Category: Christensen, Clayton

Low End Tech Upstart Moves Up-Market to Compete with Incumbents

MediaTekRevenueGraph2010-05-20.gif

Source of graph: online version of the WSJ article quoted and cited below.

The MediaTek example briefly mentioned below, seems a promising fit with Christensen’s theory of disruptive innovators.

(p. B7) TAIPEI–A little-known Taiwanese chip-design company is making waves in the cellphone business, grabbing market share from larger U.S. rivals and helping drive down phone prices for consumers.
. . .
While MediaTek isn’t known for cutting-edge innovation, it has been able to apply the nimble, cost-cutting approach of Taiwan’s contract manufacturers to the business of designing semiconductors, in which engineers use advanced software to lay out the microscopic circuits that make gadgets like cellphones function.
“MediaTek has brought down the cost significantly,” says Jessica Chang, an analyst at Credit Suisse Group AG, who says mobile-phone makers are increasingly drawn to MediaTek’s products because of their functionality and low cost.

For the full story, see
TING-I TSAI. “Taiwan Chip Firm Shakes Up Cellphone Business.” The Wall Street Journal (Mon., APRIL 19, 2010): B7.
(Note: ellipsis added.)

On Christensen’s theories, see:
Christensen, Clayton M., and Michael E. Raynor. The Innovator’s Solution: Creating and Sustaining Successful Growth. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2003.

Porter Airlines Beats Incumbents in Serving High End Customers

DeluceRobertOfPorterAirlines2010-05-20.jpg“Robert Deluce set up Porter Airlines at Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport in October 2006.” Source of caption and photo: online version of the WSJ article quoted and cited below.

Clayton Christensen explains why upstart entrepreneurs who move up-market to serve under-served customers, will almost always lose to motivated incumbents.
Apparently Robert Deluce has not read Christensen.

(p. B8) TORONTO–As a teenager, Robert Deluce learned to fly at this city’s small airport just outside the downtown on a Lake Ontario island.
Lately, the 59-year-old airline entrepreneur has been giving his own brand of flying lessons there in a dogfight with larger competitors over a lucrative flying niche: the high-margin business traveler.
n 2005, Mr. Deluce bought the airport’s ramshackle terminal and later kicked out an Air Canada regional partner named Jazz Air. Then, he set up Porter Airlines, which has become a hit with business fliers for its top-notch service and convenient location, a one-minute ferry ride from the downtown waterfront. Earlier this month, closely held Porter opened the first phase of a gleaming, 150,000-square-foot terminal that eventually will house two passenger lounges and 10 aircraft gates.
. . .
The new carrier’s mascot is a raccoon. “He’s mischievous and determined and pretty much always achieves his desired goal,” said Mr. Deluce, chuckling over breakfast at a Toronto hotel. “Air Canada and Jazz probably think he’s over-mischievous.”
. . .
In recent years, Toronto’s waterfront has been revitalized, with high-rise condos and parks replacing grain elevators and industrial warehouses. Air Canada’s partner Jazz and a predecessor, which had been flying to and from the downtown airport for years, reduced service even as the redevelopment was progressing. The airport’s traffic waned to 25,000 fliers in 2005 from 400,000 a year in the late 1980s.
Smelling opportunity, Mr. Deluce pounced, acquiring the old terminal and evicting Jazz. He raised C$126 million in start-up capital and placed a US$500 million order for 20 Canadian-built turboprop aircraft. With 70 seats, they are perfectly sized for the airport’s short, 4,000-foot runway. Porter took wing in October 2006.
His aggressive tactics as CEO have earned him both criticism and grudging respect. Brian Iler, chairman of CommunityAir, a Toronto citizens advocacy group that wants the airport shut because of noise issues and other concerns, gives Mr. Deluce his due. “Everything he has done, he’s managed to turn things his way,” Mr. Iler says. “It’s an amazing run of luck.”
. . .
Porter now flies to four U.S. destinations and seven other cities in Eastern Canada, with an eighth coming this month. It had its first month of profitability in June 2007 and paid out to its employee profit-sharing plan that year and in 2008, Mr. Deluce says. He won’t say whether Porter was profitable in 2009.
The new airline has attracted a following for its downtown location, competitive fares, leather seats with generous legroom and complimentary beer, wine and snacks. Female flight attendants wear retro pillbox hats and peplum jackets.
Christopher Sears, vice president of research for Montreal-based brokerage firm MacDougall, MacDougall & MacTier Inc., said he has flown Porter 30 to 40 times between Montreal and Toronto. Once he arrives in Toronto, he grabs a free shuttle to a hotel two blocks from his firm’s Toronto office.
“Porter has built up a lot of goodwill with me,” he says, vowing to stick with the company even if rivals break into the downtown airport.

