Books – Page 154 – artdiamondblog.com

Picking Up Surface Nuggets Versus Digging a Deep Hole in One Place

(p. 423) The work was extraordinarily difficult, pushing the limits of the technically possible. Disappointment is my daily bread, he had said. I thrive on it. But he did not thrive. Often he thought of abandoning the work, abandoning all of it. Yet every day he continued to fill nearly every waking hour with thinking about it. Between 1934 and 1941 he published nothing. Nothing. For a scientist to go through such a dry period is more than depressing. It is a refutation of one’s abilities, of one’s life. But in the midst of that dry spell, Avery told a young researcher there were two types of investigators: most “go around picking up surface nuggets, and whenever they can spot a surface nugget of gold they pick it up and add it to their collection. . . . [The other type] is not really interested in the surface nugget. He is much more interested in digging a deep hole in one place, hoping to hit a vein. And of course if he strikes a vein of gold he makes a tremendous advance.”

Source:
Barry, John M. The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History. Revised ed. New York: Penguin Books, 2005.
(Note: italics, ellipsis, and brackets, all in original.)

Google Does Good

Source of cartoon: online version of the NYT commentary quoted and cited below.

(p. A25) . . . the vast majority of books ever written are not accessible to anyone except the most tenacious researchers at premier academic libraries. Books written after 1923 quickly disappear into a literary black hole. With rare exceptions, one can buy them only for the small number of years they are in print. After that, they are found only in a vanishing number of libraries and used book stores. As the years pass, contracts get lost and forgotten, authors and publishers disappear, the rights holders become impossible to track down.

Inevitably, the few remaining copies of the books are left to deteriorate slowly or are lost to fires, floods and other disasters. While I was at Stanford in 1998, floods damaged or destroyed tens of thousands of books. Unfortunately, such events are not uncommon — a similar flood happened at Stanford just 20 years prior. You could read about it in The Stanford-Lockheed Meyer Library Flood Report, published in 1980, but this book itself is no longer available.
Because books are such an important part of the world’s collective knowledge and cultural heritage, Larry Page, the co-founder of Google, first proposed that we digitize all books a decade ago, when we were a fledgling startup. At the time, it was viewed as so ambitious and challenging a project that we were unable to attract anyone to work on it. But five years later, in 2004, Google Books (then called Google Print) was born, allowing users to search hundreds of thousands of books. Today, they number over 10 million and counting.
. . .
In the Insurance Year Book 1880-1881, which I found on Google Books, Cornelius Walford chronicles the destruction of dozens of libraries and millions of books, in the hope that such a record will “impress the necessity of something being done” to preserve them. The famous library at Alexandria burned three times, in 48 B.C., A.D. 273 and A.D. 640, as did the Library of Congress, where a fire in 1851 destroyed two-thirds of the collection.
I hope such destruction never happens again, but history would suggest otherwise. More important, even if our cultural heritage stays intact in the world’s foremost libraries, it is effectively lost if no one can access it easily. Many companies, libraries and organizations will play a role in saving and making available the works of the 20th century. Together, authors, publishers and Google are taking just one step toward this goal, but it’s an important step. Let’s not miss this opportunity.

For the full commentary, see:
SERGEY BRIN. “A Library to Last Forever.” The New York Times (Fri., October 9, 2009): A25.
(Note: ellipses added.)
(Note: the online version is dated October 8th.)

“A Man of Science Past Sixty Does More Harm than Good” (Unless His Name is “Avery”)

