Antitrust – Page 9 – artdiamondblog.com

ExxonMobil’s “Honorable If Rigid Corporate Culture”

Source of book image: online version of the NYT review quoted and cited way below.

(p. C12) From Indiana to Indonesia, ExxonMobil is the multinational corporation that people love to hate. John D. Rockefeller’s creation is famed and feared for its discipline, its disregard for public opinion and its ability, year after year, to pump out the largest profits of any corporation on the planet. In “Private Empire,” Steve Coll provides a rare exploration of what makes a modern corporate giant tick and shows why the world looks different to the executives in the “God Pod” at ExxonMobil’s Texas headquarters than it might to you or me.

For the full review essay, see:
Marc Levinson. “Boardroom Reading of 2012.” The Wall Street Journal (Sat., December 15, 2012): C12.
(Note: the online version of the review essay has the date December 14, 2012.)

From another review of the same book:

“Private Empire” is meticulous, multi-angled and valuable. It is also, perhaps surprisingly, despite all the dark facts I have dumped above, impartial. Mr. Coll and his phlegmatic research assistants have interviewed more than 400 people, including Exxon Mobil’s longtime chief executive Lee R. Raymond, a legendarily hard character.

It’s among this book’s achievements that it attempts to view a dysfunctional energy world, as often as not, through Exxon Mobil’s eyes. The company is portrayed here, some egregious missteps aside, as possessing an honorable if rigid corporate culture that seeks to supply a product (unlike tobacco companies, to which it is often compared) that a functioning society actually must have.

For this full review, see:
DWIGHT GARNER. “Oil’s Dark Heart Pumps Strong.” The New York Times (Sat., April 27, 2012): C25 & C32(?).
(Note: the online version of the review essay has the date April 26, 2012 and has the title “BOOKS OF THE TIMES; Oil’s Dark Heart Pumps Strong; ‘Private Empire,’ Steve Coll’s Book on Exxon Mobil.”)

The book under review, is:
Coll, Steve. Private Empire: ExxonMobil and American Power. New York: The Penguin Press, 2012.

“Richly Researched” Study of “Ironies of Antitrust Policy” in Retailing

(p. 819) Levinson’s book opens up a crucial discussion on the role of integrated retailer-distributors in shaping the twentieth-century U.S. economy. As he rightly notes in the book’s conclusion, A&P was in many ways the Walmart of its day: it used its buying power to squeeze inefficiencies out of supply chains, it was widely reviled for upending small-town business patterns and bitterly fighting union organizers, and yet it drew waves of customers who appreciated its low prices. While we have many business histories of mass-production industries, we have only a handful of richly researched studies of the mass retailers that have, in the words of historian Nelson Lichtenstein (2009), “become the key players in the worldwide marketplace of our time.” Levinson has produced a valuable book for business and economic historians interested in retailing, supply chains, and the ironies of antitrust policy. As a former editor for The Economist, furthermore, Levinson is particularly effective at translating challenging economic concepts into language that lay audiences and undergraduate students can grasp.

For the full review, see:
Hamilton, Shane. “The Great A&P and the Struggle for Small Business in America.” Journal of Economic Literature 50, no. 3 (Sept. 2012): 818-19.
(Note: italics in original.)

The book under review is:
Levinson, Marc. The Great A&P and the Struggle for Small Business in America. New York: Hill and Wang, 2011.

The Lichtenstein book mentioned is:
Lichtenstein, Nelson. The Retail Revolution: How Wal-Mart Created a Brave New World of Business. hb ed. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2009.

In Antitrust, as in Medicine, First Do No Harm

(p. 94) Western Union’s lawyers carne up with a dusty old New York Stale law, dated 1905, that said no one could buy more than 10 percent of a telegraph company chartered in that state without the approval of Albany lawmakers. Hard to believe, but it was right there in black and white and there was no possibility of getting the New York State legislature to understand why it was vital to build digital highways.
Talk about unintended consequences!
(p. 95) Originally, the law was written to stop Western Union from monopolizing the telegram business, but the law backfired and was used by the monopolist for its own protection.

Source:
Wyly, Sam. 1,000 Dollars and an Idea: Entrepreneur to Billionaire. New York: Newmarket Press, 2008.

