Category: Books

FDR’s 1935 Revival Prediction Proved False

(p. C1) Despite the reputation of the New Deal, deep government interventions are unpredictable and sometimes harmful, reminds Amity Shlaes, who wrote a popular history of the Depression, “The Forgotten Man.”

Ms. Shlaes points to the period of 1936 and 1937, when the Federal Reserve used New Deal laws to tighten reserve requirements on the nation’s banks. The goal was to make the banks stronger, but the result was that banks tightened still further. That cut off credit to the economy at a sensitive period. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by more than a third between August 1937 and January 1938. Unemployment surged. It was the “depression within the Depression.”
It wasn’t the revival that FDR had predicted back in 1935, when he boasted: “Never since my inauguration in March 1933, have I felt so unmistakably the atmosphere of recovery.”
. . .
“When you’re in the expert business, after a while you realize there are no experts,” says Richard Sylla, New York University’s Henry Kaufman Professor of The History of Financial Institutions and Markets.
The important thing to know, it seems, is how little we know.

For the full commentary, see:
DENNIS K. BERMAN. “THE GAME; Tomorrow’s Recession Recovery Is Today’s History Lesson.” Wall Street Journal (Tues., MARCH 3, 2009): C1.
(Note: ellipsis added.)

The reference to the excellent Shlaes book, is:
Shlaes, Amity. The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression. New York: HarperCollins, 2007.

Gilder Explored “The Spirit of Enterprise”

SpiritOfEntrepreneurshipBK.jpg

Source of book image:
http://g-ecx.images-amazon.com/images/G/01/ciu/64/17/bc94225b9da0b4326fb8b010.L.jpg

Gilder presents many case studies of entrepreneurs, with plenty of thought-provoking commentary and generalization.
I read the 1984 version because it is the version that is available in audio that can be listened to while walking the dachshund. I also own the 1992 updated version, and can say from a flip-through that this it is a major revision (not just a “revision” that consists of a new introduction, as is often done).
Gilder justly, and eloquently, takes economists to task for generally ignoring the role of the entrepreneur in improving our lives.

For the early edition, see:
Gilder, George. The Spirit of Enterprise. 1 ed. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984.
For the revised version, see:
Gilder, George. Recapturing the Spirit of Enterprise: Updated for the 1990s. updated ed. New York: ICS Press, 1992.

RecapturingTheSpiritOfEnterpriseBK.jpg

Source of the book image: http://www.icspress.com/images/recapturing.jpg

“Venturesome” Consumers May Help Save the Day

Bhidé makes thought-provoking comments about the role of the entrepreneurial or “venturesome” consumer in the process of innovation. The point is the mirror image on one made by Schumpeter in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy when he emphasized that consumer resistance to innovation is one of the obstacles that entrepreneurs in earlier periods had to overcome. (The decline of such consumer resistance was one of the reasons that Schumpeter speculated that the entrepreneur might become obsolete.)
I would like to see Bhidé’s evidence on his claim that technology rapidly advanced during the Great Depression. The claim seems at odds with Amity Shlaes’ claim that New Deal policies often discouraged entrepreneurship.

(p. A15) Consumers get no respect — we value thrift and deplore the spending that supposedly undermines the investment necessary for our long-run prosperity. In fact, the venturesomeness of consumers has nourished unimaginable advances in our standard of living and created invaluable human capital that is often ignored.
Economists regard the innovations that sustain long-run prosperity as a gift to consumers. Stanford University and Hoover Institution economist Paul Romer wrote in the “Concise Encyclopedia of Economics” in 2007: “In 1985, I paid a thousand dollars per million transistors for memory in my computer. In 2005, I paid less than ten dollars per million, and yet I did nothing to deserve or help pay for this windfall.”
In fact, Mr. Romer and innumerable consumers of transistor-based products such as personal computers have played a critical, “venturesome” role in generating their windfalls.
. . .
History suggests that Americans don’t shirk from venturesome consumption in hard times. The personal computer took off in the dark days of the early 1980s. I paid more than a fourth of my annual income to buy an IBM XT then — as did millions of others. Similarly, in spite of the Great Depression, the rapid increase in the use of new technologies made the 1930s a period of exceptional productivity growth. Today, sales of Apple’s iPhone continue to expand at double-digit rates. Low-income groups (in the $25,000 to $49,999 income segment) are showing the most rapid growth, with resourceful buyers using the latest models as their primary device for accessing the Internet.
Recessions will come and go, but unless we completely mess things up, we can count on our venturesome consumers to keep prosperity on its long, upward arc.