(p. 421) . . . , in 1928, Fred Griffith in Britain published a striking and puzzling finding. Earlier Griffith had discovered that all known types of pneumococci could exist with or without capsules. Virulent pneumococci had capsules; pneumococci without capsules could be easily destroyed by the immune system. Now he found something much stranger. He killed virulent pneumococci, ones surrounded by capsules, and injected them into mice. Since the bacteria were dead, all the mice survived. He also injected living pneumococci that had no capsules, that were not virulent. Again the mice lived. Their immune systems devoured the unencapsulated pneumococci. But then he injected dead pneumococci surrounded by capsules and living pneumococci without capsules.
The mice died. Somehow the living pneumococci had acquired cap-(p. 422)sules. Somehow they had changed. And, when isolated from the mice, they continued to grow with the capsule–as if they had inherited it.
Griffith’s report seemed to make meaningless years of Avery’s work– and life. The immune system was based on specificity. Avery believed that the capsule was key to that specificity. But if the pneumococcus could change, that seemed to undermine everything Avery believed and thought he had proved. For months he dismissed Griffith’s work as unsound. But Avery’s despair seemed overwhelming. He left the laboratory for six months, suffering from Graves’ disease, a disease likely related to stress. By the time he returned, Michael Dawson, a junior colleague he had asked to check Griffith’s results, had confirmed them. Avery had to accept them.
His work now turned in a different direction. He had to understand how one kind of pneumococcus was transformed into another. He was now almost sixty years old. Thomas Huxley said, “A man of science past sixty does more harm than good.” But now, more than ever, Avery focused on his task.

Source:
Barry, John M. The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History. Revised ed. New York: Penguin Books, 2005.
(Note: ellipsis added.)
(Note: italics in original.)

Rapid Mutation of RNA-Based Flu Virus Allows Rapid Adaptation to Immune System Response

I found the passage quoted below to be especially illuminating on how rapid mutation helps explain why the flu virus is so successful and dangerous. (An additional important factor is that the virus can survive in birds, without killing them.)
It occurs to me that something akin to rapid mutation (e.g., rapid experimentation) has also been advocated as a way to quickly advance science (Karl Popper), or enterprise (George Gilder).

(p. 105) Whenever an organism reproduces, its genes try to make exact copies of themselves. But sometimes mistakes–mutations–occur in this process.

This is true whether the genes belong to people, plants, or viruses. The more advanced the organism, however, the more mechanisms exist to prevent mutations. A person mutates at a much slower rate than bacteria, bacteria mutates at a much slower rate than a virus–and a DNA virus mutates at a much slower rate than an RNA virus.
DNA has a kind of built-in proofreading mechanism to cut down on copying mistakes. RNA has no proofreading mechanism whatsoever, no way to protect against mutation. So viruses that use RNA to carry their genetic information mutate much faster–from 10,000 to 1 million times faster–than any DNA virus.
Different RNA viruses mutate at different rates as well. A few mutate so rapidly that virologists consider them not so much a population of copies of the same virus as what they call a “quasi species” or a “mutant swarm.”
These mutant swarms contain trillions and trillions of closely related but different viruses. Even the viruses produced from a single cell will include many different versions of themselves, and the swarm as a whole will routinely contain almost every possible permutation of its genetic code.
Most of these mutations interfere with the functioning of the virus and will either destroy the virus outright or destroy its ability to infect. But other mutations, sometimes in a single base, a single letter, in its genetic code will allow the virus to adapt rapidly to a new situation. It is this adaptability that explains why these quasi species, these mutant swarms, can move rapidly back and forth between different environments and also develop extraordinarily rapid drug resistance. As one investigator has observed, the rapid mutation “confers a certain randomness to the disease processes that accompany RNA [viral] infections.”
Influenza is an RNA virus. So is HIV and the coronavirus. And of all RNA viruses, influenza and HIV are among those that mutate the fastest. The influenza virus mutates so fast that 99 percent of the 100,000 to 1 million new viruses that burst out of a cell in the reproduction process (p. 106) are too defective to infect another cell and reproduce again. But that still leaves between 1,000 and 10,000 viruses that can infect another cell.
Both influenza and HIV fit the concept of a quasi species, of a mutant swarm. In both, a drug-resistant mutation can emerge within days. And the influenza virus reproduces rapidly–far faster than HIV. Therefore it adapts rapidly as well, often too rapidly for the immune system to respond.

Source:
Barry, John M. The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History. Revised ed. New York: Penguin Books, 2005.
(Note: italics in original.)

How Wilson and the Feds Turned “Only Influenza” into “The Great Influenza”

Here is the core of John Barry’s account of how President Woodrow Wilson, and his administration, turned what might have been an ordinary flu, into what, by some measures, was the worst pandemic in human history:

(p. 396) . . . , whoever held power, whether a city government or some private gathering of the locals, they generally failed to keep the community together. They failed because they lost trust. They lost trust because they lied. (San Francisco was a rare exception; its leaders told the truth, and the city responded heroically.) And they lied for the war effort, for the propaganda machine that Wilson had created.

