artdiamondblog.com – Page 561 – Art Diamond's web log

Venter’s Use of ESTs “Leapfrogged” his X-Chromosome Proposal

(p. 82) Venter dubbed the fragments “expressed sequence tags,” or ESTs for short.
. . .
Venter was ecstatic. He had veered wildly off course from his approved plan of research, but the risk had paid off. While the Human Genome Project grant committee was still dragging its feet over his X-chromosome proposal, he had already leapfrogged ahead of that idea and found a way to go forward even faster, using his ESTs. Venter wrote Watson to let him know what he was up to, hoping to win his approval and some funding to continue the EST project.

Reference to book:
Shreeve, James. The Genome War: How Craig Venter Tried to Capture the Code of Life and Save the World. 1st ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004.
(Note: ellipsis added.)

At Pixar, “Storytelling is More Important Than Graphics”

Source of book image:
http://bp2.blogger.com/_Sar8IPNlxOY/SClPS33oTxI/AAAAAAAAB_0/B8GjajHtetY/s1600/PixarTouch.jpg

(p. A19) One of Mr. Catmull’s other inspirations was to hire computer animator John Lasseter after he was fired by Walt Disney Co. in 1983. (He had apparently stepped on one too many toes in the company’s sprawling management structure.) Then again, as Mr. Price reports, in the world of computer animators, workplace comings and goings seemed to be part of the job. Mr. Lasseter himself had already quit Disney and then returned before being fired. In the creative ferment of computer animation in the late 1970s and early 1980s, what mattered most was the work itself: Never mind who signs the paychecks – what project are you working on now?
. . .
One of Pixar’s first projects revealed a truth that would point the way to success: Storytelling is more important than graphics firepower. The company created a short film, directed by Mr. Lasseter, called “Tin Toy,” about a mechanical one-man band fleeing the terrors of a baby who wants to play with it. “Tin Toy” made audiences laugh in part because it turned established themes on their heads. The story was told from the toy’s-eye view, close to the floor. The baby, doing what babies do, seemed like a gigantic, capricious monster. “Tin Toy” won the 1988 Academy Award for animated short film.
The upside-down “Tin Toy” point of view seems to fit much of what happened at Pixar afterward. The company made a deal with Disney in 1991: The little animation outfit would produce three movies, and the entertainment behemoth would distribute and market them. With the outsize success of the first movie in the deal, “Toy Story” – it grossed $355 million world-wide – Pixar and Disney were perhaps on an inevitable collision course over control and profits. Mr. Price adroitly depicts the clashes between Mr. Jobs and his nemesis at Disney, chief executive Michael Eisner, and captures the sweet vindication of Mr. Lasseter as the projects he guides outstrip the animation efforts of his former employer.
The sweetest moment in the Pixar saga came two years ago, when Disney bought the company for $7.4 billion in an all-stock deal – one that gave Pixar executives enormous power at their new home. Mr. Jobs sits on the Disney board and is the company’s largest shareholder. (Mr. Eisner left in 2005.) And Mr. Lasseter became the chief creative officer for the combined Disney and Pixar animation studios, where Mr. Catmull serves as president.
The day after the sale was announced, Mr. Lasseter and Mr. Catmull flew to Burbank, Calif., to address a crowd of about 500 animation staffers on a Disney soundstage. “Applause built as they made their way to the front,” Mr. Price reports, “and then erupted again in force” when the two men were introduced. “Lasseter was welcomed as a rescuer of the studio from which he had been fired some twenty-two years before.” In one of their first moves, Mr. Price says, Messrs. Lasseter and Catmull “brought back a handful of Disney animation standouts who had only recently been laid off.” Redemption, after all, is essential to any story well told.

For the full review, see:

PAUL BOUTIN. “Bookshelf, An Industry Gets Animated.” The Wall Street Journal (Weds., May 14, 2008): A19.
(Note: ellipsis added.)

Schumpeter’s Final Thoughts on the Importance of the Individual Entrepreneur

Here is McCraw discussing and quoting Schumpeter’s notes for the Walgreen Lectures that he was preparing to deliver just before he died.