For the full commentary, see:
Amar Bhidé. “Consumers Can Still Spot Value in a Crisis.” Wall Street Journal (Thurs., MARCH 11, 2009): A15.
(Note: ellipsis added.)

Pay and Profits at Finance Firms Became “Divorced from Actual Economic Activity”

FinanceIndustryPayAndProfitsGraph.jpg Source of graphs: online version of the NYT article quoted and cited below.

(p. 3) Nonetheless, a significant portion of the finance boom also seems to have been unrelated to economic performance and thus unsustainable. Benjamin M. Friedman, author of “The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth,” recalled that when he worked at Morgan Stanley in the early 1970s, the firm’s annual reports were filled with photographs of factories and other tangible businesses. More recently, Wall Street’s annual reports tend to highlight not the businesses that firms were advising so much as finance for the sake of finance, showing upward-sloping graphs and photographs of traders.

“I have the sense that in many of these firms,” Mr. Friedman said, “the activity has become further and further divorced from actual economic activity.”
Which might serve as a summary of how the current crisis came to pass. Wall Street traders began to believe that the values they had assigned to all sorts of assets were rational because, well, they had assigned them.

For the full story, see:
PETER S. GOODMAN. “Debt Sweat; Printing Money and Its Price.” The New York Times, Week in Review Section (Sun., December 28, 2008): 1 & 4.
(Note: ellipsis added.)

Benjamin Friedman’s book is:
Friedman, Benjamin M. The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth. New York: Knopf, 2005.

Barro Estimates 20% Chance of Depression

Robert Barro is a Harvard economist who specializes in issues of macroeconomics and economic growth.

(p. A15) The U.S. macroeconomy has been so tame for so long that it’s impossible to get an accurate reading about depression odds just from the U.S. data. My approach uses long-term data for many countries and takes into account the historical linkages between depressions and stock-market crashes. (The research is described in “Stock-Market Crashes and Depressions,” a working paper Jose Ursua and I wrote for the National Bureau of Economic Research last month.)

The bottom line is that there is ample reason to worry about slipping into a depression. There is a roughly one-in-five chance that U.S. GDP and consumption will fall by 10% or more, something not seen since the early 1930s.
. . .
In the end, we learned two things. Periods without stock-market crashes are very safe, in the sense that depressions are extremely unlikely. However, periods experiencing stock-market crashes, such as 2008-09 in the U.S., represent a serious threat. The odds are roughly one-in-five that the current recession will snowball into the macroeconomic decline of 10% or more that is the hallmark of a depression.

The bright side of a 20% depression probability is the 80% chance of avoiding a depression. The U.S. had stock-market crashes in 2000-02 (by 42%) and 1973-74 (49%) and, in each case, experienced only mild recessions. Hence, if we are lucky, the current downturn will also be moderate, though likely worse than the other U.S. post-World War II recessions, including 1982.
. . .
Given our situation, it is right that radical government policies should be considered if they promise to lower the probability and likely size of a depression. However, many governmental actions — including several pursued by Franklin Roosevelt during the Great Depression — can make things worse.

I wish I could be confident that the array of U.S. policies already in place and those likely forthcoming will be helpful. But I think it more likely that the economy will eventually recover despite these policies, rather than because of them.

For the full commentary, see:
ROBERT J. BARRO. “What Are the Odds of a Depression?” Wall Street Journal (Weds., MARCH 4, 2009): A15.
(Note: ellipses added.)

Barro’s co-authored textbook on economic growth is:
Barro, Robert J., and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. Economic Growth. 2nd ed: The MIT Press, 2003.

