Christensen, Clayton – Page 7 – artdiamondblog.com

Motorola Hurt By Failing to Leapfrog Itself

Source of graph: online version of the WSJ article cited below.

Clayton Christensen, in a series of books, has highlighted why it is difficult for a successful incumbent to prepare a successor for its own winning product. The Motorola case below is another example.

Note, though, that Motorola’s failure is not the understandable one of failing to prepare what Christensen calls a "disruptive innovation." If the story below is right, it is a case of the less understandable failure to continue to deliver with what Christensen calls "sustaining innovation."

(p. A1) A year ago, Motorola Inc. appeared headed for a third straight year of rich profits under Chief Executive Ed Zander, driven by its hit cellphone the Razr. "A lot of you are always asking what is after the Razr," Mr. Zander said in an April 2006 conference call after another quarter of 30%-plus growth. "I say more Razrs."

But behind the scenes, Motorola was working furiously to get a successor phone to market by the second half of 2006, according to people familiar with the matter. When it failed to do so, profit margins on handsets narrowed and the company swung to a loss. Key executives left. And as the stock slid, activist investor Carl Icahn built up a position and began campaigning for a board seat to address what he called Motorola’s "operational problems."

Motorola’s travails illustrate the risks for a company that rides high with a big consumer hit. Amid its success with the Razr, it fell behind on developing a phone with the next generation of technology. Missing a beat is especially hazardous in cellphones, where it can take two to three years to develop a new line.

. . .

(p. A14) As the Razr grew hot, some former designers and engineers say Motorola repeated mistakes it had made a decade earlier with another big hit, the compact flip-top phone known as the StarTAC. That phone was a huge seller, but it also was an analog phone, and its popularity blinded the company to an industry shift to digital technology. Similarly, while Motorola was selling countless Razrs, competitors were hard at work on more sophisticated products for 3G networks.

Motorola put engineers and designers who could have been working on new products on the Razr and its derivatives, some former executives say. "All resources went to feeding the beast," says a former Motorola designer. "Suddenly, you created this thing that requires a lot of energy and attention." Other former executives dispute that the focus on the Razr diverted work from other products and contend Motorola was right to ride the still-popular Razr as long as possible.

For the full story, see:

CHRISTOPHER RHOADS and LI YUAN. "DROPPED CALL; How Motorola Fell A Giant Step Behind; As It Milked Thin Phone, Rivals Sneaked Ahead On the Next Generation." The Wall Street Journal (Fri., April 27, 2007): A1 & A14.

(Note: ellipsis added.)

The most complete source of Christensen’s theory and examples is:

Christensen, Clayton M., and Michael E. Raynor. The Innovator’s Solution: Creating and Sustaining Successful Growth. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2003.

Motorola CEO. Source of image: online version of the WSJ article cited above.

When You Need to Know the Difference Between Glacier Creek and Big Thompson River

Is it Glacier Creek, or Big Thompson River? Source of photo: me.

On May 17, 2007, in Estes Park, Colorado, I was the co-leader of a "two hour" hike with 15 Montessori middle-schoolers from Omaha, Nebraska. At some point what we were seeing didn’t seem to correspond with what our roughly drawn YMCA map told us we should be seeing–we worried that we had taken a wrong turn and were lost.

II we were on course, then the water beside us should be Glacier Creek. If we were lost, then it was probably Big Thompson River. (It’s appearance didn’t help–it looked a bit larger than a creek, but a lot smaller than a ‘big river.’)

The first person I found to ask was a tourist who admitted upfront that she was extremely uncertain about where we were. She pulled out a modest map, and pointed to where she thought we might be, which was along the Big Thompson River.

Seeking confirmation, I apologetically interrupted a fellow teaching his girl-friend how to fly fish. This fellow was dressed as an outdoors-man, and exuded confidence. He talked about hiking on a glacier the day before. He helpfully strode back to his SUV with me and pulled a detailed, authoritative-looking map. With no doubt, he pointed on the map to where we were, on Glacier Creek, as I had hoped. As we walked back to where he had been fishing, he pointed in the direction that we had been hiking, and said that without question, we should continue to hike in that direction.

The scenery was fantastic, but Cindy began to worry whether we were going in the right direction, pointing out that there didn’t seem to be any opening in the mountains in the direction in which we were supposing the YMCA camp should be. I agreed with her observation, but said that there must be some non-obvious route, because the fellow who pointed us in this direction had exuded credibility.

