China – Page 30 – artdiamondblog.com

Chinese College Graduates Are Underemployed “Ant Tribe” in Big Cities

(p. A1) BEIJING — Liu Yang, a coal miner’s daughter, arrived in the capital this past summer with a freshly printed diploma from Datong University, $140 in her wallet and an air of invincibility.

Her first taste of reality came later the same day, as she lugged her bags through a ramshackle neighborhood, not far from the Olympic Village, where tens of thousands of other young strivers cram four to a room.
Unable to find a bed and unimpressed by the rabbit warren of slapdash buildings, Ms. Liu scowled as the smell of trash wafted up around her. “Beijing isn’t like this in the movies,” she said.
Often the first from their families to finish even high school, ambitious graduates like Ms. Liu are part of an unprecedented wave of young people all around China who were supposed to move the country’s labor-dependent economy toward a white-collar future. In 1998, when Jiang Zemin, then the president, announced plans to bolster higher education, Chinese universities and colleges produced (p. A12) 830,000 graduates a year. Last May, that number was more than six million and rising.
It is a remarkable achievement, yet for a government fixated on stability such figures are also a cause for concern. The economy, despite its robust growth, does not generate enough good professional jobs to absorb the influx of highly educated young adults. And many of them bear the inflated expectations of their parents, who emptied their bank accounts to buy them the good life that a higher education is presumed to guarantee.
“College essentially provided them with nothing,” said Zhang Ming, a political scientist and vocal critic of China’s education system. “For many young graduates, it’s all about survival. If there was ever an economic crisis, they could be a source of instability.”
. . .
Chinese sociologists have come up with a new term for educated young people who move in search of work like Ms. Liu: the ant tribe. It is a reference to their immense numbers — at least 100,000 in Beijing alone — and to the fact that they often settle into crowded neighborhoods, toiling for wages that would give even low-paid factory workers pause.
“Like ants, they gather in colonies, sometimes underground in basements, and work long and hard,” said Zhou Xiaozheng, a sociology professor at Renmin University in Beijing.
. . .
A fellow Datong University graduate, Yuan Lei, threw the first wet blanket over the exuberance of Ms. Liu, Mr. Li and three friends not long after their July arrival in Beijing. Mr. Yuan had arrived several months earlier for an internship but was still jobless.
“If you’re not the son of an official or you don’t come from money, life is going to be bitter,” he told them over bowls of 90-cent noodles, their first meal in the capital.
. . .
In the end, Mr. Li and his friends settled for sales jobs with an instant noodle company. The starting salary, a low $180 a month, turned out to be partly contingent on meeting ambitious sales figures. Wearing purple golf shirts with the words “Lao Yun Pickled Vegetable Beef Noodles,” they worked 12-hour days, returning home after dark to a meal of instant noodles.
. . .
Mr. Li worried aloud whether he would be able to marry his high school sweetheart, who had accompanied him here, if he could not earn enough money to buy a home. Such concerns are rampant among young Chinese men, who have been squeezed by skyrocketing real estate prices and a culture that demands that a groom provide an apartment for his bride. “I’m giving myself two years,” he said, his voice trailing off.
By November, the pressure had taken its toll on two of the others, including the irrepressible Liu Yang. After quitting the noodle company and finding no other job, she gave up and returned home.

For the full story, see:
ANDREW JACOBS. “China’s Army of Graduates Is Struggling.” The New York Times, First Section (Sun., December 12, 2010): A1 & A12.
(Note: ellipses added.)
(Note: the online version of the story is dated December 11, 2010 and has the title “China’s Army of Graduates Struggles for Jobs.”)

Chinese Government Created Real Estate Bubble in a Dozen Ghost Towns Like Kangbashi Area of Ordos

“As China’s roaring economy fuels a wild construction boom around the country, critics cite places like Kangbashi as proof of a speculative real estate bubble they warn will eventually burst.” Source of photo: online version of the NYT article quoted and cited below. Source of caption: online version of the NYT slideshow that accompanied the online article quoted and cited below.

The October 19, 2010 New York Times front page story (quoted below) on the Ordos ghost town in China, was finally picked up by the TV media on May 30 in a nice NBC Today Show report.
It should be clear that the Chinese real estate bubble will burst, just as real estate bubbles eventually burst in places like Japan and the United States. What is not clear is what the effects will be on the Chinese and world economies.

(p. A1) Ordos proper has 1.5 million residents. But the tomorrowland version of Ordos — built from scratch on a huge plot of empty land 15 miles south of the old city — is all but deserted.