It is impossible to quantify how many deaths the lies caused. It is impossible to quantify how many young men died because the army refused to follow the advice of its own surgeon general. But while those in authority were reassuring people that this was influenza, only influenza, nothing different from ordinary “la grippe,’ at least some people must have believed them, at least some people must have exposed themselves to the virus in ways they would not have otherwise, and at least some of these people must have died who would otherwise have lived. And fear really did kill people. It killed them because those who feared would not care for many of those who needed but could not find care, those who needed only hydration, food, and rest to survive.

Source:
Barry, John M. The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History. Revised ed. New York: Penguin Books, 2005.
(Note: ellipsis added.)

Government Actions Helped Spread 1918 Influenza

Source of book image: http://www.virology.ws/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/great-influenza.jpg

I like John Barry’s The Great Influenza very much, although not entirely for the reasons that I had expected to like it. I wanted to learn more of the details of the worst flu pandemic in history, and the book delivers those details.
But I had not expected that there would be substantial discussion of the epistemology of science and medicine, and of the political and global context that preceded and affected the 1918 H1N1 influenza pandemic.
As an added bonus, the book gives substantial coverage to the life and work of one of my heroes, Oswald Avery. As a result of his research related to the pandemic, he discovered that DNA was the genetic material—a huge milestone in the history of medicine. But he never received the Nobel Prize because the Nobel Committee didn’t want to be seen endorsing controversial work that had not stood the test of time.
On the other hand, the Nobel Committee had no such compunctions about giving the Nobel Peace Prize to President Woodrow Wilson. Barry’s book indicts Wilson for having major responsibility for the severity of the pandemic. His administration drafted huge numbers of young men to fight in WWI, bringing them into close contact in shoddy, incomplete training camps. Some of these young men already had the flu, and they quickly spread it to many of their fellow soldiers. The Wilson administration continued to move these soldiers around the country and to Europe, vastly speeding the spread of the disease.
Barry also documents that the Wilson administration, in the name of patriotism and morale, punished those who told the truth about the severity of the pandemic. The results extended far beyond the trampling of civil liberties. For example, there was a huge parade in Philadelphia to sell war bonds, a parade that could easily have been canceled, but was not—igniting the rapid spread of the disease in that hard-hit city. If the newspapers had been allowed to print the truth about the pandemic, then there probably would have been sufficient outcry to cancel the parade; or at the very least, many better-informed citizens would have avoided the parade, and saved their lives, and the lives of their family members.
There is also a lot in book about the biology of the disease that is of interest, and about the suffering of those who experienced it.
But what I found eye-opening was the extent to which the severity of the disease was due to avoidable actions by Woodrow Wilson and his administration.

Source of book discussed above:
Barry, John M. The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History. Revised ed: New York: Penguin Books, 2005.

For another eye-opening account about Woodrow Wilson and WWI, see:
Raico, Ralph. The Spanish-American War and World War I, Parts 1 & 2: Knowledge Products, 2006.

For a neat little paper on Oswald Avery, see:
Diamond, Arthur M., Jr. “Avery’s ‘Neurotic Reluctance’.” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 26, no. 1 (Autumn 1982): 132-36.

Doctors Seek to Regulate Retail Health Clinic Competitors

“A nurse practitioner with a patient at a retail clinic in Wilmington, Del.” Source of caption and photo: online version of the WSJ article quoted and cited below.

Clayton Christensen, in a chapter of Seeing What’s Next, and at greater length in The Innovator’s Prescription, has persuasively advocated the evolution of nurse practitioners and retail health clinics as disruptive innovations that have the potential to improve the quality and reduce the costs of health care.
An obstacle to the realization of Christensen’s vision would be government regulation demanded by health care incumbents who would rather not have to compete with nurse practitioners and retail health clinics. See below for more:

(p. B1) Retail health clinics are adding treatments for chronic diseases such as asthma to their repertoire, hoping to find steadier revenue, but putting the clinics into greater competition with doctors’ groups and hospitals.

