their brother or neighbor, than some unknown taxpayer in a distant state. And the local philanthropist is more likely to be able to judge which relative or neighbor will benefit from aid. Giving billions to fraudsters fueled the future inflation that ordinary decent citizens would latter struggle with.

If the federal government wanted to reduce the pain from the pandemic, the best way would have been to reduce the number, and shorten the length, of mandates. Handing so much money to fraudsters, with so little due diligence, is outrageous.

[Admission: I was the victim of identity theft when the S.B.A. gave a fraudster, using my name, tens of thousands of dollars for a potato farm supposedly run by me. Then the S.B.A. had the audacity to start sending me threatening letters about my alleged failure to pay back the loans they had given to the fraudster.]

(p. A1) When J. Bryan Quesenberry first learned that the federal government was sending out hundreds of billions of dollars to help businesses survive during the Covid-19 pandemic, he thought: “There’s going to be fraud here. There just has to be.”

A few months later, Mr. Quesenberry started sifting through a list of businesses that received Paycheck Protection Program loans, which were intended to help small businesses ravaged by the pandemic continue paying their employees. The Oregon lawyer said he knew businesses were not allowed to receive more than one loan during a single round, so he searched for “double dippers.”

He soon found dozens of businesses across the country that appeared to improperly obtain P.P.P. loans. During the summer of 2020, Mr. Quesenberry started suing those firms to try to help the government recover funds.

“It just blows my mind,” Mr. Quesenberry said. “That’s tax money that comes out of your pocket and that comes out of my pocket.”

As federal officials try to retrieve billions in stolen pandemic relief funds, private citizens are scouring public data, company websites and social media pages to help identify potential cases. Those who have filed suits say they are motivated by the desire to root out wrongdoers and expose corporate fraud.

But there is also a strong financial incentive. Under the False Claims Act, private citizens can file lawsuits on behalf of the federal government against those who may have defrauded the United States. If the government recovers funds, those citizens can typically earn between 15 and 30 percent of that amount.

. . .

(p. A15) The armchair sleuthing highlights how widespread pandemic fraud was and how federal investigators have struggled to keep up with it. In its haste to stave off an economic crisis and provide immediate aid to Americans, Washington distributed billions of dollars with few strings and little oversight. The Small Business Administration’s inspector general has estimated that more than $200 billion — or at least 17 percent of the pandemic loans the agency distributed — was awarded to “potentially fraudulent actors.” The majority of P.P.P. loans have been forgiven by the federal government.

While federal investigators have gone after some of the biggest perpetrators of fraud, limited resources have hindered their ability to go after the estimated thousands of people who improperly took government money.

. . .

Some private citizens said that it often took hours to investigate leads, and that they were unearthing cases that might otherwise slip through the cracks. Although Mr. Quesenberry said he relied primarily on information available on the internet to build cases, he said it was a time-intensive process that often required combing through government websites, Yelp pages, news articles and LinkedIn profiles. He said he thought he added value because he was pulling together evidence to “paint the picture of fraud.”

Mr. Quesenberry has earned more than $400,000 from 10 cases that have helped the federal government recover more than $3 million, according to a review of documents from U.S. attorney’s offices. Mr. Quesenberry said he had been investigating pandemic fraud for about four and a half years and was now working on his cases full time.

. . .

Hadar Susskind, the president and chief executive of Americans for Peace Now, said officials thought they had qualified for the loan because they did not consider the nonprofit to be a political organization. He said they had settled because it could have been costlier to go to court.

Mr. Susskind said he had never met Mr. Abrams, but he believed the complaint was “very much ideologically motivated” because of the nonprofit’s work to promote Israeli-Palestinian peace.

In an email, Mr. Abrams said: “In America these anti-Israel organizations have the right to spin, distort or even outright lie about Israel. However, they do not have the right to subsidize their activities with government monies for which they were not eligible.”

Mr. Abrams said he had long done other activist work, including recently representing a Jewish high school student who was the victim of antisemitic bullying. He said that he did not charge fees in those matters, and that the “whistle-blower cases do generate significant revenue so things more or less balance out.”

For the full story see:

Madeleine Ngo. “Fraud Hunters Earn Windfalls Tied to Covid.” The New York Times (Monday, November 25, 2024): A1 & A15.

(Note: ellipses, and bracketed date, added.)

(Note: the online version of the story has the date Nov. 23, 2024, and has the title “They Investigated Pandemic Fraud, Then Earned Thousands.”)