First Principle for Trustbusters Should Be “Do No Harm”

(p. A2) In essence, Justice says that, beginning in 2008, several plankton, in the form of five publishers, conspired against a whale, Amazon, whose monopoly clout had imposed a $9.99 retail price for e-books.
The deal the publishers eventually reached with Apple unfixed the price of e-books by linking their prices to the cover price of the print version. More importantly, publishers could begin to reclaim the right to set e-book retail prices generally.
. . .
Apple, with 15% of the e-book market, is no monopolist. The five publishers, though Justice insists they dominate trade publishing, account for only about half of e-book sales. Crucially for antitrust, the barriers to entry are zilch: Amazon, with 60% market share, could create its own e-book imprint tomorrow and begin bidding for the most popular authors.
. . .
Let’s go back to “per se” vs. “rule of reason.” Because the 1890 Sherman Act is so sweeping and almost any business arrangement could be read as prohibited, courts understandably evolved a “rule of reason” to distinguish the permissible from the impermissible. Unfortunately, the result has been antitrust as we know it: wild and fluctuating discretion masquerading as law. Retail price maintenance alone has been embraced and dumped so many times by the courts that it must feel like Jennifer Aniston.
“Do no harm” would be a better principle for trustbusters.

For the full commentary, see:
HOLMAN W. JENKINS, JR. “BUSINESS WORLD; Washington vs. Books; What about piracy, low barriers to entry and the fact that literature isn’t chopped liver?” The Wall Street Journal (Sat., April 14, 2012): A15.
(Note: the online version of the commentary is dated April 13, 2012.)

A&P Sold Consumers Better and Lower-Priced Food

Source of book image: online version of the WSJ review quoted and cited below.

(p. A15) Mr. Levinson’s history centers on the two Hartford sons who followed their father into the business. They would spend their entire working lives at the company being known simply as “Mr. George” and “Mr. John.” Thoughtful and studious, Mr. George’s idea of excitement was a good jigsaw puzzle; Mr. John, somewhat more outgoing, liked the horses but also a daily lunch of milk and crackers. Together the brothers, neither of whom had finished high school, built what would be, for 40 years, the largest retail outlet in the world.

The brothers’ business philosophy was simple, writes Mr. Levinson: “If the company keeps its costs down and prices low, more shoppers would come through its doors, producing more profits than if it kept prices high.” The more stores they could open, the greater the take.
But the Hartfords had a public-relations problem. Since the nation’s earliest days, small family stores had served as community anchors. There were thousands across the country. Mom and pop knew every customer who came through their door; they extended credit to families down on their luck. If low-priced chains drove out such stores, what would happen to small-town America?
In fact, many mom-and-pop operations were inefficiently and incompetently run. A&P might be coldly corporate by comparison, but it offered consumers far more variety and fresher, better-quality goods at less cost to the family budget.

For the full review, see:
PATRICK COOKE. “BOOKSHELF; How a Grocer Bagged Profits; At its peak, the chain had nearly 16,000 stores. Critics charged it with competing unfairly by offering too-low prices.” The Wall Street Journal (Mon., AUGUST 29, 2011): A15.
(Note: ellipsis added.)

The book under review is:
Levinson, Marc. The Great A&P and the Struggle for Small Business in America. New York: Hill and Wang, 2011.

Steve Jobs on Public School System Monopoly

(p. A15) These days everyone is for education reform. The question is which approach is best. I favor the Steve Jobs model.
In 1984 Steve introduced the Mac with a Super Bowl ad. It ran only once. It ran for only one minute. And it shows a female athlete being chased by the helmeted police of some totalitarian regime.
At the climax, the woman rushes up to a large screen where Big Brother is giving a speech. Just as he announces, “We shall prevail,” she hurls her hammer through the screen.
If you ask me what we need to do in education, I would point you to that ad.
. . .
Steve Jobs knew all about competitive markets. He once likened our school system to the old phone monopoly. “I remember,” he said in a 1995 interview, “seeing a bumper sticker with the Bell Logo on it and it said ‘We don’t care. We don’t have to.’ And that’s what a monopoly is. That’s what IBM was in their day. And that’s certainly what the public school system is. They don’t have to care.”
We have to care. In this new century, good is not good enough. Put simply, we must approach education the way Steve Jobs approached every industry he touched. To be willing to blow up what doesn’t work or gets in the way. And to make our bet that if we can engage a child’s imagination, there’s no limit to what he or she can learn.