(p. 475) In notes he prepared in 1949 for the prestigious Walgreen Lectures, Schumpeter headed one entire section “The Personal Element and the Element of Chance: A Principle of Indeterminateness.” Here, he wrote that the time had come for economists to face a problem they had long tried to dodge:

the problem of the influence that may be exerted by exceptional individuals, a problem that has hardly ever been treated without the most blatant preconceptions. Without committing ourselves either to hero worship or to its hardly less absurd opposite, we have got to realize that, since the emergence of exceptional indi-(p. 476)viduals does not lend itself to scientific generalization, there is here an element that, together with the element of random occurrences with which it may be amalgamated, seriously limits our ability to forecast the future. That is what is meant here by “a principle of indeterminateness.” To put it somewhat differently: social determinism, where it is nonoperational, is a creed like any other and entirely unscientific.

Source:
McCraw, Thomas K. Prophet of Innovation: Joseph Schumpeter and Creative Destruction. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2007.

McCain Proposes Prize to “Leapfrog” Battery Technology

“Campaigning Monday in Fresno, Calif., Senator John McCain said, if elected, he would offer $300 million to anyone who could build a more efficient car battery.” Source of caption and photo: online version of the NYT article quoted and cited below.

(p. A15) FRESNO, Calif. — In the 18th century the British offered a £20,000 prize to anyone who figured out how to calculate longitude. More recently, Netflix offered a million dollars for improving movie recommendations on its Web site. Now Senator John McCain is suggesting a new national prize: He said here Monday that if elected president he would offer $300 million to anyone who could build a better car battery.
. . .
“I further propose we inspire the ingenuity and resolve of the American people,” Mr. McCain said, “by offering a $300 million prize for the development of a battery package that has the size, capacity, cost and power to leapfrog the commercially available plug-in hybrids or electric cars.”
He said the winner should deliver power at 30 percent of current costs. “That’s one dollar, one dollar, for every man, woman and child in the U.S. — a small price to pay for helping to break the back of our oil dependency,” he said.

For the full story, see:

MICHAEL COOPER. “McCain Proposes a $300 Million Prize for a Next-Generation Car Battery.” The New York Times (Tues., June 24, 2008): A15 & A20.
(Note: ellipsis added.)

“Leapfrog-type Competition”

Below is the abstract of a paper that mentions “leapfrog-type competition.” Appendix 2 of the paper (pp. 143-144) attempts to set down a mathematical model of leapfrog competition.

(p. 135) This paper examines competition patterns and competitive strategies when technology changes continually. It first discusses optimal behavior for investment in technology. It is argued that although technological innovations supersede existing technologies, there are economically justifiable barriers to investing in the new technologies. These economic barriers, coupled with continuous technological change, have implications for certain aspects of strategy, such as entry by means of new technologies, timing of entry, leapfrog-type competition, vertical integration, the productivity dilemma, and escalating commitment. Finally, the industrial transformation of the steel industry is used as an example to illustrate these implications.

The reference for the paper is:
Tang, Ming-Je, and S. Zannetos Zenon. “Competition under Continuous Technological Change.” Managerial and Decision Economics 13, no. 2 (Mar.-Apr. 1992): 135-48.

Harvard Professor Doriot Used Venture Capital to Finance the Digital Equipment Corporation

Source of book image: http://creativecapital.wordpress.com/category/how-to-buy-creative-capital/

Doriot taught at Harvard during the whole time that Joseph Schumpeter taught at Harvard. Given that their interests apparently overlapped, it is surprising that there are no references to Schumpeter or to “creative destruction” in Ante’s book.
There are also no references to Doriot in McCraw’s recent comprehensive intellectual biography of Schumpeter.
(Scherer in his essay “An Accidental Schumpeterian” mentions taking a useful course from Doriot, but does not illuminate the relationship, if any, between Doriot and Schumpeter.)

(p. A17) Before Sand Hill Road near Stanford University became the center of the venture-capital universe – before Google and Pets.com – the modern market for financing risky startup companies took shape far from Silicon Valley in the years after World War II.