For the full story, see
SUSAN CAREY. “Tiny Airline Flies Circles Around Its Rivals; Top-Notch Service, Proximity to Downtown Toronto Make Porter a Hit With High-Margin Business Travelers.” The Wall Street Journal (Weds., MARCH 17, 2010): B8.
(Note: ellipses added.)
(Note: the online version of the article has the slightly different title “Tiny Airline Flies Circles Around Rivals; Top-Notch Service, Proximity to Downtown Toronto Makes Porter a Hit With High-Margin Business Travelers.”)

On Christensen’s theories, see:
Christensen, Clayton M., and Michael E. Raynor. The Innovator’s Solution: Creating and Sustaining Successful Growth. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2003.

BillyBishopAirportTrafficGraph2010-05-20.gif

Source of graph: online version of the WSJ article quoted and cited above.

Did Fairchild Fail Due to Bad Management or Disruptive Technology?

Clayton Christensen has shown how good management, following respected practices, can fail in the face of disruptive technologies. It would be interesting to investigate whether Fairchild was an example of what Christensen is talking about, or whether it just did not have good management.

(p. 89) Andrew Grove . . . had played a central role in bringing Fairchild to the threshold of a new era. But Fairchild would not enjoy the fruits of his work. Following the path of venture capital pioneer Peter Sprague were scores of other venture capitalists seeking to exploit the new opportunities he had shown them. Collectively, they accelerated the pace of entrepreneurial change–splits and spinoffs, startups and staff shifts–to a level that might be termed California Business Time (“What do you mean, I left Motorola quickly?” asked Gordon Campbell with sincere indignation. “I was there eight months!”).

The venture capitalist focused on Fairchild: that extraordinary pool of electronic talent assembled by Noyce and Moore, but left essentially unattended, undervalued, and little understood by the executives of the company back in Syosset, New York. Fairchild leaders John Carter and Sherman Fairchild commanded the microcosm: the most important technology in the history of the human race. Noyce, Moore, Hoerni, Grove, Sporck, design genius Robert Widlar, and marketeer Jerry Sanders represented possibly the most potent management and technical team ever assembled in the history of world business. But, hey, you guys, don’t forget to report back to Syosset. Don’t forget who’s boss. Don’t give out any bonuses without clearing them through the folks at Camera and Instrument. You might upset some light-meter manager in Philadelphia.
They even made Charles Sporck, the manufacturing titan, feel like “a little kid pissing in his pants.” Good work, Sherman, don’t let the big lug put on airs, don’t let him feel important. He only controls 80 percent of the company’s growth. Widlar is leaving? Great, he never fit in with the corporate culture anyway. Sporck has gone off with Peter Sprague? There are plenty more where he came from.
“It was weird,” said Grove, “they had no idea about what the company or the industry was like, nor did they seem to care. . . . Fairchild was just crumbling. If you wish, the semiconductor division management consisted of twenty significant players: eight went to National, eight went into Intel, and four of them went to Alcoholics Anonymous or something.” Actually there were more than twenty and they went into startups all over the Valley; some twenty-six new semiconductor firms sprouted up between 1967 and 1970. “It got to the point,” recalled one man quoted in Dirk Hanson’s The New Alchemists, “where people were practically driving trucks over to Fairchild and loading up with employees.”

Source:

Gilder, George. Microcosm: The Quantum Revolution in Economics and Technology. Paperback ed. New York: Touchstone, 1990.
(Note: the first ellipsis was added; the others were in the original. The italics were also in the original.)

Doctors Seek to Regulate Retail Health Clinic Competitors

NursePractitioner2009-09-26.jpg“A nurse practitioner with a patient at a retail clinic in Wilmington, Del.” Source of caption and photo: online version of the WSJ article quoted and cited below.

Clayton Christensen, in a chapter of Seeing What’s Next, and at greater length in The Innovator’s Prescription, has persuasively advocated the evolution of nurse practitioners and retail health clinics as disruptive innovations that have the potential to improve the quality and reduce the costs of health care.
An obstacle to the realization of Christensen’s vision would be government regulation demanded by health care incumbents who would rather not have to compete with nurse practitioners and retail health clinics. See below for more:

(p. B1) Retail health clinics are adding treatments for chronic diseases such as asthma to their repertoire, hoping to find steadier revenue, but putting the clinics into greater competition with doctors’ groups and hospitals.