We finally got to a small museum. There, an old park service employee asked where we were from. When I said "Omaha" he jokingly asked if knew his old friend Warren Buffet? He told us that he had lived in this area all his life, and that we were definitely walking along Big Thompson River. Then he tried to draw a map to show us how to get back. He scratched his head, discarded his first attempt, and started trying again. Then he asked us (again) where we were from? At this point, I was really worried.

But his second attempt at a map was a good one–it got us back to the YMCA camp.

Maybe we should look for advice from those who are self-critical, as the old man was, rather than from those who exude undoubting self-confidence, as the fly fisherman did? (Or maybe the key was local credentials?)

Maybe, I made a mistake that Christensen and Raynor warn against in their The Innovator’s Solution: looking at charisma and confidence as signs of who to follow. (In fairness to myself, at the time, I didn’t have much else to go on.)

Another Effort to Explore the Black-Box of Innovation

(p. 210) Schumpeter argues that innovation can happen endogenously and that its main source is the creative entrepreneur. Schumpeterian innovation is still black-boxed, however, because it is the product of the ingenuity of entrepreneurs and cannot be reproduced systematically.

. . .

The reconstructionist view takes off where the new growth theory left off. Building on the new growth theory, the reconstructionist view suggests how knowledge and ideas are deployed in the process of creation to produce endogenous growth for the firm. In particular, it proposes that such a process of creation can occur in any organization at any time by the cognitive reconstruction of existing data and market elements in a fundamentally new way.

Source:

Kim, W. Chan, and Renée Mauborgne. Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space and Make Competition Irrelevant. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2005.

Kodak Tries to Survive Creative Destruction

A Kodak digital production printer. Source of photo: online version of the NYT article cited below.

Digital photography replacing film technology is an example of Schumpeter’s process of creative destruction, and maybe also of the gradual growth of a disruptive technology. Leading incumbent firms frequently have trouble prospering, or even surviving, during such a change. Both the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times had articles on the latest news from Kodak. Here is an excerpt from the New York Times version:

On Tuesday, as the Eastman Kodak Company unveiled its long-anticipated consumer inkjet printer in New York, the mood at the company’s Rochester headquarters could not have been more positive.

“People know we are back on the offensive,” said Frank Sklarsky, Kodak’s chief financial officer. “And that’s making them a lot more charged up about coming to work.”

But yesterday, Kodak gave them reason again to feel depressed. The company said it would cut 3,000 more jobs this year, on top of the 25,000 to 27,000 it had already said would be gone by the end of 2007. At that rate, Kodak will end the year with about 30,000 employees, half the number of just three years ago and a fraction of the 145,000 people it employed in 1988, when its brand was synonymous with photography.

Kodak executives insist that the new cuts do not indicate any snags in the continuing struggle to transform itself from a film-based company into a major competitor in digital imagery. And analysts, too, say the cuts are inevitable, and probably healthy.

For the full NYT story, see:

CLAUDIA H. DEUTSCH. "Shrinking Pains at Kodak." The New York Times (Fri., February 9, 2007): C1 & C4.

For the related WSJ story, see:

WILLIAM M. BULKELEY and ANGELA PRUITT. "Kodak Sees More Job Cuts, Higher Restructuring Costs." The Wall Street Journal (Fri., February 9, 2007): B4.

Source of the first and third graphic: the WSJ article cited above. Source of the second graphic: the NYT article cited above.

“Good to Great” is Good, but Not Quite Great

Source of book image: http://images.barnesandnoble.com/images/7770000/7775266.jpg

When Ameritrade founder Joe Ricketts spoke to my Executive MBA class a few years ago, I mentioned to him that I had heard from Bob Slezak that Ricketts was a fan of Clayton Christensen’s The Innovator’s Dilemma. Ricketts said that was true, but that the recent business book that he was most enthused about was Jim Collin’s Good to Great.

Ricketts is not alone. Good to Great has become a business classic since it came out. Recently I finally got around to reading it.

Well, I think it’s good, but not quite great. I like the empirical, inductive methodology mapped out at the beginning. And some of the conclusions ring true. For example the importance of facing the "brutal facts." And the importance of developing a thought-out "hedgehog" concept. And the importance of getting the right people on the bus. And the importance of slowly, consistently building momentum.

But I’ve got some big bones to pick, too.