Bailouts Reduce Resources Left for Entrepreneurs

Columbia University Professor Amar Bhidé has authored two important books on entrepreneurship. Some of his thoughts on the current economic crisis follow:

(p. A15) Our ignorance of what causes economic ailments — and how to treat them — is profound. Downturns and financial crises are not regular occurrences, and because economies are always evolving, they tend to be idiosyncratic, singular events.

After decades of diligent research, scholars still argue about what caused the Great Depression — excessive consumption, investment, stock-market speculation and borrowing in the Roaring ’20s, Smoot-Hawley protectionism, or excessively tight monetary policy? Nor do we know how we got out of it: Some credit the New Deal while others say that that FDR’s policies prolonged the Depression.
. . .
Large increases in public spending usurp precious resources from supporting the innovations necessary for our long-term prosperity. Everyone isn’t a pessimist in hard times: The optimism of many entrepreneurs and consumers fueled the takeoff of personal computers during the deep recession of the early 1980s. Amazon has just launched the Kindle 2; its (equally pricey) predecessor sold out last November amid the Wall Street meltdown. But competing with expanded public spending makes it harder for innovations like the personal computer and the Kindle to secure the resources they need.

Hastily enacted programs jeopardize crucial beliefs in the value of productive enterprise. Americans are unusually idealistic and optimistic. We believe that we can all get ahead through innovations because the game isn’t stacked in favor of the powerful. This belief encourages the pursuit of initiatives that contribute to the common good rather than the pursuit of favors and rents. It also discourages the politics of envy. We are less prone to begrudge our neighbors’ fortune if we think it was fairly earned and that it has not come at our expense — indeed, that we too have derived some benefit.

To sustain these beliefs, Americans must see their government play the role of an even-handed referee rather than be a dispenser of rewards or even a judge of economic merit or contribution. The panicky response to the financial crisis, where openness and due process have been sacrificed to speed, has unfortunately undermined our faith. Bailing out AIG while letting Lehman fail — behind closed doors — has raised suspicions of cronyism. The Fed has refused to reveal to whom it has lent trillions. Outrage at the perceived use of TARP funds to pay bonuses is widespread.

For the full commentary, see:

Amar Bhidé. “Don’t Believe the Stimulus Scaremongers.” Wall Street Journal (Tues., FEBRUARY 17, 2009): A15.
(Note: ellipsis added.)

Bhidé’s two books on entrepreneurship are:
Bhidé, Amar. The Origin and Evolution of New Business. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Bhidé, Amar. The Venturesome Economy: How Innovation Sustains Prosperity in a More Connected World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.

“Firms that Made Wrong Decisions Should Fail”

SchwartzAnnaDrawing.jpg

Anna J. Schwartz.

Source of image: online version of the WSJ article quoted and cited below.

(p. A11) Most people now living have never seen a credit crunch like the one we are currently enduring. Ms. Schwartz, 92 years old, is one of the exceptions. She’s not only old enough to remember the period from 1929 to 1933, she may know more about monetary history and banking than anyone alive. She co-authored, with Milton Friedman, “A Monetary History of the United States” (1963). It’s the definitive account of how misguided monetary policy turned the stock-market crash of 1929 into the Great Depression.
. . .
These are not, Ms. Schwartz argues, the same thing. In fact, by keeping otherwise insolvent banks afloat, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury have actually prolonged the crisis. “They should not be recapitalizing firms that should be shut down.”
Rather, “firms that made wrong decisions should fail,” she says bluntly. “You shouldn’t rescue them. And once that’s established as a principle, I think the market recognizes that it makes sense. Everything works much better when wrong decisions are punished and good decisions make you rich.” The trouble is, “that’s not the way the world has been going in recent years.”
Instead, we’ve been hearing for most of the past year about “systemic risk” — the notion that allowing one firm to fail will cause a cascade that will take down otherwise healthy companies in its wake.
Ms. Schwartz doesn’t buy it. “It’s very easy when you’re a market participant,” she notes with a smile, “to claim that you shouldn’t shut down a firm that’s in really bad straits because everybody else who has lent to it will be injured. Well, if they lent to a firm that they knew was pretty rocky, that’s their responsibility. And if they have to be denied repayment of their loans, well, they wished it on themselves. The [government] doesn’t have to save them, just as it didn’t save the stockholders and the employees of Bear Stearns. Why should they be worried about the creditors? Creditors are no more worthy of being rescued than ordinary people, who are really innocent of what’s been going on.”