Walgreen Co.’s Take Care retail clinic recently started a pilot program in Tampa and Orlando offering injected and infused drugs for asthma and osteoporosis to Medicare patients. At some MinuteClinics run by CVS Caremark Corp., nurse practitioners now counsel teenagers about acne, recommend over-the-counter products and sometimes prescribe antibiotics.
. . .
As part of their efforts to halt losses at the clinics, the chains are lobbying for more insurance coverage, and angling for a place in pending health-care reform legislation, while trying to temper calls for regulations.
. . .
(p. B2) But such moves are raising the ire of physicians’ groups that see the in-store clinics as inappropriate venues for treating complex illnesses. In May, the Massachusetts Medical Society urged its members to press insurance companies on co-payments to eliminate any financial incentive to use retail clinics.
. . .
The clinics are helping alter the practice of medicine. Doctors are expanding office hours to evenings and weekends. Hospitals are opening more urgent-care centers to treat relatively minor health problems.

For the full story, see:
AMY MERRICK. “Retail Health Clinics Move to Treat Complex Illnesses, Rankling Doctors.” The Wall Street Journal (Thurs., SEPTEMBER 10, 2009): B1-B2.
(Note: ellipses added.)

A brief commentary by Christensen (and Hwang) on these issues, can be found at:

CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN and JASON HWANG. “How CEOs Can Help Fix Health Care.” The Wall Street Journal (Tues., July 28, 2009).

For the full account, see:
Christensen, Clayton M., Jerome H. Grossman, and Jason Hwang. The Innovator’s Prescription: A Disruptive Solution for Health Care. New York: NY: McGraw-Hill, 2008.

RetailHealthClinicGraph2009-09-26.gif

Source of graph: online version of the WSJ article quoted and cited above.

“Axel Springer Has Dared to Compete with Itself”

The European newspaper publisher Axel Springer, discussed in the story quoted below, appears to be following the advice of Christensen and Raynor in their book The Innovator’s Solution. In that book, they suggest that incumbent firms need to be willing to set up units that compete with their older business models, if they hope to survive the introduction of disruptive innovations.

(p. B4) PARIS — As the death toll in the American newspaper industry mounted this month, the German publisher Axel Springer, which owns Bild, the biggest newspaper in Europe, reported the highest profit in its 62-year history.
. . .
Axel Springer generates 14 percent of its revenue online, more than most American newspapers, even though the markets in which it operates — primarily Germany and Eastern Europe — are less digitally developed than the United States.
One reason, Mr. Döpfner said, is that Axel Springer has dared to compete with itself. Instead of trying to protect existing publications, it acquired or created new ones, some of which distribute the same content to different audiences.
At one newsroom in Berlin, for example, journalists produce content for six publications: the national newspaper Die Welt, its Sunday edition and a tabloid version aimed at younger readers; a local paper called Berliner Morgenpost, and two Web sites.

For the full story, see:
ERIC PFANNER. “European Newspapers Find Creative Ways to Thrive in the Internet Age.” The New York Times (Mon., March 29, 2009): B4.
(Note: ellipsis added.)

The Christensen and Raynor book mentioned above, is:
Christensen, Clayton M., and Michael E. Raynor. The Innovator’s Solution: Creating and Sustaining Successful Growth. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2003.

Durant and Studebaker Made Transition from Carriage to Car

Christensen’s theory of disruptive innovation predicts that incumbents will seldom survive a major disruption. So it is interesting that Durant and Studebaker, appear to have been exceptions, since they made the transition from producing carriages to producing cars. (Willie Durant founded General Motors in 1908.)

(p. 189) In 1900, fifty-seven surviving American automobile firms, out of hundreds of contenders, produced some 4,000 cars, three-quarters of which ran on steam or electricity. Companies famous for other products were entering the fray. Among them were the makers of the Pope bicycle, the Pierce birdcage, the Peerless wringer, the Buick bathtub, the White sewing machine, and the Briscoe garbage can. All vied for the market with stationary-engine makers, machine-tool manufacturers, and spinoffs of leading carriage firms, Durant and Studebaker. Among the less promising entrants seemed a lanky young engineer from Edison Illuminating Company named Henry Ford, whose Detroit Automobile Company produced twenty-five cars and failed in 1900.