Maybe the biggest "bone" is Collins’ assumption that our goal should be the survival and greatness of a firm. Instead of almost viewing firms as ends in themselves, why can’t we view firms as vehicles for getting great things done?

Maybe great things can be done through firms that last and are lastingly great. Or maybe great things can be done by shooting star firms, that are glorious while they last, but don’t last long. Collins says it must be the former. But either way works for me.

A smaller "bone" is the conclusion that "level 5" leaders tend to be modest. Well maybe. But some of that conclusion is derived from Collins’ defining "great" in terms of high growth of stock value. A modest leader will be unappreciated by Wall Street, and her company’s stock value will show higher growth when she succeeds. But has she thereby accomplished more than if she had built exactly the same company, but been more transparent and enthused about the company’s future prospects, and hence generated more realistic expectations from Wall Street? Remember, the value of a stock grows, not by the company doing well, but by it doing better than investors expected. (On this issue, Collins should read the first couple of chapters of Christensen and Raynor’s The Innovator’s Solution.)

But don’t get me wrong: this is a very good book. Those interested in how the capitalist system works, should read it, as should those who want to manage well.

The book is:

Collins, Jim. Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap. And Others Don’t. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 2001.

Risk Diversification Only Works If Risks are Random

Source of book image: http://www.inbubblewrap.com/2006/08/should_i_do_it_should_i.php

According to Mr. Apgar, managing director of the Corporate Executive Board and a former McKinsey consultant, the problem is that our traditional tool set deals only with random risk. Equity prices, interest rates, natural catastrophes — all operate, more or less, as perfect markets, distributing risk with equal probability among all the players. No one consistently knows more about what drives these phenomena than anyone else. We can bear or hedge these risks in the secure sense that competitors don’t have an inside lead on the future.

. . .

In real business, though, many of the risks that can potentially wipe us out are non-random — what Mr. Apgar calls "learnable risks" — involving customers, technologies, marketing strategies, supplier relationships and so on. The challenge is not just to learn, quickly, enough about them to survive but to determine whether someone else can learn about them even faster and thus put us out of business.

. . .

. . . Mr. Apgar also explains how to perform a "risk audit," judging a company’s current projects by how they diversify total risk or demonstrate risk intelligence. Here is where his program differs most widely from conventional wisdom — because, as he notes, risk diversification is no virtue if the risks are non-random and we have little intelligence of any of them. If you don’t know much about poisonous snakes, keeping several different species won’t make you any safer.

Like liberty, risk intelligence demands eternal vigilance — and for the same reason: threats evolve. Mr. Apgar’s analysis of the life cycle of a business risk is particularly fruitful. He notes that a successful company needs to maintain a risk pipeline, constantly probing into areas where it has higher risk intelligence and opportunities for real diversification — just as technology and pharmaceutical companies need a proportion of blue-sky research to innovate into the future.

For the full review, see:

MICHAEL KAPLAN. "BOOKS; The Hazards of Fortune." Wall Street Journal (Fri., December 8, 2006): W6.

(Note: ellipses added.)

Evan Williams Spurns Bad Money

Evan Williams (on left) with Noah Glass, co-founded Odeo. Source of photo: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/25/technology/25podcast.html?ex=1267419600&en=b80f1d3808f556cc&ei=5088

Evan Williams’ story illustrates Christensen and Raynor’s advice that disruptive innovators need to seek good money, and spurn bad money. Good money is patient for growth, but impatient for profit. Bad money is the opposite.

EVAN WILLIAMS recently bought his freedom. It cost him a bit more than $2 million, and he says it was worth every penny.

I’m not talking about paying off a big debt to one of Tony Soprano’s loan-shark underlings. Mr. Williams is a serial entrepreneur, one of those Silicon Valley characters who start company after company. And he purchased his freedom from the venture capitalists and others who financed his company, Odeo. Mr. Williams dug into his pockets and gave them back their money. He got to keep his struggling podcast company and renamed it the Obvious Corporation.

In the process, Mr. Williams, who is 34, has become something of a cause célèbre among a small group of mostly young entrepreneurs who seem determined to turn their back on venture capitalists. They say they yearn for a new entrepreneurship model. They talk about building ”sustainable companies” suggesting something idealistic in their quest. With comments on blogs urging Mr. Williams to ”keep up the goodness,” it feels a bit like the birth of a mini-movement in the Valley.

. . .