Broad boulevards are unimpeded by traffic in the new district, called Kangbashi New Area. Office buildings stand vacant. Pedestrians are in short supply. And weeds are beginning to sprout up in luxury villa developments that are devoid of residents.
. . .
(p. A4) As China’s roaring economy fuels a wild construction boom around the country, critics cite places like Kangbashi as proof of a speculative real estate bubble they warn will eventually pop — sending shock waves through the banking system of a country that for the last two years has been the prime engine of global growth.
. . .
Analysts estimate there could be as many as a dozen other Chinese cities just like Ordos, with sprawling ghost town annexes. In the southern city of Kunming, for example, a nearly 40-square-mile area called Chenggong has raised alarms because of similarly deserted roads, high-rises and government offices. And in Tianjin, in the northeast, the city spent lavishly on a huge district festooned with golf courses, hot springs and thousands of villas that are still empty five years after completion.
. . .
In 2004, with Ordos tax coffers bulging with coal money, city officials drew up a bold expansion plan to create Kangbashi, a 30-minute drive south of the old city center on land adjacent to one of the region’s few reservoirs. . . .
In the ensuing building spree, home buyers could not get enough of Kangbashi and its residential developments with names like Exquisite Silk Village, Kanghe Elysees and Imperial Academic Gardens.
Some buyers were like Zhang Ting, a 26-year-old entrepreneur who is a rare actual resident of Kangbashi, having moved to Ordos this year on an entrepreneurial impulse.
“I bought two places in Kangbashi, one for my own use and one as an investment,” said Mr. Zhang, who paid about $125,000 for his 2,000-square-foot investment apartment. “I bought it because housing prices will definitely go up in such a new town. There is no reason to doubt it. The government has already moved in.”
Asked whether he worried about the lack of other residents, Mr. Zhang shrugged off the question.
“I know people say it’s an empty city, but I don’t find any inconveniences living by myself,” said Mr. Zhang, who borrowed to finance his purchases. . . .

For the full story, see:
DAVID BARBOZA. “A City Born of China’s Boom, Still Unpeopled.” The New York Times (Weds., October 19, 2010): A1 & A4.
(Note: ellipses added.)
(Note: the online version of the commentary is dated October 19, 2010 and has the title “Chinese City Has Many Buildings, but Few People.”)

Source of graph: online version of the NYT article quoted and cited above.

China’s Speculative Real Estate Bubble

Visit msnbc.com for breaking news, world news, and news about the economy

In a front page article on October 20, 2010, the New York Times reported on how the Chinese government encouraged a real estate investment binge that has resulted in a growing number of empty, speculatively built ghost cities. Now the video media has picked up the story in the well-done story linked to above and cited below.

Williams, Ian, reporter. “The Roads Not Taken: Visiting China’s Ghost Cities.” Broadcast on the Today Show, Sunday morning, May 30, 2011.

Monster Mao

Source of book image: http://www.wellesley.edu/Polisci/wj/chinesepolitics/chang-halliday_files/changUS.jpg

(p. 11) After Mao comes to power, Chang and Halliday show him continuing his thuggery. This is more familiar ground, but still there are revelations. Mao used the Korean War as a chance to slaughter former Nationalist soldiers. And Mao says some remarkable things about the peasants he was supposed to be championing. When they were starving in the 1950’s, he instructed: “Educate peasants to eat less, and have more thin gruel. The State should try its hardest . . . to prevent peasants eating too much.” In Moscow, he offered to sacrifice the lives of 300 million Chinese, half the population at the time, and in 1958 he blithely declared of the overworked population: “Working like this, with all these projects, half of China may well have to die.”

At times, Mao seems nuts. He toyed with getting rid of people’s names and replacing them with numbers. And discussing the possible destruction of the earth with nuclear weapons, he mused that “this might be a big thing for the solar system, but it would still be an insignificant matter as far as the universe as a whole is concerned.”
Chang and Halliday recount how the Great Leap Forward led to the worst famine in world history in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, and how in 1966 Mao clawed his way back to supreme power in the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Some of the most fascinating material involves Zhou Enlai, the longtime prime minister, who comes across as a complete toady of Mao, even though Mao tormented him by forcing him to make self-criticisms and by seating him in third-rate seats during meetings. In the mid-1970’s, Zhou was suffering from cancer and yet Mao refused to allow him to get treatment – wanting Zhou to be the one to die first. “Operations are ruled out for now” for Zhou, Mao declared on May 9, 1974. “Absolutely no room for argument.” And so, sure enough, Zhou died in early 1976, and Mao in September that year.
This is an extraordinary portrait of a monster, who the authors say was responsible for more than 70 million deaths.

For the full review, see:
NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF. “The Real Mao.” The New York Times Book Review (Sun., October 23, 2005): 22.
(Note: ellipsis in original.)
(Norte: the online version of the review has the title “‘Mao’: The Real Mao.”)