Walgreen Co.’s Take Care retail clinic recently started a pilot program in Tampa and Orlando offering injected and infused drugs for asthma and osteoporosis to Medicare patients. At some MinuteClinics run by CVS Caremark Corp., nurse practitioners now counsel teenagers about acne, recommend over-the-counter products and sometimes prescribe antibiotics.
. . .
As part of their efforts to halt losses at the clinics, the chains are lobbying for more insurance coverage, and angling for a place in pending health-care reform legislation, while trying to temper calls for regulations.
. . .
(p. B2) But such moves are raising the ire of physicians’ groups that see the in-store clinics as inappropriate venues for treating complex illnesses. In May, the Massachusetts Medical Society urged its members to press insurance companies on co-payments to eliminate any financial incentive to use retail clinics.
. . .
The clinics are helping alter the practice of medicine. Doctors are expanding office hours to evenings and weekends. Hospitals are opening more urgent-care centers to treat relatively minor health problems.

For the full story, see:
AMY MERRICK. “Retail Health Clinics Move to Treat Complex Illnesses, Rankling Doctors.” The Wall Street Journal (Thurs., SEPTEMBER 10, 2009): B1-B2.
(Note: ellipses added.)

A brief commentary by Christensen (and Hwang) on these issues, can be found at:

CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN and JASON HWANG. “How CEOs Can Help Fix Health Care.” The Wall Street Journal (Tues., July 28, 2009).

For the full account, see:
Christensen, Clayton M., Jerome H. Grossman, and Jason Hwang. The Innovator’s Prescription: A Disruptive Solution for Health Care. New York: NY: McGraw-Hill, 2008.

Source of graph: online version of the WSJ article quoted and cited above.

Economic Understanding of the Great Depression is Still “Fragmentary”

In the last few decades the accepted opinion among most economists was that the profession understood what caused the Great Depression sufficiently so that we could be confident that we know how to avoid another Great Depression in the future.
Now the accepted opinion is becoming less accepted. I quote below the last sentence of Harold Cole’s review of a 2007 book that surveys current views of the Great Depression by distinguished economists:

(p. 418) I came away from the book struck by the fragmentary state of the science with respect to the Great Depression and the challenges that we still face in terms of developing a truly satisfactory quantitative theory of what happened.

Source:
Cole, Harold. “Review of Parker’s “the Economics of the Great Depression”.” Journal of Economic Literature 46, no. 2 (June 2008): 415-18.

The book under review is:
Parker, Randall E. The Economics of the Great Depression: A Twenty-First Century Look Back at the Economics of the Interwar Era. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar, 2007.

55% of Nebraskans Favor School Vouchers

The Friedman Foundation mentioned in the passage below, was founded by Nobel Prize winning economist Milton Friedman who is often credited with creating the idea of education vouchers in his classic book Capitalism and Freedom.
Capitalism and Freedom was based on a series of lectures that Friedman delivered at Wabash College at the invitation of my much-missed mentor Ben Rogge. (Before teaching me economics in Indiana, Rogge was a native Nebraskan who earned his bachelor’s degree from Hastings College.)

(p. 4B) A majority of Nebraskans are open to school-choice reforms such as school vouchers and tax-credit scholarships, according to a survey made public Thursday by a national school-choice group.

“It really appears Nebraska is ready to start talking about school-choice reform options,” said Paul DiPerna, director of partner services for the Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice, which commissioned the survey.
The group partnered with the Nebraska Catholic Conference and other state and national groups to conduct the telephone survey of 1,200 likely voters.
Fifty-five percent of those surveyed said they favored school vouchers and supported a tax-credit scholarship system, which would give tax credits to individuals and businesses that contribute money to nonprofit organizations that distribute private school scholarships.

For the full story, see:
Dejka, Joe. “Support for school choice tax plan seen; An Indianapolis organization says its survey shows Nebraskans would back a pending bill.” Omaha World-Herald (Fri., Sept. 18, 2009): 4B.

Jane Jacobs “Rightly Condemned the Arrogance and Elitism of Urban Planners”

Source of book image: online version of the WSJ review quoted and cited below.