In candid posts on his blog, Mr. Williams chronicled Odeo’s story, warts and all. He admitted to making mistakes. Getting too much venture money too early was one of them. It made it harder to persuade the board and the company’s 14 employees to change course when, for example, Apple Computer introduced a competing product that cut into Odeo’s prospects. ”It’s a bigger ship to turn,” Mr. Williams said.

For the full story, see:

MIGUEL HELFT. "STREET SCENE: VC NATION; Yearning for Freedom From Venture Capital Overlords." The New York Times (Fri., November 24, 2006): C5.

(Note: ellipsis added.)

The reference for the Christensen and Raynor book is:

Christensen, Clayton M., and Michael E. Raynor. The Innovator’s Solution: Creating and Sustaining Successful Growth. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2003.

Silicon Graphics’ Jim Clark Understood Disruptive Innovation

There’s a great passage in The New, New Thing about Jim Clark trying to convince Silicon Graphics to produce a PC. Clark talks about how hard it is for a company to create a product that competes with itself.

Shades of Clayton Christensen:

Clark thought that Silicon Graphics had to "cannibalize" itself. For a technology company to succeed, he argued, it needed always to be looking to destroy itself. If it didn’t, someone else would. "It’s the hardest thing in business to do," he would say. "Even creating a lower-cost product runs against the grain, because the low-cost products undercut the high-cost, more profitable products." Everyone in a successful company, from the CEO on down, has a stake in whatever the company is currently selling. It does not naturally occur to anyone to find a way to undermine that creative destruction, and he was prepared to do the deed. He wanted Silicon Graphics to operate in the same self-corrosive spirit. (p. 66 of hb edition)

The reference to The New, New Thing is:

Lewis, Michael. The New New Thing: A Silicon Valley Story. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000.

Christensen’s most important book is:

Christensen, Clayton M., and Michael E. Raynor. The Innovator’s Solution: Creating and Sustaining Successful Growth. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2003.

Is Variety Good?

Chris Anderson has a stimulating and useful chapter in The Long Tail on why having variety and choice is good.

Not all agree. My old Wabash economics professor, Ben Rogge, with wry amusement, used to refer us to Alvin Toffler’s Future Shock. Toffler’s view was that choice was stressful—visualize the Robin Williams’ Russian émigré character in "Moscow on the Hudson," when he collapses in panic on not knowing how to choose amongst the variety of coffees in the Manhattan supermarket aisle.

What amused Rogge was the contrast between the old critics of capitalism, who criticized capitalism for providing too few goods for the proletariat, and the new critics, like Toffler, who criticized capitalism for providing too many goods for the proletariat.

Although Toffler has recanted his earlier views, others, such as Barry Schwartz in The Paradox of Choice, have picked up the anti-choice banner.

Here’s my current two cents worth. Sometimes we value variety for its own sake, and sometimes not. I may find the variety of ethnic restaurants exciting, but not the variety of music on I-tunes.

But even when I don’t value variety for its own sake, I still may value it because it increases the odds that the product I can find matches the product I want. Let me explain.

In the language of Clayton Christensen and co-author Raynor, in The Innovator’s Solution, generally what I want is a good that does well, a "job" that I want or need to get done.

Some critics of mass production descried the loss of the variety of products produced by pre-industrial craftsmen. But what good did it do the peasants that no two chairs were quite alike, if all of them were too hard and misshapen for the job of comfortably sitting in them?

Mass production reduced variety, but increased quality, in the sense of bringing (cheaply) to market, products that were far better at doing the jobs that most people wanted/needed to get done.

If the modern varieties of chairs are a response to differences in the jobs that different consumers need to get done, then I might generally, and accurately, presume that variety is usually good, not because I want to constantly sample a lot of different chairs (like I want to sample a lot of different ethnic foods), but rather because variety increases the odds that I will find the one or two particular chairs that allow me to do the job that I want a chair to do for me.

Specifically, recently, we were looking for a chair that was firm, spill-resistant, would swivel to allow talking to someone in the kitchen, would recline for watching television, would be dog-chew resistant, and would have a color/fabric complementary to the rest of the furniture. We shopped at Nebraska Furniture Mart, which is the largest furniture store in the U.S., with the greatest selection, because we hoped to find the one chair that would do all of these jobs.

We came close, but I wish there was a store with even greater selection.

The Missing Pillow: A Lack of Incentives Leaves an Obvious ‘Job’ Undone

In late July, I had an appointment for a treadmill stress-test at Omaha’s Methodist Hospital. They told me the process would be over in an hour, but it took about two hours, due to another patient having some sort of crisis during their stress-test.