Book reviewed:
Chang, Jung , and Jon Halliday. Mao: The Unknown Story. New York: Knopf, 2005.

Chinese Encyclopedia Was Burned to Protect Monopolies Granted by Emperor

(p. 262) As with Tudor England, government monopoly of patronage meant control. Virtually all copies of the seventeenth–century Chinese encyclopedia, the T’ien Kung K’ai-wu or Exploitation of the Works of Nature, which included illustrations of everything from hydraulics to metallurgy, were destroyed because, according to Joseph Needham, much of the material touched on industries that had been granted monopoly status by the Qing emperors: “The absence of political competition did not mean that technological progress could not take place, but it did mean that one decision-(p. 263)maker [i.e. the Emperor] could deal it a mortal blow.” It is therefore no surprise that a high percentage of both the inventions and inventors we associate with China from the time of the Han Dynasty to the Qings were government sponsored and employed.

Another liability of a strong central government is that it is, well, strong. Europe’s fragmented system of sovereign states made it possible for innovative minds such as Paracelsus, Leibniz. Rousseau, and Voltaire to “shop” for more congenial places whenever they skated too close to heretical or otherwise challenging notions; in China, one had to travel a thousand miles to a place where the empire’s writ ran not.

Source:
Rosen, William. The Most Powerful Idea in the World: A Story of Steam, Industry, and Invention. New York: Random House, 2010.
(Note: italics and bracketed words in original.)

Suppliers Hold Back Some Supply When They Expect Prices to Rise in the Future

“Farmer Yu Feng tends his stockpile of roughly 7,700 pounds of cotton that he is storing in his home in Huji, China.” Source of caption and photo: online version of the WSJ article quoted and cited below.

In my Micro Principles classes I explain some of the variables that shift demand curves and some of the variables that shift supply curves. Supply curves, for instance, can be shifted by a change in the expectations of future prices. So, if suppliers come to expect that prices will go up in the future, that will shift the supply curve today to the left.
When I saw the photo above, I thought it was a wonderful illustration of the point.

(p. B1) Yu Lianmin, a cotton farmer in Huji, China, harvested 6,600 pounds of cotton this year. Despite record cotton prices, he didn’t sell any of it.
Instead, mounds of cotton are piled up in two empty rooms of Mr. Yu’s home, and the homes of many of the farmers in his small township of Yujia, which is part of the bigger township of Huji in northern Shandong province, 220 miles southeast of Beijing.
. . .
“I think there’s still hope for prices to go higher,” he said.
. . .
Expectations that prices will rise are driving the apparent stockpiling, . . .

For the full story, see:
CAROLYN CUI. “Chinese Take a Cotton to Hoarding.” The Wall Street Journal (Sat., January 29, 2011): B1 & B11.
(Note: ellipses added.)

Stranded Chinese Drivers Curse Government and Buy Noodles from Entrepreneurs

“Enterprising residents of Hetaocun sold food to stranded travelers at a markup.” Source of caption and photo: online version of the NYT article quoted and cited below.

(p. A7) HETAOCUN, China — Compared with some of the more spectacular recent traffic jams in China, among them a 60-mile snarl last summer that paralyzed a major artery outside Beijing for two weeks, the thousands of travelers who spent the night trapped on a snow-coated highway in southwest Guizhou Province on Monday did not even warrant a mention in the local news media.
. . .
Stranded drivers chain-smoked, stomped their feet against the chill and cursed the government for failing to come to their rescue. As the night wore on, fuel lines froze and cellphone batteries died.
The residents of Hetaocun, however, saw the unmoving necklace of taillights from their mountain village and got entrepreneurial. They roused children from their beds, loaded boxes of instant noodles into baskets and began hawking their staples to a captive clientele. The 500 percent markup did not appear to dent sales.
“It rarely snows here, so this is a good thing,” said Yi Zhonggui, 42, as he wove past stalled vehicles with his wife and 4-year-old daughter lugging thermoses of hot water.
As the supply of noodles ran low, residents began gathering up the walnuts that give the village its name. In between cries of “walnuts, walnuts,” salesmen like Chen Xianneng obliged the desperate with snippets of news from the front, even if the information was based on hearsay.

For the full story, see:
ANDREW JACOBS. “Hetaocun Journal; As Traffic Backs Up, Villagers See Opportunity.” The New York Times (Weds., JANUARY 19, 2011): A7.
(Note: ellipsis added.)
(Note: the online version of the article is dated January 18, 2011 and has the title “Hetaocun Journal; In China, Traffic Jam Benefits Enterprising Villagers.”)