Healthcare Innovations Can Be Effective AND Cheap

Many are resigned to accept our current mess of a healthcare system because they fear that if the system was changed into a fully free market system they would not be able to afford anything approaching their current level of healthcare. But they do not understand what would change. If patients paid for their own healthcare there would be competition to provide cheaper healthcare services to the many. Henry Ford got rich finding ways to make cars better and cheaper. Bill Gates got rich mainly by making adequate operating systems cheaper.

If we made healthcare a free market, then healthcare would find its Henry Ford and Bill Gates. If patients directly paid for healthcare, then healtcare services would be more consumer oriented–for instance the value of patients’ time would be respected. Medical entrepreneurs would compete to bring us more cures and cheaper cures.

The problem is not that we are “fixated on profits” as is suggested in the last paragraph quoted below. The problem is that our non-market healthcare system creates perverse incentives and perverse regulatory constraints, so that simple frugal innovations are not rewarded.

[Below I first quote a few passages from The New York Times obituary of Cash, and then from The Wall Street Journal obituary of Cash.]

(p. A21) Richard A. Cash, who as a young public-health researcher in South Asia in the late 1960s showed that a simple cocktail of salt, sugar and clean water could check the ravages of cholera and other diarrhea-inducing diseases, an innovation that has saved an estimated 50 million lives, died on Oct. 22 at his home in Cambridge, Mass. He was 83.

. . .

Dr. Cash, the son of a doctor, arrived in East Pakistan, today Bangladesh, in 1967 as part of a project through the U.S. Public Health Service. There he worked with another young American doctor, David Nalin, to respond to a cholera outbreak outside the capital, Dhaka.

The two had already been researching a simple oral rehydration therapy and knew of other, previous efforts, all of which had failed. But they believed that the therapy held promise, especially in the face of mounting deaths.

They realized that a main problem was volume: Past efforts had resulted in too little or too much hydration. Dr. Cash and Dr. Nalin conceived a trial in which they carefully measured the amount of liquid lost and replaced it with the same amount, mixed with salt and sugar to facilitate absorption.

They divided 29 patients into three groups, with one group receiving an IV drip, another an oral treatment through a tube, and the third an oral treatment by drinking from a cup.

Other doctors and nurses found their experiment bizarre and tried to stop them. But Dr. Cash and Dr. Nalin persisted, splitting the work between them in two 12-hour shifts, to ensure the integrity of the trial.

The results were definitive: Only three of the tubed patients — and only two who drank the solution — needed additional IV treatment.

. . .

“We’re enamored by high technology,” he said at the Council on Foreign Relations. “And we’re not in love with low-tech. Low-tech is always seen in our eyes as second-class. Why would you do this, when you could do that? And I would argue just the opposite.”

For the full obituary from The New York Times that is quoted above, see:

Clay Risen. “Richard A. Cash, 83, Who Saved Millions From Dehydration, Dies.” The New York Times (Monday, November 4, 2024): A21.

(Note: ellipses added.)

(Note: the online version of the obituary has the date Nov. 2, 2024, and has the title “Richard A. Cash, Who Saved Millions From Dehydration, Dies at 83.”)

(p. C6) Half a liter of water, plus a pinch of salt and a fistful of sugar. As scientific insights go, it can’t compare to the intricate equations developed to split the atom or map the planets’ paths. But its simplicity was crucial to its monumental impact.

That simple solution—the cornerstone of Oral Rehydration Therapy, or ORT—has proved extraordinary in staving off and reversing the devastating consequences of dehydration caused by cholera and other diarrheal diseases, saving tens of millions of lives since its development nearly six decades ago. In 1978, an editorial in the Lancet called ORT “potentially the most important medical advance of the century.”

. . .

Cash saw this ethos of simplicity and accessibility as instructive for a western medical system that’s infatuated with high-tech solutions, dismissive of low-tech ones and fixated on profits—and where, consequently, an overnight stay in the hospital for dehydration can result in a four-figure bill. “A solution that can’t be applied,” he told Harvard Magazine, “is really no solution at all.”

For the full obituary from The Wall Street Journal that is quoted immediately above, see:

Jon Mooallem. “A Doctor Whose Simple Treatment Prevented Millions Of Cholera Deaths.” The Wall Street Journal (Saturday, Nov. 9, 2024): C6.

(Note: ellipsis added.)

(Note: the online version of the obituary has the date November 7, 2024, and has the title “Richard Cash, Whose Rehydration Therapy Saved Millions of Lives, Dies at 83.”)