They had me put on a gown, they stuck an I-V "dye" drip in back of my hand, and they pasted about six electrodes to my chest, after shaving and applying something like sand paper to the parts of the chest where the electrodes were attached. Then they had me lie on my side on a hard table, to wait. It was very uncomfortable. The first nurse said that there was supposed to be a pillow on the table, but did nothing to obtain one. Every several minutes some technician or nurse would stop in to ask if I was ready for them. (I was always ready.) But it turned out that someone needed to do something to me first, and that person was, I guess, taking care of the crisis next door. At least one of these visitors also mentioned that I was supposed to have a pillow, but did nothing to acquire one. If memory serves, the first nurse came back in, and again mentioned that I was supposed to have a pillow, but again did nothing to obtain one.

These people were all pleasant and friendly. For example, they had a lot of friendly chats amongst themselves, that I could not help but over-hear. (One of them was pregnant with twins, but did not know the genders of the babes-to-be, and so had not yet spent the time to come up with names.)

But two hours later, when the whole process was over, I still did not have a pillow.

A week or two after the test, I received a several page survey from Methodist Hospital asking a bunch of questions about how I thought they had done during the test. You see they really "care" about my opinion. (They also run frequent, slick TV ads about how much they "care.")

Marketers, and management gurus, say that organizations need to invest in surveys and the like to figure out what the customer wants and needs. And Clayton Christensen advocates spending resources to figure out what "job" the customer needs to have done. And maybe, sometimes, it does take surveys and research.

But sometimes it is obvious that the customer needs a pillow.

What is missing is not a survey, or statistical analysis.

What is missing is the incentive for someone to go get the pillow.

P.S. You may wonder, then, if it is simply a mistake for the hospital to send out the survey? I suspect that those who send out the survey are not making a mistake, but are trying to get a different job done than the one that appears to be intended. It appears that they are trying to find out what customers want and need. But maybe they already know that. Maybe they are mainly sending out the survey so that if anyone asks if they are "customer-oriented" they can whip out the survey to prove that yes-indeed, they sure are. In other words, the point of the survey is not to learn about customers; it is to cover rear-ends.

Sprint to Risk Billions on New Infrastructure

Source of graphic: online version of the WSJ article cited below.

If Sprint bets on WiFi, they’re betting with their money; if the government bets on WiFi, they’re betting with your money. If Sprint succeeds, thereby benefiting the consumer, at no risk to the consumer, the consumer should not object to their earning huge profits.

Note also, that this is a plausble candidate for a firm trying to follow Clayton Christensen’s advice to try to disrupt itself. (And see the comment at the end, for someone who hasn’t read Christensen, or doesn’t believe what he has read.)

Analysts say building a nationwide WiMax network could cost Sprint between $1 billion and $4 billion, a hefty sum for a company that is already struggling to meet Wall Street’s expectations. Sprint said it expects to invest $1 billion on the project in 2007 and between $1.5 billion and $2 billion in 2008.

Sprint’s decision carries considerable risks: Investors have hammered telecom companies that have made large capital investments in new technologies, banking on future markets to emerge. For example, among other things, Verizon Communications Inc.’s stock has been under fire as the company is rolling out a costly new fiber optic network that it says will position the company to deliver a bundled TV, Internet, and phone service. Also, WiMax technology is still untested on a large scale.

Sprint is making a huge bet that consumer demand for wireless Internet access and services such as cellphone downloads of music and video will continue to grow in the coming years. Consumers already can get access to wireless Internet service at Wi-Fi "hotspots" in airports and coffee shops, and some cities, like Anaheim, Calif., are blanketing their terrain with Wi-Fi connections.

. . .

. . . , some analysts and industry experts question why the company is gearing up for such a major capital investment when it is already even or ahead the other top U.S. carriers, Verizon and Cingular Wireless, when it comes to data services. "Why compete against yourself? It doesn’t make a lot of sense at this point," said Mike Thelander, principal analyst at Signals Research Group who predicted several weeks ago that Sprint would choose WiMax.

For the full story, see:

AMOL SHARMA and DON CLARK. "Sprint Bets on New Wireless ‘WiMax’." Wall Street Journal (Tues., August 8, 2006): B1-B2.

(Note: the above passages are from the online version, which was later, and less tentative about Sprint’s intentions, than the print version.)

(Note: ellipses added.)