For the full story, see:
BRIAN M. CARNEY. “OPINION: THE WEEKEND INTERVIEW with Anna Schwartz; Bernanke Is Fighting the Last War.” The Wall Street Journal (Weds., OCTOBER 18, 2008): A10.
(Note: ellipsis added.)

Financial Crisis Is “A Coming-Out Party” for Taleb and Behavioral Economists

(p. A23) My sense is that this financial crisis is going to amount to a coming-out party for behavioral economists and others who are bringing sophisticated psychology to the realm of public policy. At least these folks have plausible explanations for why so many people could have been so gigantically wrong about the risks they were taking.

Nassim Nicholas Taleb has been deeply influenced by this stream of research. Taleb not only has an explanation for what’s happening, he saw it coming. His popular books “Fooled by Randomness” and “The Black Swan” were broadsides at the risk-management models used in the financial world and beyond.

In “The Black Swan,” Taleb wrote, “The government-sponsored institution Fannie Mae, when I look at its risks, seems to be sitting on a barrel of dynamite, vulnerable to the slightest hiccup.” Globalization, he noted, “creates interlocking fragility.” He warned that while the growth of giant banks gives the appearance of stability, in reality, it raises the risk of a systemic collapse — “when one fails, they all fail.”

Taleb believes that our brains evolved to suit a world much simpler than the one we now face. His writing is idiosyncratic, but he does touch on many of the perceptual biases that distort our thinking: our tendency to see data that confirm our prejudices more vividly than data that contradict them; our tendency to overvalue recent events when anticipating future possibilities; our tendency to spin concurring facts into a single causal narrative; our tendency to applaud our own supposed skill in circumstances when we’ve actually benefited from dumb luck.

And looking at the financial crisis, it is easy to see dozens of errors of perception. Traders misperceived the possibility of rare events. They got caught in social contagions and reinforced each other’s risk assessments. They failed to perceive how tightly linked global networks can transform small events into big disasters.

Taleb is characteristically vituperative about the quantitative risk models, which try to model something that defies modelization. He subscribes to what he calls the tragic vision of humankind, which “believes in the existence of inherent limitations and flaws in the way we think and act and requires an acknowledgement of this fact as a basis for any individual and collective action.” If recent events don’t underline this worldview, nothing will.

For the full commentary, see:
DAVID BROOKS. “The Behavioral Revolution.” The New York Times (Tues., October 28, 2008): A31.

The reference to Taleb’s Black Swan book is:
Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. New York: Random House, 2007.

Another review of Taleb’s book is:
Diamond, Arthur M., Jr. “Review of: Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. The Black Swan.” Journal of Scientific Exploration 22, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 419-422.

The Future Is “a Whirlpool of Uncertainty”

(p. B1) Nearly all of us try forecasting the market as if each of the past returns of every year in history had been written on a separate slip of paper and tossed into a hat. Before we reach into the hat, we imagine which return we are most likely to pluck out. Because the long-term average annual gain is about 10%, we “anchor” on that number, then adjust it up or down a bit for our own bullishness or bearishness.

But the future isn’t a hat full of little shredded pieces of the past. It is, instead, a whirlpool of uncertainty populated by what the trader and philosopher Nassim Nicholas Taleb calls “black swans” — events that are hugely important, rare and unpredictable, and explicable only after the fact.

For the full commentary, see:

JASON ZWEIG. “THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR; Why Market Forecasts Keep Missing the Mark.” Wall Street Journal (Mon., January 24, 2009): B1.

The reference for Taleb’s book, is:
Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. New York: Random House, 2007.

A brief, idiosyncratic review of Taleb’s book, is:
Diamond, Arthur M., Jr. “Review of: Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. The Black Swan.” Journal of Scientific Exploration 22, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 419-422.