The Fragility of China’s Red Capitalism

Source of book image: http://media.wiley.com/product_data/coverImage300/63/04708258/0470825863.jpg

Red Capitalism is scheduled for release on February 15, 2011. I have not read it, but from early reports it would appear to be a credible account that updates and supports concerns about China’s economy expressed by David Smick (The World Is Curved) and others.

The reference is:
Walter, Carl E., and Fraser J. T. Howie. Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundation of China’s Extraordinary Rise. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2011.

The Smick book mentioned, is:
Smick, David M. The World Is Curved: Hidden Dangers to the Global Economy. New York: Portfolio Hardcover, 2008.

Trade Stats Count iPhone as Chinese Export, Despite Only 3.6% of iPhone Costs from China

Source of graph: online version of the WSJ article quoted and cited below.

(p. B1) . . . two academic researchers estimate that Apple Inc.’s iPhone–one of the best-selling U.S. technology products–actually added $1.9 billion to the U.S. trade deficit with China last year.

How is this possible? The researchers say traditional ways of measuring global trade produce the number but fail to reflect the complexities of global commerce where the design, manufacturing and assembly of products often involve several countries.
“A distorted picture” is the result, they say, one that exaggerates trade imbalances between nations.
Trade statistics in both countries consider the iPhone a Chinese export to the U.S., even though it is entirely designed and owned by a U.S. company, and is made largely of parts produced in several Asian and European countries. China’s contribution is the last step–assembling and shipping the phones.
So the entire $178.96 estimated wholesale cost of the shipped phone is credited to China, even though the value of the work performed by the Chinese workers at Hon Hai Precision Industry Co. accounts for just 3.6%, or $6.50, of the total, the researchers calculated in a report published this month.

For the full story, see:
ANDREW BATSON. “Not Really ‘Made in China’; The iPhone’s Complex Supply Chain Highlights Problems With Trade Statistics.” The Wall Street Journal (Thurs., December 16, 2010): B1 & B2.
(Note: ellipsis added.)
(Note: the online version of the article is dated DECEMBER 15, 2010nd that were not in the print version.)

The research report breaking down iPhone costs by country is:

Xing, Yuqing, and Neal Detert. “How the Iphone Widens the United States Trade Deficit with the People’s Republic of China.” ADBI Working Paper Series, no. 257, December 2010.

Chinese Communist Oligarchs Unfriend the World

“The Facebook friendship map, created by Paul Butler.” Source of caption and map: online version of the WSJ article quoted and cited below.

(p. B7) The contrast between Facebook’s spreading global network of users and its effective absence from China is starkly illustrated by a map, produced by a Facebook intern and flagged on the Economist’s website earlier this month, that has lately become a point of fascination of the Chinese Internet.

Described by its creator Paul Butler as “a social graph of 500 million people,” the map represents the worldwide volume of Facebook friendships across geographic locations using lines of varying intensity. Butler’s methodology is interesting in its own right, but what appeared to most interest China’s netizens was how China appears on the map. Or, rather, how it doesn’t.
. . .
Since Facebook is blocked in China, the number Facebook friendship lines flowing in and out of the country is essentially negligible, making China almost impossible to see.”

For the full story, see:
Josh Chin. “Facebook Gets Back Into China (Sort of…).” The Wall Street Journal (Tues., December 21, 2010): B7.
(Note: ellipsis added.)
(Note: the online version of the article has the title “Facebook Gets Back Into China (Sort of…)” and includes paragraphs at the end that were not in the print version.)

Chinese Centralized Autocracy Prevents Sustained Innovation

Zheng He’s voyages of exploration were mentioned in a previous blog entry.

(p. C12) The real problem with contemporary China’s version of the Zheng He story is that it omits the ending. In the century after Zheng’s death in 1433, emperors cut back on shipbuilding and exploration. When private merchants replaced the old tribute trade, the central authorities banned those ships as well. Building a ship with more than two masts became a crime punishable by death. Going to sea in a multimasted ship, even to trade, was also forbidden. Zheng’s logs were hidden or destroyed, lest they encourage future expeditions. To the Confucians who controlled the court, writes Ms. Levathes, “a desire for contact with the outside world meant that China itself needed something from abroad and was therefore not strong and self-sufficient.”

Today’s globalized China has apparently abandoned that insular ideology. But it still clings to the centralized autocracy that could produce Zheng’s voyages in one generation only to destroy the technology and ambition they embodied in the next. It still officially celebrates “harmony” against the unruliness and competition that create sustained innovation. Its past would be more usable if it offered models of diversity and dissent or, at the very least, sanctuary from the all-or-nothing decisions of absolutist rule.

For the full commentary, see:
VIRGINIA POSTREL. “COMMERCE & CULTURE; Recovering China’s Past on Kenya’s Coast.” The Wall Street Journal (Sat., DECEMBER 4, 2010): C12.