For the full commentary, see:
RUPERT MURDOCH. “OPINION; The Steve Jobs Model for Education Reform; If we can engage a child’s imagination, there’s no limit to what he or she can learn..” The Wall Street Journal (Sat., OCTOBER 15, 2011): A15.
(Note: ellipsis added.)

Mackey Reduced Role in Whole Foods after Being “Drained” by Antitrust Battle

“Higher existing-store sales powered Whole Foods earnings. Above, co-founder John Mackey juggles apples in a New York store last November.” Source of caption and photo: online version of the WSJ article quoted and cited below.

(p. B6) Whole Foods Market Inc. reported Wednesday that fiscal second-quarter profits had more than doubled and raised its full-year earnings forecast. The company also shook up its management team, naming a co-chief executive, though current CEO and co-founder John Mackey said he expects to work “for another decade or so.”
. . .
Mr. Mackey in December resigned as Whole Foods’ chairman after a year of controversy. Last summer, he wrote a controversial opinion article for The Wall Street Journal on his views of health care reform that led to boycotts of the natural grocer by some of his most loyal shoppers. Last spring, the Fair Trade Commission ordered the sale of 37 former Wild Oats Markets Inc. stores, a multi-year battle that Mr. Mackey says left him drained and influenced his decision to appoint Mr. Robb as co-CEO.

For the full story, see:
TIMOTHY W. MARTIN. “Profit Soars at Whole Foods; Grocery Chain Forecasts Sharply Higher Profit, Promotes Two Veteran Executives.” The Wall Street Journal (Thurs., MAY 13, 2010): B6.
(Note: ellipsis added.)
(Note: the first paragraph quoted above has slightly different wording in the online version than the print version; the second paragraph quoted is the same in both.)

Competitors Have “Incentive to Misuse the Government to Obtain an Advantage”

(p. A15) Today’s technology behemoth risks becoming tomorrow’s dinosaur, and competitors sometimes plead for government intervention to obtain what they fail to achieve in the market. As a former head of a competition agency, I offer . . . principles to guide competition policy toward successful innovators.

. . . , be wary of competitor complaints. When a competitor tells government that its rival acts unfairly, the complaint should be viewed with great suspicion. Competitor complaints are driving recent EU investigations into companies that include Qualcomm, Google, Oracle and IBM. Competitors can provide valuable information about marketplace realities, but they have every incentive to misuse the government to obtain an advantage that is otherwise unattainable.
. . .
. . . , don’t create disincentives for innovation. Complaining competitors often want innovators to be forced to share the source of their success, regardless of intellectual property rights. Nothing could be more destructive to the incentives for future innovation than rules that prevent innovators from reaping the full benefits of their work. As a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court said in its 2004 Verizon v. Trinko decision, “[f]irms may acquire monopoly power by establishing an infrastructure that renders them uniquely suited to serve their customers.”

For the full commentary, see:
TIMOTHY J. MURIS. “Antitrust in a High-Tech World; The first rule of regulators should be to be wary of complaints from competitors..” The Wall Street Journal (Tues., August 12, 2010): A15.
(Note: ellipses added.)

Doctors Seek to Regulate Retail Health Clinic Competitors

“A nurse practitioner with a patient at a retail clinic in Wilmington, Del.” Source of caption and photo: online version of the WSJ article quoted and cited below.

Clayton Christensen, in a chapter of Seeing What’s Next, and at greater length in The Innovator’s Prescription, has persuasively advocated the evolution of nurse practitioners and retail health clinics as disruptive innovations that have the potential to improve the quality and reduce the costs of health care.
An obstacle to the realization of Christensen’s vision would be government regulation demanded by health care incumbents who would rather not have to compete with nurse practitioners and retail health clinics. See below for more:

(p. B1) Retail health clinics are adding treatments for chronic diseases such as asthma to their repertoire, hoping to find steadier revenue, but putting the clinics into greater competition with doctors’ groups and hospitals.

Walgreen Co.’s Take Care retail clinic recently started a pilot program in Tampa and Orlando offering injected and infused drugs for asthma and osteoporosis to Medicare patients. At some MinuteClinics run by CVS Caremark Corp., nurse practitioners now counsel teenagers about acne, recommend over-the-counter products and sometimes prescribe antibiotics.
. . .
As part of their efforts to halt losses at the clinics, the chains are lobbying for more insurance coverage, and angling for a place in pending health-care reform legislation, while trying to temper calls for regulations.
. . .
(p. B2) But such moves are raising the ire of physicians’ groups that see the in-store clinics as inappropriate venues for treating complex illnesses. In May, the Massachusetts Medical Society urged its members to press insurance companies on co-payments to eliminate any financial incentive to use retail clinics.
. . .
The clinics are helping alter the practice of medicine. Doctors are expanding office hours to evenings and weekends. Hospitals are opening more urgent-care centers to treat relatively minor health problems.