Libertarians Salute Trump for Keeping His Promise to Pardon Free Trade Innovator Ross Ulbricht

Libertarians believe that governments should stay out of voluntary exchanges between consenting adults. So when Ross Urlbricht set up Silk Road as a platform for exchange that excluded governments, he became a libertarian hero. (For an extensive account see Bilton 2017.) When Ulbricht was given a disproportionately severe sentence, he became a martyred libertarian hero.

Libertarians are conflicted about Donald Trump. They like his courage and perseverance, but don’t like his name-calling and bullying. They like his deregulation and downsized bureaucracies, but don’t like his tariffs and industrial policy.

Trump promised that if elected, he would pardon Ross Ulbricht. On the first full day of his second term, The Donald kept his promise. Libertarians like that–a lot!

Michael Milken was an entrepreneurial finance innovator whose RICO conviction, instigated by Rudy Giuliani in his New York City prosecutor days, was a travesty of justice. (See: Kornbluth 1992; (an aside in) Milken 2023, and Sandler 2023.) The second Bush could and should have pardoned Milken, but did not. Trump late in his first term did, putting justice ahead of political correctness.

Not many people care about Ulbricht and Milken, but those who do care, care–inclining them to keep open minds on Donald Trump.

For The New York Times‘s snidely dismissive view of the Ulbricht pardon see:

David Yaffe-Bellany and Ryan Mac. “Pardon Is Won By Leveraging Trump’s Needs.” The New York Times (Fri., January 24, 2025): A1 & A15.

(Note: the online version of the article has the date January 22, 2025, and has the title “How Trump Was Persuaded to Pardon an Online Drug Kingpin.”)

The best known account of Ulbricht’s Silk Road is:

Bilton, Nick. American Kingpin: The Epic Hunt for the Criminal Mastermind Behind the Silk Road. New York: Portfolio, 2017.

The books on Milken mentioned in my comments are:

Kornbluth, Jesse. Highly Confident: The Crime and Punishment of Michael Milken. New York: William Morrow & Co., 1992.

Milken, Michael. Faster Cures: Accelerating the Future of Health. New York: William Morrow, 2023.

Sandler, Richard V. Witness to a Prosecution: The Myth of Michael Milken. ForbesBooks: Charleston, South Carolina, 2023.

Obamacare (the So-Called “Affordable Care Act”) Has “A Complex, Often Byzantine, Eligibility and Enrollment System”

Obamacare, Medicare, and Medicaid are supposed to help the least-well-off. But the least-well-off are exactly those who are least able to navigate the red-tape of the bureaucracy. Signing up for Amazon Prime was far simpler than signing up for Medicare. (My source is personal experience.)

(p. A18) The Trump administration on Friday said that it would drastically cut annual spending on so-called navigator groups that help Americans enroll in Obamacare health insurance plans, from around $100 million to just $10 million.

. . .

The Trump administration on Friday [Feb. 14, 2025] noted that health insurance navigators enrolled only 92,000 people on the Affordable Care Act’s marketplaces last year, or less than 1 percent of plan participants, amounting to more than $1,000 per enrollment. During Mr. Trump’s first term, with funding levels similar to the one announced Friday, navigators enrolled people at “a far more efficient $211 per enrollment,” the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services said in its announcement.

. . .

“They are primarily there to help people navigate a complex, often byzantine, eligibility and enrollment system,” said Sabrina Corlette, a research professor at Georgetown University’s Center on Health Insurance Reforms.

For the full story see:

Noah Weiland. “Administration Will Cut Funds For Navigators Of Obamacare.” The New York Times (Saturday, February 15, 2025): A18.

(Note: ellipses, and bracketed date, added.)

(Note: the online version of the story has the date Feb. 14, 2025, and has the title “Trump Shrinks Funds for Navigators Who Help Americans Enroll in Obamacare.”)

Land Use Regulations Slow Home Building

Productivity in manufacturing in the U.S. between 1930 and 2020 has increased, with stagnation for the last 10 years. In contrast, residential construction productivity increased, with more variability, from 1930 until the 1970s, and then stagnated or decreased. Starting in the 1970s an increase in land use and environmental regulations caused the stagnation.

So if we want more and better and cheaper housing, the key is less government regulation.

The study I summarize above is:

D’Amico, Leonardo, Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko, William R. Kerr, and Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto. “Why Has Construction Productivity Stagnated? The Role of Land-Use Regulation.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 33188, Nov. 2024.