ARD was the first to raise what was then known as “risk capital” from outsiders at a time when investors’ wounds were still fresh from the stock-market crash of 1929 and the Depression of the 1930s. The high failure rate of start-ups had generally precluded raising money from average investors. And so ARD’s chief competitors in the postwar years were the Rockefellers and another old-money operation, J.H. Whitney & Co.
. . .
The company would hardly merit attention except for its one grand slam, Digital Equipment Corp., which helped establish the East Coast high-tech stronghold along Route 128 outside Boston.
Digital, a minicomputer maker co-founded by former Massachusetts Institute of Technology engineer Ken Olsen, received $70,000 from ARD in 1957 in return for a 70% stake, which eventually grew in value to hundreds of millions of dollars. Mr. Ante calculates the investment’s return at 70,000%.
. . .
Doriot, who taught at Harvard for 40 years, beginning in 1926, offered a popular class that was ostensibly about manufacturing but was more a seminar in his business philosophy. “He stressed common sense themes such as self-improvement, teamwork, and contributing to society,” Mr. Ante writes. Doriot was known for “spicing up his philosophy with practical and pithy words of advice.” Among them: “Always remember that someone somewhere is making a product that will make your product obsolete.”

For the full review, see:

RANDALL SMITH. “Bookshelf; Money to Make Things New.” The Wall Street Journal (Weds., May 21, 2008): A17.
(Note: ellipses added.)

Reference to the biography of Doriot:
Ante, Spencer E. Creative Capital: Georges Doriot and the Birth of Venture Capital. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2008.

Schumpeter Saw that the “Demand for Teaching Produces Teaching and Not Necessarily Scientific Achievement”

From McCraw’s summary of Schumpeter’s History of Economic Analysis:

(p. 453) During the mid-nineteenth century, universities were beginning to teach economics, but “the demand for courses and textbooks produced courses and textbooks and not much else. Does this not show that there is something to one of the theses of this book, namely, that need is not the necessary and sufficient condition of analytic advance and that demand for teaching produces teaching and not necessarily scientific achievement?”

Source:
McCraw, Thomas K. Prophet of Innovation: Joseph Schumpeter and Creative Destruction. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2007.

Kodak Ignored Digital to Its Peril

“Steven J. Sasson, an electrical engineer, created the first digital camera.” Source of caption and photo: online version of the NYT article quoted and cited below.

Kodak’s problems in detailed in the article below, fit very well Christensen’s account about how difficult it is for incumbent firms to embrace major disruptive technologies.

(p. C1) ROCHESTER — Steven J. Sasson, an electrical engineer who invented the first digital camera at Eastman Kodak in the 1970s, remembers well management’s dismay at his feat.
“My prototype was big as a toaster, but the technical people loved it,” Mr. Sasson said. “But it was filmless photography, so management’s reaction was, ‘that’s cute — but don’t tell anyone about it.’ ”
. . .
(p. C2) The company now has digital techniques that can remove scratches and otherwise enhance old movies. It has found more efficient ways to make O.L.E.D.’s — organic light-emitting diodes — for displays in cameras, cellphones and televisions.
This month, Kodak will introduce Stream, a continuous inkjet printer that can churn out customized items like bill inserts at extremely high speeds. It is working on ways to capture and project three-dimensional movies.
. . .
Paradoxically, many of the new products are based on work Kodak began, but abandoned, years ago. The precursor technology to Stream, for example, pushed ink through a single nozzle. Stream has thousands of holes and uses a method called air deflection to separate drops of ink and control the speed and order in which they are deposited on a page.
“I remember wandering through the labs in 2003, and seeing the theoretical model that could become Stream,” said Philip J. Faraci, Kodak’s president. “The technology was half-baked, but it was a real breakthrough.”
Other digital technologies languished as well, said Bill Lloyd, the chief technology officer. “I’ve been here five years, and I’m still learning about all the things they already have,” he said. “It seems Kodak had developed antibodies against anything that might compete with film.”
It took what many analysts say was a near-death experience to change that. Kodak, a film titan in the 20th century, entered the next one in danger of being mowed down by the digital juggernaut. Electronics companies like Sony were siphoning away the photography market, while giants like Hewlett-Packard and Xerox had a lock on printers.
“This was a supertanker that came close to capsizing,” said Timothy M. Ghriskey, chief investment officer at Solaris Asset Management, which long ago sold its Kodak shares.

For the full story, see:
CLAUDIA H. DEUTSCH. “At Kodak, Some Old Things Are New Again.” The New York Times (Fri., May 2, 2008): C1-C2.
(Note: ellipses added.)