For the full story, see:
AMY MERRICK. “Retail Health Clinics Move to Treat Complex Illnesses, Rankling Doctors.” The Wall Street Journal (Thurs., SEPTEMBER 10, 2009): B1-B2.
(Note: ellipses added.)

A brief commentary by Christensen (and Hwang) on these issues, can be found at:

CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN and JASON HWANG. “How CEOs Can Help Fix Health Care.” The Wall Street Journal (Tues., July 28, 2009).

For the full account, see:
Christensen, Clayton M., Jerome H. Grossman, and Jason Hwang. The Innovator’s Prescription: A Disruptive Solution for Health Care. New York: NY: McGraw-Hill, 2008.

Source of graph: online version of the WSJ article quoted and cited above.

Justice Department is Creating Barriers to Companies Trying to Create New Technologies

Intel CEO Craig Barrett. Source of caricature: online version of the WSJ article quoted and cited below.

(p. A9) Craig Barrett is spending the last days of his tenure as Intel chairman the same way he spent his previous 35 years at the corporation: moving at a superhuman pace that leaves exhausted subordinates in his wake.

Mr. Barrett has maintained this lifestyle since he replaced Andrew Grove as CEO of Intel in 1998. “Was it hard to follow a legend?” he asks himself in his typical blunt way, adding, “What do you think?” Mr. Barrett barely broke pace when he became chairman in 2005, and shows no sign of slowing even now, at age 69, as he faces retirement.
. . .
The latest thing that has him animated is the record $1.45 billion antitrust fine levied against Intel by the European Union this week. Mr. Barrett shakes his head and says, “The antitrust rules and regulations seem designed for a different era. When you look at high-tech companies, with the high R&D budgets, specialization and market creation they need to hold their big market shares, it’s so very different from the old world of oil companies and auto makers that the antitrust regulations were designed for. They are out of sync with reality.
“And how do you reconcile European regulators, who don’t believe that any company should have more than 50% market share — even a market that company created — with the way we operate here? Of course, now it seems as if our Justice Department is preparing to march in lock-step behind Europe. In the end, all they are going to do is create barriers to companies growing, entering into new markets, and bringing new technologies into those markets. And when we stop being the land of opportunity, all of those smart immigrant kids getting their Ph.D.s here are going to start heading home after they graduate. Then watch what happens to our competitiveness.”

For the full story, see:
MICHAEL S. MALONE. “OPINION: THE WEEKEND INTERVIEW with Craig Barrett; From Moore’s Law to Barrett’s Rules; Intel’s chairman on antitrust silliness and the secrets of high-tech success.” Wall Street Journal (Sat., MARCH 16, 2009): A9.
(Note: ellipsis added.)

Costs of Entry Were Low in Entrepreneurial Garment Industry in 1900

(p. 146) This was the second great advantage of the garment
industry. It wasn’t just that it was growing by leaps and bounds. It was also explicitly entrepreneurial. Clothes weren’t made in a single big factory. Instead, a number of established firms designed patterns and prepared the fabric, and then the complicated stitching and pressing and button attaching were all sent out to small contractors. And if a contractor got big enough, or ambitious enough, he started designing his own patterns and preparing his own fabric. By 1913, there were approximately (p. 147) sixteen thousand separate companies in New York City’s garment business, many just like the Borgenichts’ shop on Sheriff Street.

“The threshold for getting involved in the business was very low. It’s basically a business built on the sewing machine, and sewing machines don’t cost that much,” says Daniel Soyer, a historian who has written widely on the garment industry. “So you didn’t need a lot of capital. At the turn of the twentieth century, it was probably fifty dollars to buy a machine or two. All you had to do to be a contractor was to have a couple sewing machines, some irons, and a couple of workers. The profit margins were very low but you could make some money.”

Source:
Gladwell, Malcolm. Outliers: The Story of Success. New York, NY: Little, Brown, and Co., 2008.