(A15) In her day, she was a tenacious activist and an opponent of powerful interests, courting disfavor in high places. But today everyone loves Jane Jacobs, and understandably so. The author of the now-classic “The Death and Life of Great American Cities” (1961) is widely regarded as a common-sense visionary who reminded people about what makes cities livable.

According to Anthony Flint, the author of ”Wrestling With Moses,” Jacobs’s most important contribution was the idea that “cities and city neighborhoods had an organic structure of their own that couldn’t be produced at the drafting table.” Mr. Flint, a former journalist who now works at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, clearly counts himself as a Jacobs fan. His book is a lively and informative valentine to her, aimed at showing us especially how she “took on New York’s master builder and transformed the American city.”
The villain of the story is Robert Moses, the ”master builder” who for four decades–from the 1930s into the 1960s–led several well-funded, quasi-governmental agencies and radically transformed the landscape of New York, building roads, bridges, tunnels, parks, playgrounds, beaches and public housing. Though he never held elective office, he was powerful indeed, establishing a formidable base in the city and state bureaucracies. He might have fallen into obscurity after his death if it were not for Robert Caro, who immortalized Moses in “The Power Broker” (1974), a massive biography that portrays Moses as a despot whose creations helped to destroy the city.
. . .
One roots for Jacobs every step of the way, not least because she rightly condemned the arrogance and elitism of urban planners. And Moses was, in fact, a bully who had acquired too much power and disregarded the concerns of local residents. Slum clearance too often targeted functioning working-class neighborhoods, and urban renewal went far beyond what its utopian aims could possibly deliver.

For the full review, see:
VINCENT J. CANNATO. “Not Here, She Said; How Jane Jacobs fought the ‘power broker’ to save the Village–and a city.” The Wall Street Journal (Thurs., July 29, 2009): A15.
(Note: ellipsis added.)

The source of the book being reviewed, is:
Flint, Anthony. Wrestling with Moses: How Jane Jacobs Took on New York’s Master Builder and Transformed the American City. New York, NY: Random House, Inc., 2009.

Obama Industrial Policy Risks Funding Dead Ends

(p. B1) President Obama has cast himself as a reluctant interventionist in two of the nation’s major industries, Wall Street and Detroit. The federal aid, he says, is a financial bridge to a postcrisis future and the hand-holding will be temporary.

Even so, the scale of the government investment and control — especially by the auto task force now vetting plans at Chrysler and General Motors — points to an approach that has been shunned by the United States more than other developed nations.
“By any coherent definition, this is industrial policy,” said Marcus Noland, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.
. . .
(p. B7) . . . a more comprehensive, industrial-policylike approach to Detroit carries its own perils, economists say. In trying to manage the industrial shrinkage, they say, there is a fine line between easing the social impact and protecting jobs in ways that inhibit economic change and renewal. In pursuit of new growth, governments risk encouraging overinvestment in areas that prove to be technological dead ends.
In the Japanese experience, economists see evidence of both dangers. Problems, they say, are typically byproducts of what economists call “political capture.” That is, an industrial sector earmarked for special government attention builds up its own political constituency, lobbyists and government bureaucrats to serve that industry. They slow the pace of change, and an economy becomes less nimble and efficient as a result.
Economists say the phenomenon is scarcely confined to nations with explicit industrial policies and cite the history of agricultural subsidies in America or military procurement practices.
But going down the path of industrial policy certainly holds that risk. “You have to bear in mind the opportunity costs of these kinds of government interventions, and remember that life is not an economic textbook and that politics can easily override economic rationality,” said Mr. Noland, an author, with Howard Pack, of “Industrial Policy in an Era of Globalization: Lessons From Asia.”

For the full story, see:
STEVE LOHR. “Highway to the Unknown; Forays in Industrial Policy Bring Risks.” The New York Times (Weds., May 19, 2009): B1 & B7.
(Note: the online title is “In U.S., Steps Toward Industrial Policy in Autos.”)
(Note: ellipses added.)
The full reference to Noland and Pack’s book is:
Noland, Marcus, and Howard Pack. Industrial Policy in an Era of Globalization: Lessons from Asia, Policy Analyses in International Economics. Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute, 2003.