“Allan Camp, a technician at Kodak’s inkjet development center in Rochester, works on the development of print heads for printers.” Source of caption and photo: online version of the NYT article quoted and cited above.

European Bureaucrat Forces Businesses to Make “a Smart Business Decision”

If open standards are always “a smart business decision” why do business managers need government bureaucrats to force that decision on them (through fining firms, like Microsoft, that sometimes favor proprietary standards)?
In fact, there are circumstances in which open standards are better for customers, and there are also circumstances in which proprietary standards are better.
To better understand these issues consult Shapiro and Varian’s Information Rules and Christensen and Raynor’s The Innovator’s Solution.

(p. C8) BRUSSELS — The European Union’s competition commissioner, Neelie Kroes, delivered an unusually blunt rebuke to Microsoft on Tuesday by recommending that businesses and governments use software based on open standards.

Ms. Kroes has fought bitterly with Microsoft over the last four years, accusing the company of defying her orders and fining it nearly 1.7 billion euros, or $2.7 billion, on the grounds of violating European competition rules. But her comments were the strongest recommendation yet by Ms. Kroes to jettison Microsoft products, which are based on proprietary standards, and to use rival operating systems to run computers.
“I know a smart business decision when I see one — choosing open standards is a very smart business decision indeed,” Ms. Kroes told a conference in Brussels. “No citizen or company should be forced or encouraged to choose a closed technology over an open one.”

For the full story, see:
JAMES KANTER. “Harsh Words for Microsoft Technology.” The New York Times (Weds., June 11, 2008): C8.

References mentioned:
Christensen, Clayton M., and Michael E. Raynor. The Innovator’s Solution: Creating and Sustaining Successful Growth. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2003.
Shapiro, Carl, and Hal R. Varian. Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1999.

NASA Suffers From “Utterly Dysfunctional Funding and Management System”

Source of book image: http://press.princeton.edu/images/k8618.gif

(p. A13) The space shuttle Discovery arrived safely home over the weekend, and I suppose we are all rather relieved – that is, those of us who were aware that the shuttle had blasted off a couple of weeks ago on yet another mission. Space exploration is attracting a lot of excitement these days, but the excitement seems to have less to do with the shuttle and more to do with private space ventures, like Richard Branson’s Virgin Galactic or Robert Bigelow’s plans for space hotels or Space Adventures Ltd., whose latest customer for a private space trip is Google co-founder Sergey Brin. He bought a ticket only last week.

Robert Zimmerman’s “The Universe in the Mirror” serves to remind us that NASA, too, can do exciting things in space. Yet the career of the Hubble Space Telescope has been both triumphant and troubled, bringing into focus the strengths and the weaknesses of doing things the NASA way.
. . .
In addition to telling a thrilling tale, Mr. Zimmerman provides a number of lessons. One, he says, is the importance of having human beings in space: Had Hubble not been designed for servicing by astronauts, it would have been an epic failure and a disaster for a generation of astronomers and astrophysicists. Though robots have their uses, he notes, “humans can fix things, something no unmanned probe can do.” . . .
But the biggest lesson of “The Universe in a Mirror” comes from the utterly dysfunctional funding and management system that Mr. Zimmerman portrays. Hubble was a triumph, but a system that requires people to sacrifice careers and personal lives, and to engage in “courageous and illegal” acts, in order to see it succeed is a system that is badly in need of repair. Alas, fixing Hubble turned out to be easier than fixing the system that lay behind its problems.

For the full review, see:

GLENN HARLAN REYNOLDS. “Bookshelf; We Can See Clearly Now.” The Wall Street Journal (Mon., June 16, 2008): A13.
(Note: ellipses added.)

The revised edition of the book under review (including an afterword added by the author) is:
Zimmerman, Robert. The Universe in a Mirror: The Saga of the Hubble Space Telescope and the Visionaries Who Built It. revised pb ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010.

Schumpeter on Civil Servants Drifting into “Bureau-Sadism”

(p. 435) . . . , the British civil service, which Schumpeter had admired ever since his youth in Vienna, had become enamored of their new role in economic planning, encouraged by the Labour government. Civil servants had drifted into “downright bureau-sadism” in their attitude toward business.

Source:
McCraw, Thomas K. Prophet of Innovation: Joseph Schumpeter and Creative Destruction. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2007.
(Note: ellipsis added.)