. . .
(p. 191) Willie Durant, who knew all about production and selling from his carriage business, decided it was time to move into cars after several months of driving a prototype containing David Buick’s valve-in-head engine–the most powerful in the world for its size–through rural Michigan in 1904. Within four years, Durant was to parlay his sturdy Buick vehicle into domination of the automobile industry, with a 25 percent share of the market in 1908, the year he founded General Motors.

Source:
Gilder, George. Recapturing the Spirit of Enterprise: Updated for the 1990s. updated ed. New York: ICS Press, 1992.
(Note: ellipsis added.)

Christensen’s theory is most fully expressed in:
Christensen, Clayton M., and Michael E. Raynor. The Innovator’s Solution: Creating and Sustaining Successful Growth. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2003.

GM’s Saturn Shows Problems With Incumbent Firms Disrupting Themselves

SaturnFirstCarSpringHill1990.jpg “In July 1990, the first Saturn rolled off the Spring Hill, Tenn., assembly line, with Roger Smith of General Motors holding the key.” Source of the caption and the photo: online version of the NYT article quoted and cited below.

Clayton Christensen has shown that incumbent firms find it extremely difficult to adopt disruptive innovations that would leapfrog their current dominant business model. GM’s abandonment of its Saturn experiment would seem to be an apt illustration of the point:

(p. A29) “I’m absolutely convinced that the Saturn way could have worked,” said Michael Bennett, the original U.A.W. leader at Saturn. “But what we had was never embraced or adopted.”

Mr. Bennett, like many others, can point fingers to explain why Saturn fell short of its promise.
Mr. Bennett blamed a lack of interest by G.M. executives who succeeded Roger Smith, who as chief executive in the 1980s committed $5 billion to begin Saturn.
But those who followed him — including John F. Smith Jr., who became chief executive in 1992, and G.M.’s current chief executive, Rick Wagoner, who ran its North American operations in the 1990s — had bigger worries.
They had to lead the company through the financial turbulence at G.M. in the early 1990s. And with managers at G.M.’s other, older brands begging for investment, G.M. executives declared Saturn would have to prove it deserved more support, even though its small cars were accomplishing their main goal of winning buyers from imports.
Despite G.M.’s pledge that Saturn would be run as a separate company, with its own car development and purchasing operations, it was folded into G.M.’s small-car operations in 1994, and its lineup did not receive any new models for the next five years.

For the full story, see:
MICHELINE MAYNARD. “With Saturn, G.M. Failed a Makeover.” The New York Times (Thurs., December 3, 2008): A1 & A29.

Christensen’s fullest complete expression of his views can be found in:
Christensen, Clayton M., and Michael E. Raynor. The Innovator’s Solution: Creating and Sustaining Successful Growth. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2003.

SaturnLastCarSpringHill2007.jpg “The final Saturn built at the plant in March 2007.” Source of the caption and the photo: online version of the NYT article quoted and cited above.

Christensen Book Re-Thinks Basic Assumptions About Health Care Innovation

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Source of book image: http://images.barnesandnoble.com/images/34000000/34009038.jpg

Christensen’s new book hit the shelves in December 2008. His ideas on health care are promising, if the special interests don’t get in the way. (I have not yet read the new book, but have read earlier versions of his proposals on how disruptive innovations can improve health care.)

(p. R2) BUSINESS INSIGHT: Your coming book, “The Innovator’s Prescription,” takes a look at health care. How likely do you think it is we’ll see substantial innovation in the structure of the U.S. health-care system?
DR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, one great benefit of the current economic crisis is that it will create pressure to find a real solution to the health-care problem. Right now, emergencies exist at companies like General Motors, which has got to drive the cost of its health care down. Every city and town in America would be bankrupt if they kept their books the way private-sector companies keep their books — because of the obligation cities and towns have taken upon themselves to provide health care for their retirees.
And so we really are in an emergency where it’s likely that employers and health-care providers are open to completely rethinking some of the basic assumptions that made innovation seem impossible. What we’re hoping with this book is that we can just bring a way to frame the problem that can help people reach consensus around a course of action that otherwise, at another time, would have seemed quite counterintuitive.

For the full interview, see:
Martha E. Mangelsdorf, interviewer. “Executive Briefing; How Hard Times Can Drive Innovation.” Wall Street Journal (Mon., DECEMBER 15, 2008): R2.
(Note: ellipses added.)