Christensen Book Re-Thinks Basic Assumptions About Health Care Innovation

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Source of book image: http://images.barnesandnoble.com/images/34000000/34009038.jpg

Christensen’s new book hit the shelves in December 2008. His ideas on health care are promising, if the special interests don’t get in the way. (I have not yet read the new book, but have read earlier versions of his proposals on how disruptive innovations can improve health care.)

(p. R2) BUSINESS INSIGHT: Your coming book, “The Innovator’s Prescription,” takes a look at health care. How likely do you think it is we’ll see substantial innovation in the structure of the U.S. health-care system?
DR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, one great benefit of the current economic crisis is that it will create pressure to find a real solution to the health-care problem. Right now, emergencies exist at companies like General Motors, which has got to drive the cost of its health care down. Every city and town in America would be bankrupt if they kept their books the way private-sector companies keep their books — because of the obligation cities and towns have taken upon themselves to provide health care for their retirees.
And so we really are in an emergency where it’s likely that employers and health-care providers are open to completely rethinking some of the basic assumptions that made innovation seem impossible. What we’re hoping with this book is that we can just bring a way to frame the problem that can help people reach consensus around a course of action that otherwise, at another time, would have seemed quite counterintuitive.

For the full interview, see:
Martha E. Mangelsdorf, interviewer. “Executive Briefing; How Hard Times Can Drive Innovation.” Wall Street Journal (Mon., DECEMBER 15, 2008): R2.
(Note: ellipses added.)

“A Splendid Birthday Present” for Charles Darwin

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Source of the book image: http://images.barnesandnoble.com/images/34510000/34519930.jpg

(p. A13) . . ., on Feb. 12, biologists the world over will celebrate Charles Darwin’s 200th birthday. Throughout the year, at festivals galore marking his bicentennial, “On the Origin of Species,” a mere 150 years old, will be hailed as one of the greatest works in the history of the sciences.
. . .
Mr. Coyne begins with a succinct account of what is at stake. “Life on earth evolved gradually beginning with one primitive species — perhaps a self-replicating molecule — that lived more than 3.5 billion years ago; it then branched out over time, throwing off many and diverse species; and the mechanism for most (but not all) of evolutionary change is natural selection.”
Darwinism is thus a claim with several basic components, and the book is structured by carefully exhibiting the evidence for each. Making that structure explicit allows readers to recognize just where they are in the argument. As they follow Mr. Coyne’s parade of evidence — his discussions of the fossil record, of vestigial traits, of the ways in which living things constantly make novel use of the bits and pieces they have inherited, of the distribution of plants and animals — the components of Darwin’s thesis are sequentially supported. We have a list of things to be shown, they are shown and the truth of evolution is established.
. . .
Yet will any defense of Darwin, however painstaking and lucid, succeed in substantially modifying the public-opinion survey results? Mr. Coyne has seen the opposition first-hand, recounting his experience of talking to a group of businessmen about evolution and eliciting the reaction: “Very convincing — but I don’t believe it.” This sort of skepticism is often rooted in a sense that Darwinism somehow discredits morality — a perception that Mr. Coyne argues against, cogently, in a brief final chapter. But he does not seem to appreciate the depth of popular hostility toward Darwin.
. . .
Whether or not he succeeds in bringing Americans en masse to learn to love evolution, he has offered Darwin a splendid birthday present.

For the full review, see:
PHILIP KITCHER. “Bookshelf; Following the Evidence.” Wall Street Journal (Thurs., JANUARY 29, 2009): A13.
(Note: ellipses added.)

The reviewed book is:
Coyne, Jerry A. Why Evolution Is True. New York: Viking, 2009.

A classic paper on whether the speed of a scientist’s acceptance of evolution was related to the scientist’s age, is:
David L. Hull, Peter D. Tessner and Arthur M. Diamond. “Planck’s Principle: Do Younger Scientists Accept New Scientific Ideas with Greater Alacrity than Older Scientists?” Science 202 (November 17, 1978): 717-723.