New Business Model for Promoting Disruptive Innovation

ChristensenClayton2009-01-21.jpg

“Clayton M. Christensen” Source of caption and photo: online version of the WSJ interview quoted and cited below.

(p. R2) BUSINESS INSIGHT: . . . There must be, . . . , cases where concerns about the market cause companies to abandon their plans for new products or really retrench. Or do you see that happening less these days as companies realize the importance of keeping up with changing markets?
DR. CHRISTENSEN: In the next two years, I think the answer will hinge quite a bit on the role that hedge funds play in driving stock prices. By now, 95% of all trades on the stock exchange are executed by hedge funds, mutual funds or pension funds that you could not call shareholders. They’re share owners, but they don’t even hold the shares long enough, on average, to vote the proxy. And long-term shareholders are always better for innovation than the short-term people are.
BUSINESS INSIGHT: So we might see innovation more from private companies?
DR. CHRISTENSEN: Absolutely right. And there’s another business model toward which more and more companies need to move. It’s a business model you see with Li & Fung in Hong Kong, Tata Sons in India, and Cox Enterprises in Atlanta. In this model, the holding company is privately held, and then certain of the subsidiary companies that have the right characteristics take their shares public on the market.
What that allows those companies to do is, when they have a disruptive innovation that they need to launch, they can just do it under the private umbrella of the holding company, and not have it reduce the near-term performance of the publicly held subsidiaries.

For the full interview, see:
Martha E. Mangelsdorf, interviewer. “Executive Briefing; How Hard Times Can Drive Innovation.” Wall Street Journal (Mon., DECEMBER 15, 2008): R2.
(Note: ellipses added.)

Microsoft Still Risks Becoming “Road Kill on the Information Highway”

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“Steve Ballmer is the second Microsoft chief executive to butt his head against the view that a new era in technology brings a new market leader.” Source of caption and photo: online version of the NYT article quoted and cited below.

(p. 4) The Yahoo affair obscures the larger story: Microsoft’s long, long struggle — since 1993 — to maintain its leadership position while the Internet grew ubiquitous. Mr. Ballmer, who joined Microsoft in 1980 as its 15th employee, and Bill Gates, his mentor who will retire next month as a full-time Microsoft employee, have certainly tried their best to avert the inevitable decline of the company’s influence.

In 2000, Mr. Ballmer credited Mr. Gates for noting that no company in the computer business had ever stayed on top through what Mr. Gates called “a major paradigm shift.” The two men wanted Microsoft to be the first company to achieve that goal. An interesting challenge, but some problems are of a size that dwarf the abilities of multibillionaire mortals.
In a 1995 internal memo, “The Internet Tidal Wave,” Mr. Gates alerted company employees to the Internet’s potential to be a disruptive force. This was two years before Clayton M. Christensen, the Harvard Business School professor, published “The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail” (1997). The professor presented what would become a widely noted framework to explain how seemingly well-managed companies could do most everything to prepare for the arrival of disruptive new technology but still lose market leadership.
It’s Google, of course, that has developed the musculature to step forward and lay claim to being Microsoft’s successor as industry leader in the Internet era. If there had been any way Microsoft could have prepared for this day, it had ample time to do so. In 1993, fully five years before Google’s founding and two years before Mr. Gates’s memo, Nathan P. Myhrvold, then Microsoft’s chief technology officer, wrote his own memo, “Road Kill on the Information Highway.” It spelled out in prescient detail how each of many industries would be flattened by the build-out of digital networks, and it said that the PC software business would be no exception.

For the full commentary, see:
RANDALL STROSS. “Digital Domain; The Computer Industry Comes With Built-In Term Limits.” The New York Times, SundayBusiness Section (Sun., May 18, 2008): 4.

A Schumpeterian Policy Program Promotes Innovation and Creative Destruction

McCraw on the nature of “a Schumpeterian program” :

(p. 169) Yet it is not difficult to identify a Schumpeterian program—at whatever level of analysis one chooses: the individual entrepreneur, the business firm, the industry, or even the country. At all levels, Schumpeter’s litmus test is whether the players are pursuing innovation and bringing about creative destruction. If they are, then the program is Schumpeterian.

Source:
McCraw, Thomas K. Prophet of Innovation: Joseph Schumpeter and Creative Destruction. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2007.